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PREFACE
This dissertation examines the factors of unity and 
disunity in the politics of Pan-Arabism during the period 
from 1942 to 1973. Particular attention is paid to the 
nature of Arab aspirations to unity, to the obstacles to 
unity created by the divisions between Arab states and 
political movements, to the impact of external forces 
on Arab politics, and to the fact that no single Arab 
state has been able to establish a position of effective 
leadership in the Arab world
In Chapters I and II I deal with Arabism in history. 
There are three schools of thought which attribute the 
genesis of Arabism to, respectively, the pre-Islamic 
period, the early Islamic period, and the period after 
Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt. Most writers consider 
that just as the Islamic conquests had been the major 
force in the spread of Arabism in the Fertile Crescent 
and North Africa, so Arabism became an ingredient in the 
concept of Ummah (the all-embracing society of Muslims),
The rise of Pan-Turanism brought the Ummah to an end as 
an Islamic political community and led to the emergence 
of Arab nationalism of the several "shuoub" (peoples) of 
the Arab "qawm" (nation).
Different views of the origin of Arabism led to 
political as well as intellectual differences in 
approaches to Arab unity. Traditionalists, whether they 
were writers, leaders of political parties, or heads of 
states, saw the Arabs as a favoured people in Islam and 
advocated the attainment of Arab unity by reviving
commitment to the faith of Islam and conserving the 
traditional Islamic institutions as the sole binding 
force of Arab unity. Reformists advocated the achieve­
ment of Arab unity through the free exercise of the common 
will of the masses; their first step would be to awaken 
the consciousness of the Arab masses and their feeling of 
belonging to one nation. Competition between these two 
approaches has been a recurring feature of Arab politics 
which has contributed to the division of the Arab world 
into conservative and progressive factions.
In Chapter III I deal with the first movement for 
Arab unity, which was recognised politically by Britain 
in 1938 and 1941, The Hashemite Houses of Iraq and 
Transjordan became the main advocates of Arab unity, in 
the sense of annexing one state to another under their 
leadership. Nahas Pasha of Egypt then took over the 
leadership when he convened the Alexandria and Cairo 
conferences in 1944 and 1945. But the rivalries betv/een 
the Arab states, and the tendency to local nationalism in 
Lebanon, defeated the early aspirations of unity; and 
the League of Arab States, although it expressed the Arab 
identity of its members, was mainly important because it 
recognised their independence of each other and provided 
a framework of inter-Arab relations which would sustain 
the division of the Arab world into separate states. 
Various suggestions have been made within the League for 
promoting it into a more "advanced” body which could be 
the instrument of Arab unity, but none has been able to 
overcome the dissensions provoked by factional conflict.
Chapter IV examines first the Intellectual bases of
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socialist revolutionary movements which aspire to end 
the status quo. The variety of these movements has 
stimulated inter-revolutionary conflicts and this has 
inspired proposals on how they might be combined into 
one movement. Baathism and Nasserism are analysed in 
detail as the most prominent revolutionary movements at 
work in the Arab world. Baathism is the ideology of a 
political party looking for power at any cost, even at 
the expense of Arab unity. Its stated objectives are 
unity, socialism and freedom, and it sees itself as the 
party of revolution of the Arab masses. The main centri­
fugal effect of the Baath in the Arab world derives from, 
its combination of doctrines of socialism and unity which 
provokes opposition from oil-rich Arab states. The 
Baath has succeeded in controlling political power in 
Iraq as well as Syria but has failed in unifying even 
these two regimes into one, Nasserism, on the other hand, 
was a military power based in Egypt looking for an ideol­
ogy. It developed pragmatically from the Six Principles 
of Revolution through various Egyptian constitutions and 
the National Charter. Proclaiming freedom, socialism 
and unity, Nasserism had a share in bringing about the 
independence of other Arab states and succeeded in trans­
forming Egyptian society into a socialist one, with a 
single party system. The Wasserist strategy for Arab 
unity developed opportunistically from a programme of 
inter-Arab co-operation through the constitutional unity 
of the United Arab Republic, a scheme for partial unity, 
and finally back to "unified Arab action" i.e., a pro­
gramme of inter-Arab co-operation. Nasserism carried in
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itself the seeds of its failure; the transformation to 
socialism and the policy of challenge, of attempting to 
unite the Arab world by propaganda, confrontation or even 
military intervention, naturally resulted in the Arab cold 
war. It was then Nasser himself who had to look for 
reconciliation with other Arab leaders through summit 
conferences, and eventually the cold war was brought to 
an end by the Six Day War of June 1967. It is a paradox 
that the main centres of Nasserism are now in Libya and 
Lebanon. The chapter ends with a comparison of the two 
movements.
In Chapter V I look at the politics of Arab unity as 
a shifting pattern of three types of relationship: brother­
hood, cousinhood and enmity. This pattern became more 
recognisable after 1952 because of the emergence of 
Nasserism, socialism, revolutionary Republics and military 
coups, and the frequent switches of alignment made a major 
contribution to perpetuating the status quo. Egyptian- 
Saudi relations are treated as an important example of 
the continuously changing pattern of inter-Arab groupings, 
moving from brotherhood, to cousinhood, to enmity and 
vice-versa. External factors and unstable international 
politics had both cohesive and divisive effects on Arab 
unity and the Palestinians pose particularly acute problems.
Chapter VI sets out my conclusions, summarising the 
main arguments and examining the failure of Egypt to lead 
the other Arab states to unity.
CHAPTER X 
Arabism in History
Arabism is a complex subject. The word "Arab" itself 
has had different meanings at different stages of Arab 
history.
During the pre-Islamic period, an Arab was an 
inhabitant of Arabia or someone whose ancestors had once 
been nomads in Arabia.(1) In the remote Arab history of 
the pre-Islamic period in the first Millennium B.C.(2) 
the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula spread out into 
neighbouring regions in search of water and pasture and 
to escape from internal conflicts. The first Arab 
Semitic race was originally located in two areas: the
south-west part of the Peninsula (the Yemen) and an arid 
area with oases in the northern half of the Peninsula,
Najd, Hijaz, Arud and Yamama,(3) From there the first 
advance was made into the Fertile Crescent, where the 
Jewish Arabs lived in a more civilized region.(4)
The early Arabs entertained vague notions about a 
common stock and descent. This feeling of common origin 
underlay the distinctions drawn between Beduin Arabs 
(the inhabitants of the northern half of the Peninsula),
(1) W.M. Watt, Islamic Political Thought: the Basic
Concepts, Edinburgh, 1£6S, p.117
(2) P.M. Holt, The Cambridge History of Islam,
Cambridge, 1970, Vol.l, p.6
(3) Darwish al-Jundi, al Qavmiiyyah al-Arabiyyah pil-Adab
al-Hadith, (Arab NafTolikiism in 
Modern Arab Literature), Cairo, 1962, 
pp.36-43
(4) P.M. Holt, op.cit.; p.5
2
Genuine Arabs (the inhabitants of Yemen), and Naturalized 
Arabs (immigrants or members of tribes regarded for 
historical reasons as immigrant).(5) During the first 
Millennium B.C. there was a feeling of common conscious­
ness and self-awareness, that lacked, however, organiz­
ation and guidance. This common consciousness was 
identified with certain characteristics of the early Beduin 
way of life and culture(6) and was most strongly man­
ifested when challenged by two powers: the Sassanians in
the east and Byzantium in the west. The Battle of Dhu 
Qar is an example of the emerging Arab ability to come 
together to face a common enemy.(7) Assyrian records 
relate that in 854 B.C. Guidibu the Arab, with one 
thousand camel troops from Arabia, joined Ber-idri of 
Damascus against Shal Manassar III in the Battle of 
Qarqar(8) (or Dhu Qar as it is known in Arabic language: 
it is in what is now Iraq). Despite the small number of 
troops involved, the decisive victory of the Arabs is seen 
as the beginning of a new era, since it gave the Arab 
tribes a new confidence and enthusiasm.
The second period of Arab history is the emergence 
of Islam, when the word "Arab" signified those groups
(5) Abdul Aziz al-Duri, al Juzur al-Tarikhiyyah lil-
Qawmiyyah ^ J-Arabiyyah (The Historical 
Roots of Arab Nationalism), Beirut, 
1960, pp,10-14
(6) Ibrahim Jumah, Ideologiyyah al Qawmiyyah al-Arabiyyah
Imbithaquha min al-Dzamir al-Arabi,
(The Ideology of Arab Nationalism in 
Emergence from the Consciousness of 
Arabs) Cairo, 1960, pp,92-97
(7) Abdul Aziz al-Duri, op.cit., p.41
(8) Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind,
New York, 1973, p.12
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Which carried out the great conquests in the first century 
of Islam and then settled outside the Arabian Peninsula 
as an elite of warriors and rulers in the midst of a much 
more numerous subject population.(9) The first gener­
ation of Arab rulers were united politically and theolog­
ically for only a short period. Their political diversity 
began after the death of Umar the second Caliph.(10) 
Theological division began in the time of Ali, the fourth 
Caliph. Henceforth the work of Islamization was carried 
out by both the Arabs and non-Arab Muslims. The criterion 
of Arabization was the acceptance of the Arab language by 
the inhabitants of conquered territories where both Arabs 
and non-Arab musliras lived together, sharing an ideal of 
a unified "Ummah", an idea which conveys a sense of 
political community. The binding force of this community 
was the belief in the message of Muhammad and the "Sfeihadah" 
(the declaration that there is no god but Allah and that 
Muhammad is His apostle); faith was the pact which bound 
muslims together in the Ummah.(11) The idea of ummah was 
accepted by both Arab and non-Arab and in time it super- 
ceded the concept of Arabism. The concept of ummah thus 
permitted non-Arab muslims to play a leading role in Arab 
political life for a thousand years, until the downfall of 
Ottoman Empire in 1918,
(9) P.M. Holt, The Study of Modern Arab History (Lecture
delivered on 2 January 1965y~S0A3, London, 
1965, p.6
(10) M.A. Shaban, Islamic History A.D. 660-750 (A.H.132)
A~~NeyrTnterpretation 
Cambridge, 1971, pp.60-79
(11) Elio Salem, "Nationalism and Islam"
The Muslim World, Michigin, Vol.SS, 
196^, p.278
4The third period, that of the Arab revival, is iden­
tified with the transformation of the ideal of Ummah into 
the concept of "qawm" in which the binding forces are those 
of kinship and language.(12) This process began when 
the Arabs attempted to have an independent Arab caliphate 
in Hijaz and an independent united Arab state in the 
Fertile Crescent.(13) The territorial scope of the 
concept was limited. Thus when at the turn of the 20th 
century the Sharif of Mecca was claiming to act as a 
spokesman for the whole Arab nation, he was content to 
name the Red Sea as the western border of Arab territories. 
This implied that Egyptians, though speaking Arabic, were 
not Arabs (and indeed few of them claimed Arab descent).(14)
In reaction to the idea of an Arab caliphate, the 
religious ideal of ummah was revived by the Sultan Abdul 
Hamid and propagated as a new political ideology for the 
Ottoman Empire, It was aimed on the one hand at con­
taining the idea of an Arab caliphate and on the other hand, 
at strengthening the Empire's stand against the West.(15)
This controversy about the caliphate raised the political 
consciousness of both Arabs and Turks and contributed to 
political decisions within and between both peoples.
Abdul Hamid was deposed by the Young Turks who introduced 
the secular doctrine of pan-Turanism, The Arabs developed
(12) Charles Issawi, "The Bases of Arab Unity", Inter­
national Affairs, January 1955, p.36
(13) Mahmud Samra, "Islam and Arab Nationalism,
Complementary or Competitive", Middle 
East Forum, Vol.XLII, No.2, p.12
(14) W.M. Watt, op.cit., p.117
(15) Mahmud Samra, op.cit., p.14
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a political response, in the concept of al-Qawmiyyah al- 
Arabiyyah (Arab Nationalism) which signified that an Arab 
was "anyone whose historical tradition attached him to 
the civilization which grew up around Arab Islam in the 
Middle Ages", (16) Thus, as Professor Holt ar^çues, the 
sharing of language and a common history came to be 
stronger defining characteristics of Arabism than descent. 
These factors generated the feeling of belonging to one 
nation.
Today membership of the Arab League is sufficient to 
identify a state as "Arab" even when, as in the case of 
Mauretiania and Somalia, historic links with Arab culture 
are tenuous. The formation of the League signifies the 
latest development of the concept of "qawm", which is in 
turn divided into several "shaab" (people), We can 
consider the League as representative of "al-Qawm" (the 
nation) and each member-state as representative of a 
"shaab" (a people).
Arab writers about Arab unity can be divided into 
two schools. For both schools, Arab unity requires the 
establishment of an Arab nation and Arab nationalism is 
the force for achieving such unity. For traditionalists, 
the roots of Arab nationalism are found in Islam. Arab 
reformists, however, vrho began to be important in the 
19th century and were much affected by what they knew of 
Europe, believed that the Arab nation would be realised
(16) P.M. Holt, op.cit., pp.6-'
6through a more general feeling of coimuon nationhood. (17) 
Traditionalists attribute the oneness of the Arab 
nation to the faith which united the Arabs from the days 
of their first acceptance of Islam. One finds the trad­
itional view being expressed even by Arab Muslims with 
modernising ideas. Dr Taha Hussein, who was driven out 
of al-Azhar University because of his liberal thinicing 
about Islam, wrote in 1959; "if we really want to know 
when Arab nationalism emerges, in a proper sense of the 
word, we have to attribute it to the emergence of Islam.
The actual founder of Arab unity in its various aspects 
(political, economic, social and linguistic) was the 
Prophet Muhammad. The first Arab unity v/as attained in 
Medina, from where it grew gradually, sometimes by 
persuasion and sometimes by force".(18)
Those who attribute Arab nationalism to the Islamic 
faith believe that Islam invariably encompasses all aspects 
of life (culture, language and politics). Arab common 
culture is generated from Islamic teaching, with the Quran 
as "a mirror reflecting certain images of the life of the 
Arabs".(19) The Quran is seen as the pinnacle of achieve­
ment in Arab literature; the language, its beauty and
(17) For further information about traditionalists and 
reformists, see Dr Said Nofal, "al-wahdah al- 
Arabiyyah pi majal al-fikr wal-thaqaafah" (Arab 
Unity in sphere of Outlook and Culture) al-Hilal 
(Arabic periodical) Cairo, January 1972, pp.5-Ï5
(18) Taha Husein, "Qawmiyyah al-Arabiyyah fil-midzi wal-
hadzir wal-mustaqbal" (Arab Nationalism 
in the Past Present and Future) al-Hilal, 
Cairo, January 1959.
Vol.67, p.32
(18) Ali Hus ai al-Kliarbutli, Muhammad wal-Qawmiyyah al-
AjFabiyyah’(MÏÏÎiaiüiiaàd and Arab 
Nationalism), Cairo, 1959, 
pp. 67-75
7style an object of admiration and wonder to all Arabs. 
Nevertheless, the traditionalists appreciate also the 
political significance of a conmion language, which at 
least gives the Arabs the possibility of communicating and 
acting as one nation.
Reformists when expounding or explaining Arab 
nationalism emphasise "a comprehensive feeling of the Arab 
nation of belonging to one nation, supplemented by a 
combination of various factors of language, historical 
memories, and national interest".(20) Writers such as 
al-Razzaz, a Baathist, attach much more importance to the 
element of feeling than to religion, culture and language, 
and tend to take a Western secular view of religion as a 
belief system apart from everyday political and economic 
life. They accordingly view religion alone as an 
insufficient factor of nationalism; many Western nations 
believe in a common religion and yet live with separate 
nationalisms while India encompasses a variety of religions 
without this variety prevening her from being one new 
nation. Equally language and historical memories, taken 
alone, are not enough to form a nation. The English 
language is a national language for both the United Kingdom 
and Ireland, but they are separate nations; and the Arabs 
and Turks, in spite of their long shared historical 
memories for more than five centuries, did not merge into 
one nation. Neither religion, nor history, nor language
(20) Munif al-Razzaz, al-Maalim al-jadidah lil-Kayah al-
Arabiyyah (New Features of the Arab 
Life), Beirut, 1960, pp.270-80.
For this book al-Razzaz was awarded 
the first prize in the League of the 
Arab states' publishing competition 
in 1955.
is alone sufficient to generate a single nation. For 
the reformists the Arab nation is fundamentally defined by 
the "feeling of a group of people that they are 'sons' of 
one nation. They could be linked by all these factors 
(religion, language, history), or by some, or by none of 
them".(21) Shared interests come second to shared feelings 
in this theory of nationalism.
Sati' al-Husri, the most influential contemporary 
writer on Arab nationalism, also stressed the importance 
of feeling as a main factor of nationalism.(22) He ex­
pressed it in terms of the "spiritual" relationship that 
the Arabs have and feel toward their ancestors. It is a 
relationship that is born of various social bonds, espec­
ially a common language and history. Husri attached an 
important priority to the Arabic language as a main 
element of Arab nationalism. He said "when we find a man 
who disowns and takes no pride in the fact that he is an 
Arab, even though he is Arabic-speaking and belongs to an 
Arab nation ... we regard him as an Arab whether he likes 
it or not, whether he accepts it or not"...(23)
The reformists' readiness to think in terms of a 
number of factors going to make up the feeling of Arab 
nationalism differentiates them from the traditionalists, 
with their exclusive concentration on religion, and also
(21) ibid., p.176
(22) Sati' al-Husri, Hawla al-Qawmiyyah al-Arabiyyah,
(Concerning Arab Natibnalism)^eirut, 
1961, pp.65-66
See also L.M. Kenny, "Sati' al-Husri's 
Views on Arab Nationalism", The Middle 
East Journal, Vol.17, No.2, 1963, 
pp.231-256
(23) ibid., p.66
links them with the Western style of political science.
Thus Halpern writes ; "they are Arabs by culture and 
language and Muslims by religion";(24) and Issawi treats 
the Arabs as any other national group: "Inhabiting a
definite stretch of territory, bound by ties of kinship, 
speaking a common language, sharing common historical 
memories and practising a common way of life".(25) These 
factors together generate a feeling of belonging to one 
nation.
Another difference between the reformists and the 
traditionalists relates to the divergence between their 
perceptions of the origins of Arab nationalism. The 
traditionalists were interested in the historic origins 
of the idea of Arab nationalism, searching for the moment 
when its existence was first embodied in organized society; 
the reformists, however, were looking for something that 
could serve as an overall Arab ideology during their 
struggle for independence.
The traditionalists assert that when the first Islamic 
state was founded, and during the period of the Arab 
caliphates, the idea of Arab nationalism was implicit in, 
and an ingredient of, the idea of ummah (a unified 
Islamic Society).(26) There was an interaction between 
Arab nationalism and Islam. Islam bound the Arab tribes 
together into one people, taught them a feeling of kinship
(24) Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in
Middle East and North Africa, 
Princeton, 1963^ pp. 197^8
(25) Charles Issawi, op.cit., p.36
(26) Elle Salem, "Nationalism and Islam", The Muslim
WorlcL Vol.52, 1962, p.278
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which transcended mere ties of blood and engendered a 
feeling of brotherhood. The feeling and language of 
Arabism in turn contributed cohesion to the ummah during 
the period of the Arab caliphates. After a century of 
Arab caliphates non-Arab peoples became more important 
elements in the Islamic community. When the policy of 
reformation, to give equal political rights to Arab and 
non-Arab Muslims, was undertaken by the caliphate (under 
Omar Ibn Abdul Aziz), the Arab element no longer had the 
upper hand; and finally non-Arabs took over the ruling 
position in the community, with the downfall of the last 
Abbasid caliph.(27) During the long centuries till the 
turn of the 19th century, the Arabs were but one of the 
peoples of the ummah in which the faith of Islam played 
the unifying role.
The reformists see explicit emergence of Arab nation­
alism as an ideological movement which began in 1798 when 
Bonaparte landed in Egypt;(23) an event which was followed 
by successive Western European military, economic, cultural 
and political influences on the Arab world. The Arab 
consciousness was intensified in 1908 when Sultan Abdul 
Hamid was deposed and the policy of Turkificatioa and Pan- 
Turanism was introduced to the Arab world.(29) The Arab 
response to Pan-Turanism was to revolt against the idea
(27) K.H. Karpat, Political and Social Thought in the
Ùontemporary Middle East 
Praeger, London, 1968*^ | p7"^5B
(28) John Marlow, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism
The Cresset Press, London, 1981, pp/7-9
(29) Peter Mansfield, The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors
Macmillan, London^ TsFTo, pp.27-20"
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and propagate the alternative idea of Arab independence 
and unity. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 
was followed by the introduction of the multiple mandates 
system, fragmenting the Arab world into a variety of 
spheres of influence.(30) It was from this fragmentation 
and from the struggle for independence that the call for 
Arab unity finally emerged.
The reformists see several strands In the Arab revival. 
First there were national liberation movements in Egypt 
and the Fertile Crescent and attempts to co-ordinate the 
efforts of these independence movements. The second 
strand was a cultural revival which had been gaining 
momentum and which now contributed to the sharpening of the 
Arab national consciousness. Third, the idea of political 
nationalism, which had found its way into the Arab world 
from Europe in the past century, came to exert its appeal 
on a wider mass basis after the First World War, reinforced 
by the Allies* proclamation of the principle of national 
self-determination. Finally the advent of modern means 
of communication enhanced contact among the populations of 
the various Arab lands.(31)
During the 1920*s and 1930's the Arab revolt against 
the multiple mandates system resulted in the achievement 
of at least formal independence in Egypt (1922), Transjordan
(30) Tareq Y, Ismael, Governments and. Politics of the
Contemporary Middle EasTI
The Dorsey Press, Ontario, 1970,
pp,33-35
(31) Fayez A, Sayegh, Arab Unity; Hope and Fulfilment,
New Yoï‘k,'"l958j p.4!^
i.2
(1923) and Iraq (1930).(32) While they struggled for 
independence the idea of pan-Arabisiu and the call for unity 
had a certain value; but after the states gained their 
independence, its appeal faded. Furthermore, indepen­
dence was achieved by a territorial settlement for each 
separate state so that in 1945 there were seven indepen­
dent Arab states with carefully guarded frontiers. Between 
1941-1945 attempts to revive the idea of Arab unity 
generated only a league of independent Arab states which 
maintained their sovereign status;(33) and this develop­
ment was balanced by the emergence of further independent 
Arab states, so that membership of the League has nov/ 
increased to twenty.
In the next two chapters, there is a closer examin­
ation of the reformist and traditionalist ideas about 
Arab nationalism which shows how the political forces at 
work within the Arab world were balanced in such a way as 
to ensure (a) that some sort of league was likely to be 
established but (b) that it was unlikely to be a step 
towards the attainment of Arab unity.
(32) Peter Mansfield, op.cit., pp,195-6
(33) ibid., pp.175-180 (Chronological Table)
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CHAPTER II
Traditional and Reformist Theories of Arab Unity
Arabs can take the problem of unity or disunity at 
two levels. They can regard themselves as a nation (qawm) 
in which a majority believe in one religion, speak a common 
language, share common historical memories, inhabit a 
definite stretch of territory and practise a common 
culture. These shared attributes are regarded by the 
traditionalists as in themselves the fundamental elements 
of the Arab nation, but by reformists as factors which 
generate the feelings of belonging to one nation; but 
both schools see the division of the Arabs into separate 
states as being in the nature of a schism. Alternatively, 
Arabs can take as the point of departure the existence 
of separate Arab peoples (shuoub), organised in some 
tv/enty firmly established states which might in the future 
be joined together in one political "qawm". The first 
view suggests that attempts to realise unity should be made 
from below either by peaceful means or by revolutionary 
movements. The second view points to unification from 
above by means of the union of governments. Whatever 
view is taken has strong implications when we attempt to 
answer the questions, "who is to achieve unity?" and "how 
is it to be brought about?".
Traditional Views of Islam and Arab Unity
The unity of the Arabs, like that of other national 
groups, is a matter of a people inhabiting a definite stretch 
of territory, bound by ties of kinship, speaking a common
14
language, sharing common historical memories, and practis­
ing a common way of life which is expressed through 
religion and culture.(1) But in the case of the Arabs, 
religion is of particular importance. Though the Arabic 
word, "din", may be translated as "religion", its 
connotations are quite different from those of the English 
word, since "din" covers nearly the whole conduct of 
life.(2) Islam accordingly played a vital role in 
unifying the Arabs. From the emergence of Islam until the 
end of the Arab Caliphate the Arab world was absorbed in 
the Islamic world as an integral part of the ummah.
Indeed Islam v/as the first unifying factor to emerge from 
within the Arab community, encompassing various aspects of 
Arab life.
The people of the unified ummah lived under the moral 
imperative of Islam which, as a religion, contains pre­
cepts of direct relevance to political and social life.
Thus the Friday congregation encourages communal solid­
arity and the pilgrimage facilitates friendly contact 
between Muslims from different lands. From an early 
period, the ummah included every Muslim, irrespective of 
his race, colour or status. The member of the ummah 
lived by the precepts of Islam and submitted to the 
Shariah. Islam percolated into the darkest corners of 
their lives and gave them light, meaning and hope. Belief 
in the message of Muhammad is the unifying factor of the 
ummah, and the Shahadah (the declaration that there is no god
(1) Charles Issawi, op.cit., p.36
(2) W. Watt, op.cit., p.29
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but Allah and Muhammad is His apostle) is the pact which 
brings the individual Muslim to the ummah, subject to the 
law, and bound by its moral principles. In Islam, the 
ummah, as the community of all Muslims, is comprehensive 
in a social as well as in a religious sense, Islam holds 
out a hope of personal salvation and calls upon the Muslim 
to live in the community as well as to abide by Shariah,
His life within the community of Muslims constitutes his 
best guarantee for an orderly life in the world, and his 
role as a member of the community is as important as his 
personal conduct.(3) Thus the individual becomes through 
religion an integral part of his community. Without it, 
according to the Prophet Muhammad, he has no meaning; the 
Muslim who dissociates himself from the ummah will die, 
not as a Muslim, but as a pagan. The Prophet is reported 
to have asked for the death of him who seeks to create 
discord in the affairs of the ummah. The members of the 
ummah were called upon to be like the stones of a wall, the 
one supporting the other, and they are exhorted to love and 
support each other: "No one is a true believer unless he
wishes for his brother (Muslim) what he wishes for 
himself".(4) The Islamic community constitutes one unit, 
one realm, one world: "this is your ummah, one ummah".(5)
In the early day of Islam the ummah had constituted a 
political unity, established by the Prophet Muhammad in 
three stages of struggle (preaching to the inhabitants of
(3) Elie Salem, op.cit., pp.278-279
(4) Sahih al-Mus’lim, Cairo, 1929-30, Vol.12, p^lô
(5) Quran, Surah al-Ambia', 21/92
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Mecca, forming his followers into one opposition group, and 
finally establishing a unified ummah in Medina).(6) But 
the political conflicts and contradictions which soon 
broke the formal structure of Islam had a minimum effect 
on the Islamic community itself. Although the social, 
moral and legal affairs of the ummah began to diversify, 
the presence of political frontiers was not a great 
obstacle to Muslims. Frontiers marked the limits of the 
rule of this or that dynasty or prince, but they did not 
separate peoples, as the frontiers of the modern nation­
states do. Home was where Islam prevailed. Undoubtedly 
an Egyptian felt more at home in Egypt than in Morocco 
but, when necessary, he could settle anywhere in the land 
of Islam without feeling a serious cultural strain. When 
Mustafa Kamal abolished the Caliphate in 1924, he sought 
to put an end to Islam as the "symbol** of unity, but this 
did not destroy the unity of spirit and sentiment that 
still moulds the Muslims in the ummah.(7)
Though an Islamic comraunity could not have been founded 
without the spiritual ideal, it has since its founding 
developed strong social and cultural bonds. These bonds 
have survived even when the spiritual element has been 
weakened. In the Islamic community the spiritual factor 
is central, but it is not everything. It is even possible 
for a Muslim who is not spiritually inclined and does not 
regularly perform his religious duties, to remain a strong 
adherent of the ummah and a staunch defender of Islam,
(6) M.F. Othman, Dawlatul Fikrah (the State of Ideology)
Dar al-Kuv/itiyyah, Kuv/ait, 1968, pp.33-50
(7) Elle Salem, op.cit., p.280
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especially v/hen it is endangered by outsiders.
Ar ab _JPoslt.ion_ AiL.tjiGLJDmm
As Islam spread far beyond the Arab world, non-Arabs 
were put on an equal footing with Arabs in accordance with 
the Quran;(8) but Arab nationalism was nevertheless 
recognisable. The Arabs thought of Muhammad as an Arab 
hero, not only as the Prophet of Islam. To them Islam 
was an eruption which expressed the truth and the ideal of 
the Arab nation. They were proud of it as a religion, a 
culture and a law. Hasan al-Banna, who was more interested 
in the ummah than in the Arab nation, reiterated the unique 
place of the Arab in Islam: "the Arabs are the first
nation of Islam and Islam’s preferred people".(9)
"Nationalism and Islam", said Abdul Rahman al-Baszaz 
"are in complete agreement; the life of nationalism is 
the Arabic language which is also the language of 
Islam".(10) The preservation of this language is not 
only a national but also a religious duty. The greatest 
annals of Islamic history are the annals of Arab Islamic 
history. Arab literature is essentially Arab-Islamic 
literature. Literary Arabic, a binding force among all the
(8) The Quran, Verse No.13 Surah 49. "O mankind! We
created you from a single (pair) of a male 
and a female, and made you into nations and 
tribes, that you may know each other (not 
that you may despise each other). Verily, 
the most honoured of you in the Sight of 
Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of 
you..."
(9) Hasan al-Banna, Ma’a al-Qawmiyyah al-Arabiyyah,
(With Arab Nationalism), Cairo, 1957, 
p.115. The author was the founder of 
the Muslim Brotherhood Party,
(10) A.R. al-Bazzaz, Fi-Ruh al-Islam, (la the Spirit of
T s l a l n j n ^ g F d 1959, pp. 180-181
18
educated Arab classes, owes its continued existence largely 
to Islam and particularly to the Quran* If Islam weakens, 
literary Arabic may decline and drag with it into oblivion 
the very idea of Arab nationalism. According to the 
Prophet, "Arabism consists of language and religion"; when 
these two universals are discredited, each desert grouping 
(and the Arab world is a series of groupings in small areas 
of the wide desert) will fold into itself and wither into 
an isolated and ineffective community lacking in power, 
culture and ideology.
In modern times Arabs, whether they are Muslims or 
non-Muslims, believe that Islam was entrusted to them, and 
that they were the leaders of Islamic community till the 
downfall of Abbaside caliphate. The Quran, says Hassan 
al-Baquri, "refers to the Arab as the best community that 
has been raised up for mankind as long as they enjoin right 
conduct and forbid indecency".(11) This is, he says,
"the truth witnessed by God; and all the Arabs have to do 
is to work under the impulse of this testimony until they 
become in the eyes of all people the best nation in existence". 
(12) "We Arab nationalists" writes al Shibani, "believe 
that the Muslim world is the natural lung of Arab national­
ism, and we believe that Arab nationalism cannot be dis­
associated from Islam as a religion and as an order. Arab 
nationalism gives the Arab a country while Islam gives him
(11) the Quran, Verse No.110, Surah 3
(12) A.K. al-Baquri, Aurouba wal Din, (Arabism and Religion)
Cairo, 1959, p.63
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a complete world",(13) The association between Islam and 
Arabism is also made through the person of Muhammad who is 
depicted as the founder of Arab unity and as the fountain- 
head of Arab nationalism; "our Arab master (Sauuiduna) 
Muhammad, is the spirit of the Arab world, its foundation 
and its symbol of glory; without him, the Arab world 
would be a body without a soul",(14)
Baath doctrine linked the Arab nation with Islam, but 
it put the argument the other way round. Arabism is 
regarded as the creative force, finding expression in the 
life of an Arab, Muhammad, and in the Arabic language, with 
Islam as its end-product. The Baath doctrine stated that 
"the Arab nation is considered, philosophically speaking, 
not as a social and economic historic formation, but as a 
transcendent fact inspiring different forms, one of its 
highest contributions taking the form of Islam. It was 
not Islam that modelled the people of Arabia, the Fertile 
Crescent and North Africa, equipping them with Islamic 
values, especially the Arabic language and Arabic culture, 
but the Arab nation that created Islam."(15) This 
ideological view is parallel with that of some modern 
political interpretations of Islam. Thus M.A. Shaaban 
writes that "Muhammad did not establish a state nor did he 
unite the Arabs. He took over an existing established
(13) Elie Salem, op,cit., p.284
(14) ibid., p.284
(15) Tabitha Petran, Syria,
Earnest Benn Ltd., London, 1972, p.90
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regime and modified it, Introducing as few changes as 
possible".(16)
Both the traditionalists and modernists agree that 
Arab and Islam are intermingled: the former give Islam
the creative role in building the Islamic community (ummah) 
where the Arab nation occupied a central position; the 
latter give prominence to the Arab nation which enables 
Islam to spread and prevail under the name of ummah*
The modernist Arabs, Muslim and non-Muslim, saw Islam as 
a "revolution that can only be understood by revolutionaries",
(17) meaning that Islam should not be understood as a trad­
itional force. Aflaq said that "those who are closest to 
Islam in sentiment and spirit are the revolutionary 
generation who are presently rebelling against the old and 
the corrupt ... and those who seem to be the staunchest 
defenders of Islam are themselves the most unrevolution­
ary elements".(IS) But even some traditionalists see 
that "the Arabs must purify their beliefs and practices 
and must enter the political struggle and seize control *..
The realisable approach to this end is first of all to 
modernise oneself". Thus Hasan al-Banna did not hesitate 
to approve borrowing from the West. Indeed modernis­
ation to him meant "borrowing all technical and scientific 
aspects of Western civilization that were useful to the 
revival of Islam the two sources of the Quran and the
(16) M.A. Shaaban, op.cit., p.15
(17) Michel Aflaq, "The Socialist Ideology of Baath" in ed
K.H. Karpat, op.cit., pp.193-195
(18) ibid., p.193
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Sunnah of Muhammad contained ail that was needed to build 
the just and prosperous society. In the final analysis 
every innovation and borrowed idea was good or bad 
according to whether it conformed with the word of God and 
the teaching of His Apostle".(19)
Both traditionalists and modernists can see how an 
Islamic revival in the Arab world might aid the cause of 
Arab unity. If a feeling of community exists among 
Muslims, it should exist to a greater extent among Arabs 
since they share, in addition, a common language and habits 
and other particularities of the Arab people. Thus, Arab 
nationalism can emerge within the concept of ummah for 
all its universal connotations. Indeed, the main 
obstacle facing the movement of Arab unity was, and is, 
that of Arab factionalism and regionalism; and those 
divisive forces might be outweighed by the concept of 
ummah, if only the Arabs would commit themselves fully to 
it.
Many Arabs see themselves as members of a tribe.
Tribal allegiance antedates Islam; indeed, the concept of 
solidarity in the Islamic community is largely modelled 
on the spirit of solidarity that characterised the Arab 
tribes. Although Arabs think of themselves as citizens 
of a regional political entity (such as Iraq, Syria,
Egypt or Jordan) it can be argued that the concept of 
a national state in the fullest sense of the term, apart 
of Arabism and Islam, has not yet made a significant
(19) Hisham Sharabi, "Transformation of ideology in the
Middle East", The Middle East Journal, 
Washington, D.C. Vol.1.9, Mo.4,
1965, pp. 481-482
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impression on them. Muslim Arabs conceive of themselves 
primarily as Muslims, as members of the ummah in which 
they find their social and spiritual security. The 
Islamic conception occupies a prominent position in 
their political perspective and Islam is accordingly 
cosidered by the Arab nationalists as a fitting and 
healthy milieu for growth. They can hope that Arab 
national unity might be attained peacefully through the 
attainment of Islamic unity, through the implementation 
of the spirit of Islam. In working for this goal, Arab 
nationalism had to make a close alliance with Islam, in 
the hope of winning and mobilising the support of the 
Arab Muslim masses.
In recent history, attempts at reviving the vigour 
of Islam have occurred in the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt 
and the Sudan, and more recently in Libya, In the 
Arabian Peninsula, the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia adopted the doctrine of Wahabism (puritanism) as 
his political philosophy. Ibn Baud, ruler of the central 
Najd region, started his conquests of the eastern and 
western regions of the Peninsula not only to liberate 
them from Turkish control, but also to purify the faith 
of the inhabitants from various alien innovations and 
additions (by the time he completed his campaign he was 
fighting against the Hashemite whom he regarded as being 
no better than the Turk in matters of the faith). He 
enforced the teaching of Wahabism on his people through 
education and law. His most effective successor, King 
Faisal, kept to this mingling of political and religious 
objectives; "We, as responsible officials and governments,
must prepare our people for unity, raise their morale and 
make unity acceptable to them."(20) Arab unity was to . 
start from within every unit of the Islamic community, 
and it was the responsibility of individual Arab states 
to guide their people to such an objective. "Islam", 
said King Faisal, "is the best ideological content for 
our desired unity. In the past many nations fought 
under Arab leadership because of Islam, and won great 
victories ... Islamic unity is the best kind of unity, 
it would not be too much if we shed our blood and gave 
up our lives for that unity".(21)
In 1965, Saudi Arabia initiated the idea of the 
Islamic Summit Conference and then the establishment of 
an Islamic Secretariat, with the objective of reviving 
the idea of Pan-Islamism whiciihad been propagated by 
Jaraaluddin al-Afghani, and Miiharamad Abduh in the 19th 
century. The idea politically was, perhaps, aimed at 
polarising Arab and Muslim states into the Saudi Arabian 
orbit against secular pan-Arabisra and communism. The 
Islamic Secretariat parallels the Arab League and its 
role is meant to be competitive with, rather than 
complementary to, the League, appealing to faith and 
loyalty rather than race alone.
Egypt and the Sudan had witnessed the movement of 
Islamic revivalism in the form of political parties.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and al-Mahdiyyah in
(20) Walid Khalidi, Arab Political Documents, Slim
Press, Beirut, 1965, p.320
(21) ibid., p.320
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Sudan, both tried to reestablish the power of Islamic 
traditionalists in their respective countries, though 
without a strong practical commitment to the unity of 
the Arab nation as a whole. Both were swept away by 
rival revolutionary movements, the Brotherhood being 
supressed by Nasser and the government of al-Mahdiyyah 
being overthrown by Numeiri's coup.
The Libyan Revolution of September 1969, has at­
tempted to follow an Islamic approach to Arab unity, 
known as Qaddafyism after the Chairman of the Libyan 
Revolutionary Council. Qaddafi probably sees his 
policy as an attempt to reconcile the pan-Islamic idea 
of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia with the pan-Arabism of 
President Nasser, to whom Qaddafi owes a lot of his 
political orientation.
The Arab world is fronted by a gx’oat variety of 
(mainly indigenous) ideologies ranging from Wahabism 
(puritanism) to Arabism, Islamic Socialism and Communism. 
Attempts to unite the Arab world under any one of these 
ideologies causes only disunity and endless dispute, 
and even the idea of unity becomes a paralysing myth 
in several Arab states.(22) To circumvent these 
ideological conflicts, some Arab writers have turned 
their attention to the kind of political and social 
processes that would be needed to bring about the 
peaceful unification of the Arab people.
(22) See "Ideological Problems", in Political Dynamic in 
the Middle East, ed. by P.Y. Hammond, New York, 
1972, pp.31-36.
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Reformist Approaches to Arab Unity
Saadoun Hamadl (the present Foreign Minister of Iraq) 
suggested in 1968 that in order to achieve Arab unity there 
first had to be a free common will of the Arab people.
The realization of such a common will required the prior 
establishment of a democratic system, so that the people 
could have the freedom of choice and self-expression to 
vote for unification from below.(23)
"Democratic System" has a special connotation in the 
Arab world and is used by Arab socialist writers to mean 
"a popular democratic system". "Popular" also has a 
special connotation: it means that the system should be
based on the decision of the majority of "allied masses" 
working through a single party within the framework of 
Arab socialism. In Raszaz’s theory, which is typical 
of Arab socialist thought, the "allied masses" are the 
five groups which make up society; peasants, workers, 
intelligentsia, armed forces and "national capitalists"(24) 
The suggestion is that this political framework would give 
public opinion a decisive role in the political decision, 
so that the use of force and negotiation from positions 
of strength could be avoided.
In considering whether the popular decision on unity 
should be unanimous or by majority, Eamadi argued that the 
decision should not be taken through public opinion as it 
was before the process of political education had been
(23) Saadoun Eamadi, "Nadwah; Hawla al-Y/ahdah Wannaksah"
(Seminar; Concerning Unity and Defeat) 
Dirasat Arabiyyah, Vol.9, No.7, 1968, 
pT76
(24) Munif al-Razzaz, op.cit., p.174
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soundly implemented. At the present time, the decision 
for unity would not, for a variety of reasons, necessarily 
be a genuine people’s decision. Arab governments, with 
little educated public opinion to guide them, had to 
approach questions regarding unity partly in the light 
of doctrines of historical legitimacy, but mainly with 
regard to prevailing international conditions which, it 
was thought , made regional blocs an attractive solution 
to a number of problems even though they tended to get 
in the way of pan-Arab unification.(25) But elites had 
become accustomed to thinking of unity as a fundamental 
political value, of which the validity was not affected 
by any wavering of public opinion. In the eyes of Arab 
socialist proponents of unity, public opinion would be 
neither educated nor free until it was in favour of Arab 
unity. When it came down to the practical question, who 
was actually to decide on unity or disunity, Arab 
socialist theories gave various answers, but they all came 
to the same thing; "the leaders have to decide on behalf 
of their people with understanding of their real will and 
interests".(26) To talk about public opinion in the 
Arab world thus means in reality to talk about the opinions 
of elites, of the few thousand who are capable of express­
ing themselves and able to exert their influence on others.
This point gives a new dimension to the meaning of 
the "democratic system" desired by Arab v/riters. They 
want a popular guided democracy of the one party type,
(25) Saadoun Hamadi, op.cit., p.68
(26) ibid., p.82
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akin to Totalitarianism.(27) They think of raw public 
opinion as being liable to be swayed by loyalty to exist­
ing states, by separate Arab nationalisms, and so as 
capable of strengthening the tendency to Arab disunity 
which is rooted in the desire for diversity. Hamadi 
described public opinion "as a raw material which could 
be affected by different cultural bodies, political 
tendencies and mass media";(28) and which accordingly is 
liable to move against the true interests of the people.
A number of writers have considered how public 
opinion might be moulded into the correct shape, how it 
might be guided to be a centrifugal force to intensify 
its creative features. Abdullah al-Rimawi (the former 
Jordanian foreign minister of Nabulsi’s Cabinet of 1957 
and also a leading Baath member in Jordan) suggested that,
"the first step toward unity is to start with the 
consciousness of the Arab people. What is necessary at 
the present time is to raise rapidly and with considerable 
force the consciousness of the Arab public and their feel­
ing of belonging to one nation".(29) Mass media have a 
vital role to play in this process of eruption. The 
consciousness of the people at large is both a focal 
point and the solid ground to start from. By
(27) Blondel (ed), Comparative Government, "General
Characteristics of Totalitarian 
Dictatorship", Macmillan, 1969, p.168
(28) Saadoun Hamadi, "al-Wahdah v/al-Thawrah wal-Awamil al-
Zatiyyah" (Unity, Revolution and 
Egoism) Dirasat Arabiyyah, Beirut, 
Vol.4, February , 1968, p. 70
(29) Abduallah al-Rimawi, al-Harakah al-Arabiyyah al-
Wahidah (One Arab Movement) 
Beirut, 1964, p.256
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"consciousness" is meant, "awareness of the objective and 
internal situations, which should be stimulated in the 
process of maturation and the achievement of unity".(30)
It is necessary also to create a mutual compatibility 
between the main values relevant to political behaviour 
and political will, and to identify these with a dis­
tinctive way of life, such as the Islamic way which by the 
doctrine of "Ummah" unified Arab and non-Arab under the 
banner of Islam irrespective of race, status and differ­
ences of language and culture. It is relevant to mention 
that more importance is attached to the value of justice 
as propagated in Islam than to the value of freedom as 
propagated in Western democratic systems.
Arab nationalist writers also attach great importance 
to the value of sincerity. "It is lack of sincerity 
which has kept them (the Arabs) from extending their 
political loyalty to their nation (qaum); reasons of 
personal interest and lack of sincerity on the part of their 
leaders has stagnated the cause of unity".(31) Arabs can 
take the European Community as an example of sincerity to 
a cause; despite their ambivalence about unification and 
their dissimilarity in many respects, the members of the 
EEC are able to gear their efforts towards the satisfaction
(30) Nadim al-Bitar, "al-Tariq ila Tariq al-Wahdah al-
Arabiyyah" (The Means to the Approach 
of Arab Unity), Dirasat Arabiyyah, 
Beirut, Vol.9 No.9, July 1955, p.12
(31) Jamil Abdul Ghafar, "al-Wahdah al-Arabiyyah
Wattammazoq al-Qua al- 
Taqaddomiyyah" (Arab Unity and 
the Divided Progressive Forces) 
Dirasat Arabiyyah, Beirut,
Vol. 6, No.lî, November 1969, 
pp.9-10
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of shared interests within the framework of the community. 
Sincerity does not emerge out of the blue, especially in 
the economic field. With respect to the unification 
of states, it requires understanding of the mutual 
interests of the participants together with an "expectation 
of stronger and rewarding economic ties or joint reward as 
an essential background condition of unity".(32) In the 
case of the Arab world, sincerity for the cause of unity 
has to be reconciled with the differing economic interests 
of the Arab states, or at least of their ruling classes.
The first steps would be to propagate the spirit of unity 
throughout the Arab world, so that individuals could be 
capable of recognising any divergence from the cause.
It was important "to hold public discussion through media 
of mass communication to clarify the nation's objective 
and adopt a workable framework for the purpose",(33)
Thus clarity, mutual understanding and shared interests 
were necessarily important elements of unity.
Given sincerity to the cause of Arab unity, the 
possibility of its success was thought to be assured.
Unity required primarily the extension of loyalty to the 
proposed new governmental entity, which would represent 
the interests of the masses at large. Equally important, 
successful unification would require agreement regarding
(32) Michael Hodges, European Integration, Penguin Books,
Harmondswofth,‘ 1972, p.112
(33) Saadoun Hamadi, "Nadwah hawla al-Wahdah Wannaksah"
(seminar; Concerning Unity and 
Defeat), Dirasat Arabiyyah,
Vol.9, No.9, 1968, p.66
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organizational structure.(34)
Arab writers have seen Arab unity in the broad sense 
as a unity of people who have a common political will, 
produced by mutual insight and culture. This shared 
political will must play a vital role in the process of 
unification. With the existence of political will, the 
people will be able in a democratic system to determine 
the steps necessary for the fulfilment of unity. This 
political will can be partially or wholly achieved only 
by those members of the state who can determine for 
themselves, from one case to the next, what is to be done 
and what is to be left undone, so that the purpose of 
unity will be fulfilled. "These groups of people might 
look for unity or unite their forces for the establish­
ment of a unified state for all the Arab citizens, to 
assure their individual and collective interest, and to 
protect their security and prosperity".(35)
One may ask whether people who have free will are 
willing by themselves to determine their interest; in 
other words, whether they are willing to use their free 
will politically in determining their desired end. The 
conclusion is that not very many people with a free will
(34) c.f. Deutsch’s three criteria for a successful 
- "amalgamated security community"
in M. Hodges op.cit., p.113
1. Accept and support common governmental institutions
2. Extend generalised political loyalty to them and to 
the preservation of amalgamated community
3. Operate these common institutions with adequate 
mutual attention and responsiveness to the messages 
and needs of all participating.
(35) Dr Said Nofal, "Al-Vfahdah al-Arabiyyah fil-Majal
al-Fikr wal-Thaqafah" (Arab Unity in 
the sphere of Outlook and Culture) 
al-Hilal, Cairo, February 1972, 
p p \ 5 -15'
31
have a political will to achieve unity, but that such a 
desire can be developed, especially in a people who want 
to share and participate in their homeland, language, 
political institutions, or whatever else unites them.
But political will is not necessarily achieved only 
through shared culture and outlook, or the voluntary 
response of the masses to the call of their leaders.
It can be imposed upon them through persuasion, deception, 
law, naked force, economic pressure or police action, 
especially under what is called "a guided democratic 
regime".
Thus we come to the conclusion that "common will" is 
not necessarily the result of free political interaction.
This brings us back to the question of v/ho is to make the 
choice of unity or disunity. Is it the choice of the 
people or the leaders? Is it the choice of the ideol­
ogical organizations who succeed in convincing, persuad­
ing or forcing the people to accept unity or disunity?
What happens when there are two or more competing wills 
for unity? The answers to these questions depend on the 
role in policy-making of the common will of the masses and 
on how far they are to participate in policy-making. This 
leads us to look at the kinds of regime under which the 
people live, whether it is parliamentary democracy or 
guided democracy. When there are two or more competing 
political organizations and ideologies aiming at unity there 
is - in the case of the Arab world - definitely disunity,(36)
(36) K.W. Deutsch, Nation-Building, Atherton Press,
New York, 1966, pp.44-45
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Competition between "conservatives" and "progressives" 
for the leading role in the Arab nation has been a 
recurring feature of Arab political life. Both movements 
have strengths and weaknesses from the point of view of 
Arab nationalists. The conservatives attempt to preserve 
a national spiritual and cultural structure, ideals, values 
and sense of nationhood which is deeply rooted in the 
feeling of the people. The weakness of the conservative 
movement is that it could lead to cultural and ideological 
stagnation, unable to cope with demands for economic 
progress. The progressive movement is characterised by 
earnest desire for change, for betterment and improvement. 
There is, however, a danger inherent in it, in that, when 
it emerges suddenly and forcefully it can be a destructive 
force which hinders the process of unification, instead 
of enhancing it.(37) What is needed is to get both 
movements working in parallel so as to meet the necessity 
for change without losing the original identity of the 
nation. Islam is an important source of Arab national 
culture which can be a basis for such a combination of 
conservatism and economic progressivism - but it is not 
strong enough today to compete with the modern ideologies.
The formation of the Arab League provided an example 
of an attempt to promote political unity through cultural 
alignment. The League treaty represented the most that 
could be got out of the four schemes for unity submitted 
to the 1942 Alexandria Conference which preceded the 1945 
Cairo Conference. The degree of unity at the Conferences
(37) Dr Said Nofal, op.cit., pp.5-15
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was slight because the common will was weakened by the 
strength of the conflict between the centrifugal forces 
(conservative) and centripital forces (progressive) of 
the seven independent Arab states. The absence of an 
organized political party in some Arab states and the 
weakness of such political parties as existed in the others, 
were the features of Arab political life which were most 
relevant to the weak political will of the Arabs for unity.
The outcome was a weale organization for co-operation 
between governments. To overcome these weaknesses within 
the framework of the League, the Arab states agreed to 
form a "Permanent Cultural Committee" (the first committee 
set up by the League) in 1945. Its function was to 
produce uniform guidelines for a common culture, to promote 
Arab self-awareness, to bring together Arab outlooks and 
ideas and thus to raise up in the long run the Arabs' 
feeling of belonging to one nation.
This attempt at cultural unification by way of 
cultural uniformity was unable to meet the needs of the 
period. The policy failed, first because it had been laid 
down by what was essentially a powerless body, secondly 
because the implementation of the policy was left to the 
member states, and thirdly because there was no link between 
the League and the Arab people at large. It represented 
the Arab elites rather than the Arab people. The failure 
of the policy may be seen in its repeated subsequent 
promulgation. In 1957, after seventeen years of the League, 
a partial agreement was concluded between three members 
(Syria, Egypt and Jordan) aimed at "educating Arab citizens 
to work for the sake of one Arab nation and to respect
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their responsibility and obligation toward a combined Arab 
struggle".(38) The Arab states returned again to the 
matter of cultural unity after the defeat of 1967 when 
the Arab Educational Cultural and Scientific Organization 
was founded. The Charter of the Organization claimed 
that "the Organization is founded in response to the 
feeling of natural unity between the people of the Arab 
nation, and to the belief that unity of outlook and culture 
are the first foundation of Arab unity".(39) But these 
later mechanisms also failed, not least because of the 
resistance exerted by conservative regimes to moves for 
cultural unity which could be (and were) used by certain 
Arab states, mainly Egypt, as a platform for the trans­
mission and infiltration of revolutionary ideas.
(38) ibid., p, \5
(39) ibid., p.15
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CHAPTER III 
The League of Arab States
The politics of Arab unity involved an interaction 
between various elements; competing groups with aspir­
ations to bring about the total or partial unity of the 
Arab nation; rival Arab governments; and Great Powers 
who both influenced Arab aspirations and used them in the 
course of their own international struggle. Each part­
icipant had its own motives and intentions; on© concrete 
result of their interaction was the formation of the 
League of Arab States.
The Arab nationalists aspired to form some kind of 
union, and believed they were entitled to do so, being 
bound by common language and a community of interests which 
arose from geography, history and culture. The movement 
towards that ideal cam© to be known as Pan-Arabism. This 
movement came first as a rejection of the policy of 
Turkification imposed on the Ottoman Empire by the Young 
Turks. To this was added Great Britain’s promise, made 
to promote her influence in the Arab world, of Arab 
independence and unity, as had been demanded by Sherif 
Husein of Mecca. This pledge was violated by the Sykes- 
Picot agreement of 16 May 1916, which partitioned the 
Arab world into zones of British and French influence, 
leaving only the Arabian Peninsula fully independent.(1)
(1) Majid Khadduri, "The Arab League", The American
Journal of International Law, 
Vol.40, October 1946, pp.756-757
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These contradictory promises contributed to division 
in the Arab nationalists* attitudes, especially during 
the Second World War. The extreme nationalists were 
opposed to supporting Britain and France, the two Super 
Powers in the Arab world, since they were disillusioned by 
the way these powers had implemented their promises.
Impresses by the successes of the Axis Powers, and counting
/on their ultimate victory, they thought the salvation of
/
I the Arabs lay in taking sides with Germany. This 
attitude was clearly demonstrated by Rashid Ali Gylani’s 
revolt in Iraq in 1941, The moderate nationalists were 
opposed to Axis ideology and foresaw grave dangers to 
the Arabs from Axis penetration in the Middle East.
Their attitude was to side with the Allies against Axis 
power and they were seemingly confident of British and 
French sympathy towards their aspirations.
An explicit acknowledgement of Arab aspirations came 
on 9 November 1938, when Britain invited the independent 
Arab states to participate in the projected London Confer­
ence on Palestine, thereby recognising de facto their 
interest in a matter of concern to all Arab peoples. Two 
of the British objectives in the wider context of the 
European crisis and the need to find some solution to the 
Palestine problem, were to cool the rivalry betv/een the 
Hashemite and Saudi Houses and to draw them into a more 
stable political relationship with Britain. On 29 May 1941, 
Britain renewed her conditional recognition of the Arabs * 
aspirations towards unity, when the Foreign Secretary,
Anthony Eden, said at the Mansion House that "His Majesty’s 
Government for their part will give full support to any
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(Arab unity) scheme that comsuands general approval . *. 
such a scheme would not come into conflict with Great 
Britain’s main interests in the Near East".(2) Because 
of this recognition, some Arabs attributed the idea of 
an Arab League to Britain and consequently considered 
it a British creation,(3) The recognition had, however, 
been qualified by the phrase "general approval" (which
/implied a degree of unanimity which was unlikely to be
/
attained); and by the stipulation, expressed as a predic­
tion, that the scheme should not come into conflict with 
Great Britain's main interests in the Arab world. This 
implied that there would have to be a strengthening of 
pro-Western Arab leaders and the exclusion, at least in 
part, of the aspirations of the extremist Arab nationalists 
who supported Axis power, and particularly of such el­
ements as those led by Gylani who were in revolt against 
the British in Iraq. (By coincidence Gylani's revolt 
was finally suppressed on the same day as Eden spoke.)
The Hashemite leaders took the statement to mean 
that henceforth the British would drop their policy of 
"divide and rule" and that it would be safe for them to 
suggest ways of uniting the Arabs.(4)
Both Hashemite Kingdoms were in favour of the limited 
degree of Arab unity represented by the Fertile Crescent.
(2) M. Khadduri, "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity: a
study in inter-Arad relations" in The 
Near East and Great Britain, ed. by R.N. 
Frye, New York, 1951, pp.137-77
(3) E. Atiyyah, "The Arab League", World Affairs3. Vol.l,
January 1947, pp.34-47"
(4) S.N. Fisher, "The Arab League", in nshe Middle East,
Routledge & Kegau Paul, 1959, pp.571-72
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In 1942 Nuri al~Said, the Prime Minister of Iraq who had 
been restored to power after the suppression of Gylani's 
revolt, circulated his "Blue Book" which suggested the 
"reuniting" of "Greater Syria". Ee sent a note on 
"Arab Independence and Unity" to Mr R.G. Casey, Great 
Britain’s Minister of State in Cairo, in which he 
recommended the unification of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine 
/and Jordan in a "Greater Syria" which in a subsequent 
union with Iraq would form a single Arab state in the
I
"Fertile Crescent" as a first step in the formation of an 
Arab League.(5)
We can see from this scheme, first, that Nuri a1-8aid 
saw Arab unity as a gradual and slow development in three 
stages; (a) to unify a Greater Syria; (b) to unify the 
Fertile Crescent; (c) to form the League of Independent 
Arab States. Secondly, he wished to leave the degree of 
change within the units participating in the scheme for 
decision by the popular will. This decision would deter­
mine whether a federal or unitary constitution should be 
adopted, and whether a republican or monarchical structure 
should be established. He insisted in his explanatory 
note that the union of various parts of historic Syria 
should come first and suggested that in this instance the 
degree of unity should be on the level of federation.(6)
The degree of unity of the proposed League of Independent 
Arab States should, however, be on the level of 
"confederation". He put forward a number of possible
(5) M. Khadduri, "The Arab League", Loc.cit., p.762,not© 1
(6) Nuri al-Said, Arab Independence and Unity, Baghdad,
1943, pp.ïl-12 
See also J.C. Eerewitz, "General Nuri al-8aid Fertile 
Crescent Scheme December 1942" in Diplomacy in the Near 
and Middle East, London, 1956, pp.2o6-237"
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forms of unification in order to demonstrate Iraq’s 
willingness to be flexible, in the hope that this would 
enable other Arab states to adhere to his proposal. In 
the same spirit it was proposed that the federation of 
Greater Syria should have a permanent council nominated 
by the member states and presided over by one of the 
rulers of the states who would be chosen in a manner 
acceptable to the states concerned,(7)
What is evident here is that General Nuri al-Said 
was aiming at forming a bloc in the Fertile Crescent, under 
the name of "federal government",(8) which would strengthen 
the position of the Hashemite Kingdoms in the Arab world.
His suggestion of a League of Arab States as a looser 
structure was, perhaps, a tactical offer to both Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt, intended to dampen their opposition to 
the scheme. Furthermore, for reasons of delicacy, he 
suggested that the choice of governmental system, 
monarchical or republican, should be left to the popular 
will to decide. General Nuri applied the formula "lot’s 
do nothing about this" hoping that the Syrians might come 
to unite under a monarchical system as was promised in 
1920.
Nuri’s scheme nevertheless antagonised the Saudis, 
the traditional Hashemite foe in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Hashemite ambitions in the Fertile Crescent also ran counter 
to Syrian aspirations, since Free France had promised in 
1941 to grant independence both to Syria and Lebanon.
(7) Ibid.
(8) R.L. Watts, New Federations: Experiments in the
Commonwealth, Oxford, Ciaredon Press, 
T5m7rPPT5%T4
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The scheme was, however, consistent with British imperial 
Interests in the area. To put Syria under the influence 
of her Hashemite ally would do no harm to British interests 
there, although consideration had to be given to Jewish 
aspirations of a National Horae in Palestine, which might 
be hindered by a scheme of Arab unity,(9)
Success or failure of the scheme was mainly dependent 
I on the attitudes of Britain, France, Egypt and Saudi 
j Arabia. Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia feared the creation 
! of Greater Syria under the Hashemite auspices. Britain 
and France viewed Nuri’s plan as a wartime means of 
mobilising the moderate Arab nationalists against both 
Arab extremists and the Axis Powers. Nuri played on 
such hopes when he suggested that "if it is possible in 
the manner suggested above to create a confederation of Arab 
states ... then a great many of the "difficulties"(10) 
which have faced Great Britain and France in the Middle 
East during the past decades will disappear".(11) He 
probably aimed at combining Arab aspirations with those 
of the Great Powers. In January 1943, Iraq declared war 
against the Axis because Nuri, as Mr Khadduri said,
"firmly believed that Arab nationalism was in need of
(9) Peter Mansfield, The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors,
Macmillan, London 1973, pp.92-95
(10) He probably meant by this, the conflict between the 
- two aspirations of Arab nationalism and Zionism on
one side and between them on one side and British 
presence in the Middle East on the other,
(11) A, Tarabein, Arab Unity in the History of the
Contemporary Arab East, 1800-1950,
Beirut, 1958, p.427
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British sympathy and support",(12) which the British 
indeed had readily given since World War I. But the 
Allies' victory changed the international situation;
Britain and France were no longer in need of the strength 
of Arab unity,
Kuri's first scheme was almost bound to fail; in 
addition to international circumstances there v/as internal 
factionalism in the Arab world. The success of the 
scheme was neither in the interests of Saudi Arabia, 
because of the traditional enmity, nor in the interests 
of Egypt, because of her rivalry with Iraq.(13) Whatever 
its defects as a plan for unity, the main point in putting 
forward the scheme was, in fact, the advancement of 
Hashemite ambitions in Syria, and it was a worthwhile 
attempt within this context.
The role of external elites as a unifying factor in 
inter-Arab relations seemed to have come to an end; "the 
initiative for an Arab League" said Mr Eden on 24 February 
1943, "would have to come from the Arabs themselves".(14)
On March 2 and 17, 1943, Amir Abdullah declared that the 
Arabs should immediately seize the opportunity and call for 
a general Arab conference to decide upon the ways and 
means of carrying out the scheme of Arab unity. On 
30 May 1943, Nahas Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt, declared 
in a statement to the Egyptian Senate, that the Egyptian
(12) M. Khadduri, "General Nuri's Flirtration with the Axis
Powers", The Middle East Journal,
Vol.16, No,3, 1962, p.328
(13) B.Y. Boutros Ghali, "The Arab League. Ten Years of
Struggle", International 
Conciliation, Vol.504-505, 
iîo. 498,"”1955-56, pp. 253-268
(14) S.P. Fisher, op.cit., p.571
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Government had decided to explore the opinions of the 
various Arab Governments independently and then would 
invito them to a conference to be held in Egypt in order 
to reach an agreement on the form of the proposed Arab 
Union.
General Nuri went to Egypt and conferred with 
Nahas Pasha from July 31 to August 5, 1943; the full 
conference of Arab states met in Alexandria in September 
1944, their efforts resulted in a kind of Arab co-operation 
which fell short of what the Pan-Arabists aspired to.
Egypt's entrance into the arena of Arab politics was 
stimulated by several factors one of which was "the 
growth of Egyptian mass communications which gradually 
led to a cultural and political awakening, in which Egypt 
found herself playing a leading role".(15) During the 
forties, the idea of Pan-Arabism including all the Arabic­
speaking people was propagated in Egypt, Fuad Abazah, 
a prominent Egyptian, organised "The Arab Union" (al- 
Ittihad al-Arabi) on 25 May 1942.(16) Sati' al-Husri 
claimed that Arab intellectuals considered Egypt to be 
"the heart of the Arab countries" occupying a position in 
the Arab world comparable to that of Cairo in Egypt 
Itself. He also took the view that "Egypt is bound to 
the Arab nation by language, history, geography, common 
interests and aspirations which are living and all 
tangible and transcend the Pharaonic ideas which belong
(15) Anwar G, Chejne, "Egyptian Attitudes Toward Pan-
Arabism", The Middle East Journal, 
Vol.11, No.fT 1857, pp.253-68
(16) ibid., p.256
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to the dead past".(17) At a more moderate political 
level, the acute rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the 
Hashemite Kingdoms made each House prefer Egyptian 
leadership to advancing the ambitions of the other.
Thus Egypt was able to play a balancing role, standing 
half way between Pan-Arabism and regional factionalism 
(shaabism).
During the conference on Arab unity. General Nuri al- 
Said once again seized the opportunity to advance his 
ambitions, and proposed two possible forms of co-operation 
between the Arab states in the fields of political, 
economic and social affairs. From the beginning, he 
ruled out the possibility of unifying the Arabs under a 
unitary central government, being aware, perhaps, that 
Britain and France were not in favour of Arab unity in 
its literal sen^e and also of the internal situation in 
each Arab state. Each faced its own particular problems 
and had its own variations in economic and political 
structure, so that together they provided improbable 
material for so ambitious a project.(18)
Nuri put forward alternative schemes for the consider­
ation of the conference. One was that the Arab states 
should form a union equipped with "an executive authority" 
whose decisions would be binding on every member-state.
The union would have a "general assembly" in which each 
state would be represented on the basis of its size of 
population and GNP. The union would be chaired by a
(17) ibid., p.257, al-Husri is a leading figure in modern
Arab historical studies.
(18) A. Tabarein, op.cit., p.428
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Secretary General nominated or appointed in accordance 
with its constitutional law. The alternative scheme was 
to form a union without a nuiiierically representative 
assembly. Its decisions would be obligatory only for 
those who chose to accept them, and each member-state would 
have an equal number of representatives.
The second proposal is noteable for its omission of 
the "general assembly of popular representatives" based 
on the population size and GNP of each state. Each 
state would be given an equal number of representatives, 
irrespective of population and GNP. The amendment was, 
perhaps, meant to facilitate the affiliation of the 
smaller Arab states, especially Lebanon and Transjordan, 
to the suggested union on an equal footing. Furthermore, 
population size was an inapplicable criterion in some 
Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The popular 
assembly, suggested in the first scheme, was probably 
Intended to represent the common will of the Arab masses.
It might be seen as a legitimising authority for the 
League's decisions, after the fashion of popular democracy.
In this respect, however, it was alien to all Arab politicâl 
systems of that time, and was therefore unacceptable.
It may be supposed that Nuri himself had seen the 
danger of proportional representation of the Arab states 
in a general assembly, since this would have given his 
rival, Egypt, an upperhand in the assembly (the Egyptian 
population was the largest among the independent Arab 
states). Furthermore, such a scheme would have alienated 
Lebanon, a country which considered her Arab neighbours 
as foreign states, and so would have discouraged her from
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joining; the union. Indeed, it seems likely that Nuri's 
first scheme was put forward so that he himself should 
not be outflanked by a more "advanced" scheme, in the 
confident hope that it would be rejected by other Arab 
governments.
It was clear that the realisation of full union, with 
a central executive authority, was impossible at this stage 
of development of Arab nationalism. Some of the Arab 
states asserted their internal independence, while others 
were not prepared to renounce their sovereignty in favour 
of full union. Only Syria stood for full-fledged Arab 
unity, and was quite prepared to renounce her sovereignty 
in favour of a central executive authority of the Arab 
union; but this was a tactic intended to block schemes 
for partial unity with either of the Hashemite Kingdoms.(19)
Transjordan was represented by Mr Tawfiq Abul-Huda, 
then her Prime Minister, who agreed with the second of 
Nuri's proposals. His objective was to unite Syria 
with Transjordan in the first place, stating that the 
question of union between Syria and Transjordan was not a 
difficult one because the difference between the political 
systems of each country were insufficient to hinder the 
union. This conclusion was apparently based on no more 
than an assurance given in 1920 by Mr Faris al-Khuri, a 
notable Syrian nationalist, in a letter to Amir Abdullah 
of Transjordan in which he had said that "his Syrian 
friends were already in favour of the monarchical form 
of government, and that the republican system was adopted
(19) Majid Khadduri, "The Arab League", Loc.cit., pp.763-64
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only at the time when Syria was still under French man­
date". (20) Abdul-Huda suggested that when the union 
between Syria and Transjordan was established in the form 
of "Minor Syria", the next stage would be to unite Lebanon, 
Palestine and Minor Syria in a "tripartite union". This
suggestion showed again that Syria was the focal point of 
the scheme of Arab unity, as far as Transjordan was con­
cerned. Thus the scheme of Arab unity was meant to 
aggrandise the Hashemite Kingdom in the Fertile Crescent. 
Syria's attitude towards a monarchical system had, however, 
changed in twenty four years with the personnel who re­
presented her. When Abul-Huda suggested that "both 
Syria and Transjordan should be given the opportunity 
to conduct separate negotiations for laying down a plan 
of unity before they would Join the Arab League"(21),
Jamal Mardam, the Syrian representative, while he de­
clared his approval in principle for the scheme of the 
Minor Syria union, showed dissatisfaction with Trans­
jordan's approach to the problem. In answering a 
question by Sheik Yusof Yasin of Saudi Arabia concerning 
the future form of government, should Minor Syria come 
into being, he said, "Syria was always in favour of a 
republican system".(22) Mardam added, "Minor Syria 
could be achieved by annexation of Transjordan to Syria 
as it had been the southern province under the Arab 
regime of Faisal". Furthermore, Syria desired "to keep
(20) Majid Khadduri, "The Scheme of the Fertile Crescent",
Loc.cit., p.144
(21) ibid., p.147
(22) ibid., p.147
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Damascus as the capital of the proposed union and a 
republican form of government".(23) On the level of 
degree of unity, Syria was "strongly in favour of central 
government, despite all obstacles. When this degree 
of unity was unachievable, the alternative was any degree 
of union or covenant".(24)
The main points of conflict may be described thus.
First, each state (in this case Syria and Transjordan) saw 
the scheme of unity as a means of extending its ov/n 
territorial boundaries, by annexing one to another 
(either Syria to Transjordan or Transjordan to Syria).
Second, each state wished to keep its ov/n institutions 
intact and consequently rejected any degree of change in 
its internal system. This did not leave much room for 
compromise. Third, Syria^wished to start the scheme of 
unity with a higher degree of unity and wider territorial 
scope, while Transjordan was prepared to accept a lower 
territorial scope. Neither Syria nor Transjordan was 
ready to compromise so that the result was the preservation 
of the independence of each.
Saudi Arabia's attitude was clear from the beginning: 
she was not optimistic about reaching any agreement for 
unity. Ibn Saud sent his representative to the conference 
at Alexandria to put forward seven conditions for his 
country's membership of an Arab League. These conditions 
were generally aimed at maintaining the status quo in the 
Arab world.(25) His first point was that the degree of
(23) A. Tarabein, op.cit., p.442
(24) ibid., p.442
(25) rSTd. , p.486
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unity of the Arab states should be confined within the 
limits of inter-governmental co-operation for individual 
and collective peace of the member-states. The fifth 
required recognition of the independence of both Syria 
and Lebanon as separate Arab republics. This condition 
was aimed directly at preventing the realisation of 
Hashemite ambitions for the union of the Fertile Crescent.
The sixth condition stated the Saudis' opposition to the 
idea of cultural and legal unification between the Arab 
states. This was because in Ibn Baud's view the presence 
within his territories of the Holy Places (Mecca and 
Medina) necessitated the practice of the Islamic system 
of education and jurisprudence according to the strict 
tenets of Wahabism which was strongly opposed to any 
modernisation of the legal and educational system.
The last condition called upon the Arab states to co­
operate in the field of trade and strengthen their 
economy as one nation (ummah) bound by common interests.(36) 
Finally, Lebanon's attitude towards unity was 
hostile. On 16 September 1944, the Maronite Pat- 
riach Antun Aridha made a declaration to the effect 
that "Lebanon would not submit to any scheme of union 
or unity"(27) and demanded that a guarantee for her in­
dependence be given by France, Great Britain, the USA 
and the USSR. His ultimate desire was to establish 
"friendly relations with foreign countries, especially 
the neighbouring Arab countries". Riyad al-Solh, then
(26) ibid, p.487
(27) Majid Khadduri, "The Arab League", Loc.cit., p.147
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the Prime Minister of Lebanon, declared, stressing his 
country's independence, that "friendly co-operation 
between Christians and Muslims in Syria and Lebanon was 
more valuable to him than building an empire".(28)
It is obvious from the discussion above that the 
political will for unity among the Arab states varied 
considerably from one to another, and that there was a 
conspicuous absence of any strong link between them.
Under the title of "Arab unity" each participant at the 
conference sought an opportunity to attain his own part­
icular ends. Nuri al-Said of Iraq aimed at annexation 
of Syria to Iraq by propagating the scheme of the unity 
of "the Fertile Crescent". Amir Abdullah of Trans­
jordan aimed to extend his kingdom to Syria under the 
name of "Minor Syria". Meanwhile Syrian representatives 
capitalised on the different political systems of Syria 
and Transjordan to pre-empt the Hashemite scheme.
Lebanon leaders, Christian and Muslim, were promoting the 
idea of "friendly relations" between co-religionists in 
preference to the scheme of Arab unity, and seeking an 
international guarantee of her independence. Saudi 
Arabia was unwilling to support any scheme, favouring 
the independence of individual states and she supported 
the idea of an independent Syria and Lebanon in order to 
frustrate the Hashemites.
Egypt's role at the conference was to produce a 
compromise which could be accepted, however i*eluctantly, by 
all seven participants. In this task, Nahas Pasha was
(28) ibid., p.147
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assisted by the fact that all the delegations had felt 
obliged to give some sort of endorsement to the idea of 
Pan-Arabism, The role of mediation fell naturally to 
Egypt as the host government and also as a disinterested 
party in Hashemite-Syrian-Saudi rivalries. There was 
also an immediate Egyptian interest, A leading position 
in an Arab League would bolster her status vis-a-vis Iraq 
/and, more importantly, strengthen her hand in negotiations 
Ivflth the British. This was of special significance,
; since Nahas had already made up his mind to attempt to
I
secure the withdrawal of British forces from Egypt,
On 25 September 1944, delegates of seven nations met 
in Alexandria and signed the Protocol of Alexandria which 
laid the basis of the Charter of the Arab League and which 
was signed six months later on 22 March 1945.
The formation of the League symbolised the victory 
of local nationalism over Pan-Arabism, as can be seen in 
the way in which it has been both described by scholars 
and identified internationally. 8.8. Goodspeed saw it 
as a "loose knit organization of sovereign states, with 
the emphasis placed on voluntary co-operation" which had 
fallen "short of its expectations and had not greatly 
increased the unity of the Arab world".(29) F.S. Northedge 
entitled it "a loose confederation" which represented the 
weakest degree of unity among those suggested in various
(29) Stephen S. Goodspeed, The Nature and Function of
Internâtional Organization,
Oxford University Press, New York, 
1959, pp.563 & 565
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schemes.(30) P.E. Jacob identified it as a "simple 
alliance of expedience"(31) which could indeed have been 
formed between any set of countries, even without the 
social and cultural ties that linked the Arabs. The 
League is characterised internationally, with regard to 
its supposed function and objective of securing regional 
peace, as a "regional organisation or agency".(32)
The foundation of the Arab League can be seen also 
I as an elitist attempt to dispose of the problem of Arab 
! unity. It had given the Arabs a kind of regional organ­
isation and so could be viewed as an initial step towards 
total Arab unity. On the other hand, little had been 
done to resolve Arab rivalries, and the I/s ague Charter's 
guarantee of the independence (of each other) of the 
existing Arab states itself constituted a centrifugal 
force, that is, a force to keep Arab states apart.
Furthermore, two years of hard negotiation had resulted 
in meagre achievement and this lack of success led to an 
immediate decline in sentiment in favour of Arab unity, 
so that the League looked like being the final, rather than 
the initial, step on the road to unity. The League's 
performance soon showed its inability to secure stable 
inter-Arab relations and proved it to be ineffective 
in achieving its limited commitment to produce co-operation 
between the member states, in co-ordinating Arab policy
(30) F.S. Northedge & M.D. Donelon, International Disputes,
Europa Publications, London, 1971, 
p.243
(31) P.E. Jacob et al, The Dynamic of International Organ­
isation, The Dorsey Press,” Homewood, 
Illinois, 1972, p.131
(32) The United Nations Charter, Article No.52
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towards the Palestinian problem, and in upholding the 
security of small states (such as Lebanon, Jordan, the 
Yemen).
The first task of the League v/as to bring about 
closer relations between its member-states and to en­
courage any initiatives taken by members in this direction.
But inter-Arab disputes increased in number, partly bo- 
/cause the number of Arab states increased from seven to 
/ twenty,(33) but mainly because of an increase in the 
number of republics and a decrease in the number of 
monarchies, with the socialist republics tending to 
align themselves against the conservative monarchies.
This tendency was compounded by the fact that five of 
the monarchies are rich in oil and low in population, 
and so appear ripe and attractive for domination by 
their large republican neighbours.
The vastness of the Arab world poses the problem 
that different countries have different security problems 
and are likely to favour different solutions. Thus 
Iraq, when Nuri al-Said perceived a Soviet threat, had 
a choice between a pact with the Soviet Union or a 
defence treaty with the West. The latter turned out 
to be fatal for the Hashemite regime-, but the point is 
that no Iraqi government has ever perceived the Arab 
League as guaranteeing its safety vis-a-vis Russia or
(33) The twenty Arab states are nov; divided into twelve 
- republics (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Yemen Arab 
Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, 
Egypt, the Sudan, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania 
and Somalia) and eight monarchies (Jordan, Oman, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, 
Saudi Arabia and Morocco.)
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Iran. Similarly, at the other end of the Arab world, 
the Maghreb states have to solve their ov/n security 
problems Independently of the League.
With respect to inter-Arab co-operation, Egypt and 
Iraq, the main advocates of Pan-Arabism, have pursued 
the path of Arab unity by totally different means,
Egypt has exercised her influence to control the League 
/'as an instrument of her foreign policy (with the tacit
I approval of some other Arab states) while Iraq allied
I
I  herself with the Western powers up till 1958, and then 
with the Eastern powers since 1968. In Iraq the idea 
of Arab unity has become no more than a slogan, and the 
League is regarded as an arena for inter-Arab disputes.
Some Arab leaders have attempted to overcome the 
Iioague' 8 defects as an instrument of Arab unity by ad­
vocating the constitutional development of the Charter.
In 1960, the member-states had concluded the Treaty of 
Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation which became an 
Integral part of the Charter. At the same time the 
Prime Minister of Syria, Nazira al-Qudsi, had put forward 
another scheme of Arab unity by promoting the League 
into a more effective inter-Arab organisation.(34)
It was understood that his suggestion was aimed at 
two objectives: to secure the support of the Syrian
people to his government; and to save his country from 
the ravages of sectional conflicts which might come 
upon it through a succession of military coups by pro-
(34) Nazira al-Qudsi, "The Plan for Arab Unity",
Middle East Affairs, Vol.2, No.3, 
1951, pp.100-104
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Egyptian and pro-Iraqi factions.
In making his proposal al-Qudsi brought in an ex­
ternal catalyst to evoke the Arabist sentiment. He 
said that in the circumstances of Cold War the Arabs 
were weak internationally and not of great Importance 
in the international balance. Irrespective of whether 
the Cold War went on or the storm broke. He said that 
/"sound military considerations show that at present,
’ most of the Arab states are separately unable to con- 
I front the Zionist menace, whose major concern has been, 
and is, how to split the Arab states, to confront them 
one by one"(35); and of the League, that in its present 
form it had failed Arab hopes, for although it was lavish 
in words and demonstrations, it was barren of results.(36) 
al-Qudsi suggested that all independent Arab states should 
unify their foreign policies, national defence, economic 
force and main resources as an intermediary step to 
unitary or federal or confederal government. This 
unification would be implemented in three stages: mil­
itary unification would come first, followed by the 
gradual change and adjustment of every state system 
until they reached the third stage of harmony in which 
the separate states would eventually come to merge into 
a common national union.(37) The responsibility for 
taking the first step would fall mainly to governments. 
al-Qudsi wanted his plan to be endorsed by the League
(35) ibid.. p.103
(36) ibid., the 12th item of the plan
(37) ibid.  ^ the 25th item of the plan
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which should then set up a "steering committee"(38) to 
submit the proposal to all the Arab capitals. In order 
to mobilise political support at the popular level, he 
urged the Arab leaders to mobilise the "common will" of 
the people who, he said, already followed their leaders 
with confidence.(39) He also made his own direct appeal 
to public opinion to support the scheme.
The plan received wide acclaim in the Syrian, Iraqi
;
and Jordanian press. Egypt's reaction was cool and some 
Egyptian newspapers labeled the Plan a "utopia in Arab 
politics". Mustafa Amin, editor of the daily Akhbar al- 
Yawm, contemptuously stated that the plan was very 
attractive and aimed at "converting the desert into 
gardens",(40) The League itself took no action and 
without the support the Arab governments, popular 
enthusiasm, such as it was, had no practical result.
This episode demonstrated that in the matter of Arab 
unity, the power of initiative belongs exclusively to 
governments, Qudsi found as Nasser was to discover 
later, that appeals to the people over the heads of 
governments were not effective.
What appeared to be another attempt at transforming 
the League by means of the constitutional development of 
its Charter, was made in 1957, when A.M. Mustafa, the 
Deputy Secretary-General, suggested that the status of 
the League should be developed into what he termed 
"supranational government". He too envisaged the process
(38) ibid., the first item of the plan
(39) ibid., the 20th item of the plan
(40) Anwar G, Chejne, op.cit., pp.261-262
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being accomplished in three stages. First, there would 
be a modification of the procedure of decision-making of 
the League to make majority decisions binding on all 
member-states. Then the member-states would bestow an 
autonomous power on the League in order to enable it to 
exercise an independent authority. Finally, when the 
League had won acceptance for its new functions through­
-out the Arab world, to the extent that its member-states 
I were ready to surrender their sovereignty to it, then a 
I unified government would be set up, as a federal, confederal 
or unitary state called "the United Arab States".(41)
The implementation would have required the Arab 
states to adapt and harmonise their political systems as 
well as their political ideologies. This could not be 
done by amending the League's constitution; and it was 
not a political possibility given the fact that, with the 
meteoric rise of Nasser to prominence in the aftermath of 
Suez, most of the Arab states were involved in one way 
or another in political struggles with each other, either 
for the leadership of the Arab people or merely to ensure 
their own survival. Indeed, the mere fact that this 
proposal came from the Egyptian dominated League Secretar­
iat makes it look as though the proposal itself was but a 
tactic in Nasser's Pan-Arab strategy, intended to polarise 
Arab opinion rather than to lay a basis for unification.
In 1974 M.A. Mahgoub, the former Prime Minister of
(41) Abdul-Muneim Mustafa, "Jaraiah al-Arablyyah Satusbeh
Ghaira zat-Almawdo'" (The 
League of Arab States will be 
Unnecessary), Al-Hllal, Cairo, 
Vol. 67, 1957, pp. 39-'
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the Sudan, suggested an alternative approach to Arab 
unity. Ris suggestion was based on the revival of Arab 
cultural unity. If this could become in reality a 
common culture with meaning for the Arab masses rather 
than an image on a pedestal or an ancient culture to be 
remembered, it could serve as a basis for Arab political 
unity. In economic and technical fields he suggested 
/that gradual economic and technical unification should 
I precede political unity. He said "I believe that once 
these steps are gradually implemented, a successful 
federation of all Arab states might be achieved",(42)
But the problem of Arab unity was not so much that of the 
lack of a scheme or programme for unity, it was rather 
the lack of the political will of the Arab leaders to 
implement these or any other suggested schemes.
It is not only Arab writers who have looked for a 
clever way round the central obstacle of the lack of will 
of Arab governments. In the 7/est, S.P. Huntington has 
produced a scheme for the reconciliation of socialist 
and conservative factions. He suggested that "rep­
resentatives" should be chosen on the basis of "intra­
elites, factions and cliques"(43) to respresent the 
traditional elements in the Arab world, while the rep­
resentatives of the socialist bloc would be chosen on 
the basis of social classes such as workers, intelligentsia, 
peasants, soldiers and small business holders. In other
(42) M.A. Mahgoub, Democracy on Trial, Andre Deutsch,
Eondon, 1974, p.77
(43) S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societyy Yale University Press, 
1958, p.406
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words, as the Arab world was divided between two political 
forces, the socialist or so called "progressive" and the 
"conservative", any project of unity should take account 
of the fact and be devised in such a way as to accommodate 
it. But this was to state the essence of the problem 
rather than to solve it. A similar approach was ad­
vanced by Karl Kaiser, who wrote of promoting direct 
horizontal transactions between social sectors of differ-
/
/ent societies, transactions which would bypass the in­
stitutions of government but which would greatly affect 
their margin for mano^vre. This would allow various 
forms of mutual penetration of formally separate states 
and speed up the growth of linking activities in a number 
of non-state sectors.(44) But again, it was not realistic 
to expect Arab governments to tolerate such processes 
while they were locked in struggle with each other.
In contrast to those who sought the development 
of the League, there were others hostile to the whole 
idea of unity, for reasons of ideology (socialism, 
communism), religion (Islam, Christianity), or local 
nationalism. Factional opposition to unity in the 
Arab world was especially strong in Lebanon, Syria and 
Egypt. In Lebanon it was expressed by almost every 
faction. Charles H. Malik, a liberal with a generally 
pro-Western attitude, expressed the Christian elite's 
rejection of Arabism when he said, "our ideal is to
(44) Karl Kaiser, "Transactional Politics: toward a
Theory of Multinational Politics", 
International Organisation, Vol.25, 
No.4, 1971, p.790
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enter seriously into the positive Western heritage of 
thought, in this heritage we find the complete truth".(45)
The same rejection was made by the Phalangist leaders, 
led by Pierre Gemayel, who believes that Lebanon is 
"a soul, a spiritual principle ... it would be materially 
possible to absorb it into Syria or an Arab Empire 
temporarily; it is spiritually impossible to unite it 
/to a world which does not share its state of soul, its 
spiritual principles".(46) The focal point of the 
PhAlangists' position is less exalted, being a traditional 
and practical distrust of the Islamic form of government.
The Phalangist account of Lebanon's history is that "the 
Muslim Caliphs imposed on their lands a theocratic regime 
involving a state of discrimination against non-Muslim 
religious minorities. The Christians, called Zimmis or 
protected, were not equal to the Muslims in regard to 
rights".(47) The Phalangiste naturally fear any revival 
of such discrimination. When each faction maintains 
its Identity as Christian and Muslim their Arabism is 
forgotten. Within Lebanon, factional commitment super­
sedes the ideal of Arab nationalism although both Christ­
ian and Muslim are Arabs. During the struggle for 
independence, Lebanese politicians, Muslim and Christian, 
reached an agreement among themselves known as the 
National Convention. In accordance with it, the President
(45) A. al-Hadi al-Fikayki, "The Shu'ubujya and Arab
Nationalism", in Political 
and Social Thought in the 
Contemporary Middle East, cc/./u/Y'jWiW 
Pi'aeger,” London, 1968, p. 86
(46) P. Gemayel, "Lebanese Nationalism and its Foundations:
the Phalangist Viewpoint", ed. K.H. Karpat, 
ibid.. p.108
(47) ibid., p.108
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was always to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni 
Muslim, the Speaker a Shi’ Muslim, and the Deputy 
Speaker a Greek Orthodox, while the Greek Catholics and 
other sizeable sects were to be represented in the 
Cabinet. The convention was based on a general under­
standing that the Christians would not imperil the in­
dependence of Lebanon by looking for protective agree­
ments with European countries, while the Muslims would 
respect the religious and cultural links of the Christ­
ians with the West and would not seek to merge the 
country with her Arab neighbours who were identified as 
"Muslims" rather than "Arabs". An attempt to amend 
the proportional distribution of representatives in the 
Chamber, according to the new balance of population 
which makes the Muslims a majority in the country, 
helped to spark the civil war of 1975-76.
In Syria, Antun Saadah founded in 1936 the "Syrian 
National Party". Among its aims was that to unite 
Lebanon with Syria under the name of "Syria". Saadah 
rejected the idea of religio-political factional labels 
of Christian and Muslim which prevailed in Lebanon.
He also denied the Arab characteristics of Syria and 
rejected the essential features of Arab nationalism.
He based his party’s policy on "Syria for the Syrians" 
and asserted that Syria should preserve her own identity 
and characteristics by extending religious toleration 
to all, and by making religion a personal rather than 
a social and political matter. This differed from the 
system in Lebanon where religious factionalism is, and 
was, vigorously practised and protected as the basis of
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political and social life. In 1961, members of the 
Syrian National Party attempted an unsuccessful coup 
in Lebanon. Their aim was still to merge it with 
Syria to form a non-religious state, on the basis that 
"he who believes in Islam is a heretic; he who believes
in Christianity is even more heretical; he who believes
in Lebanon is not of our members".(48) But this was no
longer a plausible policy, given the Pan-Arabist turn 
that Syrian politics had taken since the 1950s.
There also appeared a new anti-Arabism in Egypt 
prior to the Revolution. This movement was represented 
by the Pharaonic movement which denied Egypt's Arab 
character and argued that Egypt had no business with 
the struggle for Arab nationalism. The movement was 
led by Salama Musa (1887-1959) a Christian Copt, by 
Abdul Aziz Jawish, who made a distinction between the 
Arabs and the Egyptian "nation", and Muhammad Magdi, 
who regarded the Egyptian "nation" as comprising Egypt's 
Pharaonic population only.(49) During the 1920s, the 
Egyptian leader Saad Zaghlul dismissed the idea of Arab 
unity as useless: the Arab states, in his mind, were as
nothing, and as he put it, "if you add one zero to another 
zero, and then you add another zero, what will be the 
sum?" He gave priority to the development and progress 
of each individual state and rejected the idea of unified 
Arab action which was proposed to him during the struggle
(48) Antun Saadah, "The Teaching Book of the Syrian
Socialist Party"in ed. K.H. Karpat, 
op.cit., pp.95-98
(49) A. al-Hadi al-Fikaykf, op.cit.. pp.82-83
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for independence, sending away Arab delegates from the 
Fertile Crescent with the reply that "our problem is an 
Egyptian problem and not an Arab problem".(50)
The tendency to give preference to local national­
isms over Arab nationalism was prevalent even among 
those who pioneered the movement of Arab unity, Abdul 
Rahman Azzam, the first (Egyptian) Secretary General of 
the Arab League said, after he left the Secretariat, 
that "we are Egyptian first, Arab second and Muslim 
third".(51) This may have reflected an original attitude 
about Arab unity which has survived his own involvement 
in the creation of the League, or a view formed in the 
light of experience of the politics of Arab nationalism; 
in either case, it bears witness to the negative effect 
which the League had on some of those closest to it.
(50) Anwar G, Chejne, op.cit., p.253
(51) ibid.. p.260
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CHAPTER IV
Baathism and Nasserism: the Pan-Arabist 
Revolutionary Movements
Baathism and Nasserism have been the most prominent 
revolutionary movements in the world's view of Arab 
politics. In the case of Nasserism, this has been 
largely due to the impact of the personality of Nasser 
(and to the way in which, from Suez onwards, his import­
ance was inflated by his enemies) and the central 
position of Egypt in Middle Eastern affairs; but these 
factors have in turn owed something to the pursuit of 
Pan-Arabism by both movements. This dedication to Pan- 
Arabism distinguishes Baathism and Nasserism from most 
other revolutionary movements in the Arab world which, 
like the Algerian revolutionary independence movement, 
attach a far higher importance to Algerian nationalism 
and which show interest in Pan-Arabism only in so far 
as it serves their particular national cause. But 
although Baathism and Nasserism lead the Pan-Arabist 
struggle, the ways in which they have worked to achieve 
their goal, and the bitter rivalries between them, have 
in fact contributed much to the failure of the struggle 
for Arab unity.
Before considering and comparing the two movements 
in detail, it is necessary to examine the terminology 
employed in Arab revolutionary politics. It is imposs­
ible to fix a single objective meaning to the Arab word 
for revolution because in the Arab world, as elsewhere, 
"revolution" has been adopted as the slogan of a variety 
of political movements. According to Bernard lewis,
"in current Arabic usage the noun "thawra" (revolution) 
and the adjective "thawri" (revolutionary) are the 
terms accepted by the revolutionary socialist regimes 
in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere to describe their 
own actions, intentions and ideologies",(1) Thus 
"revolution" is the cry of the socialist regimes against 
their conservative or liberal rivals (the antithesis of 
"revolution" is "reaction") and also marks the rejection 
both of the status quo in the Arab world and of the 
Arab League's approach to Arab unity. Revolution is 
presented as the necessary means to overcome the profound 
disparity between the Arab peoples' aspirations to unity 
and the reality of the complete disunity of their 
national life; and struggles against elements of weak­
ness in existing socialist regimes as well as against 
reactionary regimes earn the title "revolutionary".
Any discussion of the politics of Arab unity must accord­
ingly pay some heed to the "revolutionaries".
Two writers, a Syrian and an Egyptian, may serve 
to introduce the uses of revolutionary language in debates 
on Arab unity. Achievement of the unity of the whole 
Arab world (in the sense of a melting of Arab societies 
into one and not that of a mere "artificial composition 
and combination") requires, according to the Syrian 
Haidar, a revolutionary movement which confronts and 
destroys the separate state interests and the privileged
(1) Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Concepts of Revolution", in
Revolution in the Middle East and
Other Case Studies, ed. by 
P.J* VatikiotisT Allen & Uniwin, 
London, 1972, pp.30-40
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classes which stand against unity. Haidar includes 
amongst the main targets of such a revolutionary move­
ment: local communists who, in accordance with Stalinist
policy in the Middle East, wage war against Arab national 
unity; reactionaries who played the imperialists' role 
in the Arab world after independence; the national 
bourgeoisies who develop the internal contradictions of 
the Arab people into disputes between Arab countries 
and so create obstacles on the path of unity ; and 
feudalists who share the interests of reactionary 
regimes and imperialists in exploiting the peasants and 
working class.(2) Thus revolution means the total 
destruction of political leaderships and social struc­
tures in order to achieve the creation of the new nation; 
and revolution and the struggle for national unity become 
one and the same movement. Revolutionary writers see 
the struggle for national unity having multiple political 
implications. It would mean the destruction of all 
rightist political parties, traditional regimes and non­
nationalist elements. The acute conflict between the 
revolutionaries and the beneficiaries of the existing 
system would result in the former being gathered into one 
socialist party and the struggle would then become a 
struggle of political parties for political power. Once 
the revolutionary (the socialist) party attained political 
power in one country, the strife would be raised to the
(2) H. Haidar, "al-Thawrah wal wahdah Fil-Harb al-
Thawriyyah al-rausallahah", (Revolution 
and Unity of an Armed Revolutionary War), 
Dirasat Arabiyyab, Beirut, 1967,
Vol. 4, No.'i, pp. 38-39
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inter-state level and become a confrontation between the 
revolutionary and conservative blocs. This must some­
times break out into inter-Arab conflicts as in Yemen, 
1962-1967, the "cold war" between Nasser and his rivals 
of 1958-1967, and communal fighting such as that in Iraq 
in 1959-1975, Lebanon in 1958 and again in 1975 to the 
present day, and between the Palestinians and the King 
of Jordan in 1970. The Egyptian Haradan accordingly 
suggests that because the destruction of all non­
revolutionary regimes is a prerequisite of the creation 
of strong national unity, war between Arab states must 
be regarded as a necessary means to the ultimate aim of 
unity and that on the way to Tel Aviv, the fiercest 
battles must be fought in Arab capitals.(3)
Baathlsts tend to emphasise that, in order to ensure 
revolutionary victory in Arab capitals, the revolutionary 
process must start with the revolutionary education of 
the masses; not until they have been liberated from their 
historic and personal contradictions and induced to 
develop a new political consciousness, will the ground be 
prepared for revolutionary struggle throughout the Arab 
world. Such an argument is advanced by N, Haturn who 
suggested that the entire Arab revolutionary vanguard should 
be organised under one leadership with the task of abolish­
ing the contradictions between the peoples of the various 
Arab states and of unifying them into one nation. This 
vanguard should have branches in every Arab state while
(3) Jamal Hamdan, "Palastin wal Wahdah", (Palestine and
Unity), Al-Hilal, Cairo, December, 1964, 
Vol.7-12, pp.64-73
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its central command should co-ordinate their policies 
and design the overall strategy of the Arab revolutionary 
struggle for unity and also for the defeat of rival pan- 
Arabist policies and parties.(4)
A more elaborate version of this suggestion had 
already been advanced in 1964 by Abdullah al-Remawi, a 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs in Jordan in the 
Nabulsi government of 1957 and the enfant terrible of the 
Baath Party who was secretary general of its branch in 
Jordan, After he was expelled from the main Baath in 
1859 he established his own Baath party in Jordan, and 
then became a supporter of President Nasser.(5) He 
proposed that for Arab policies to be effective, they 
should be placed under the supervision of "al-harakah al- 
qawmiyyah al-wahidah" (One Arab Movement), This act of 
unity would signify the vertical integration of Arab 
ideology, masses and leaderships. It would require the 
self-destruction of all political parties and movements 
in the Arab world rather than their mere combination.
The practical implementation of unity of theory and 
thought, together with the emphasis which Remawi put on 
"popular political organisation" would represent a new 
version of popular democracy. The organisation would 
draw the entire Arab masses in their various "fiaat"
(4) Nur al-Din Hatum, Muhadarat 'an al-Marahil al-
Tarikhiyyah Lil-Qawmiyyah al- 
Arabiyyah (The Historical Phases 
of Arab Nationalism), Maahad al- 
Dirasat al-Arabiyyah, Cairo, 1963, 
p. 69
(5) K,K, Karpat, op.cit,, p.147, See also K,S,A. Jaber,
The Arab Baath Socialist Party, Syracus, 
Ü.P,, New York, 1966, pp.50, 54
(groups) into playing their role in building a democratic 
socialist society. Thus there would be a revolutionary 
resolution of the old ambivalence in Arab political life 
between loyalty to the ideal of an Arab nation and 
allegiance to particular states. The revolution would 
be achieved in two stages : a political revolution involv­
ing a transfer of political power; and an economic and 
social transformation which would bring with it the qual­
itative transformation of individual mentality, psychology, 
and morality as well as equality and redistribution of 
wealth in a more quantitative sense.(6) But Remawi 
stressed the necessity of there being one comprehensive 
revolution of the Arab people undertaken by a single 
popular political organisation.
A popular and socialist revolution of the sort 
prescribed by Remawi has not yet happened in the Arab 
world; the great variety of Arab revolutionary movements 
is part of the reason given by Remawi for this. These 
movements may be roughly categorised as follows;
1. Non-nationalist revolutionary groups such 
as communists who believe in the revol­
ution of the proletariat, reject the cause 
of Arab unity, and support a variety of 
revolutionary groups as a tactic to weaken 
the nationalist movement.
2. National revolutionary groups which believe 
in a variety of Arab nations rather than
(6) Abdullah al-Remawi, "al-Harakah al-Arabiyyah al-
Wahidah" (One Arab Movement), Dar 
al-nashr lil-lamieyeen, Beirut, 
January 1964, pp.25,31,38,53,61, 
73,134,280,340
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Pan-Arabism, e.g. Syrian National Party 
which advocates "Syria for the Syrians".
3. Groups who profess belief in the oneness 
of the Arab cause and appear to strive 
for it, but are called by Remawi "false 
revolutionaries" because they work in
I
I fact for their own ends in an opportunist
I manner; their claims to the monopoly of
truth are a prime cause of disunity.
4. The Baathists in Syria and Iraq whom 
Remawi called "tactical revolutionaries" 
because, despite their belief in Arab 
unity, socialism and democracy, they 
conducted themselves in a way which 
worked against the oneness of the Arab 
revolution by failing to unite their 
two countries.
5. The Baathists and Nasserites who believe 
in the oneness of Arab nation, Pan-Arabism 
and the revolutionary solution, but whom
. Remawi called "factual national revolution­
aries" because he said their actions were 
guided by an understanding of the actual 
facts of the Arab world which they thought 
required a variety of revolutionary strat­
egies to meet the variety of Arab conditions.
Remawi could only express the pious hope that the true 
revolution might be attainable by unifying these rival rev­
olutions into one movement in the sense of "unification on 
an equal footing" such as Nasserites and Baathists have
fV
suggested after 1962.(7) One way he thought this might be 
done, was by combining the three main Arab revolutionary 
charters - the Egyptian charter, the Tripoli charter of 
the Algerian revolution, and the Baath constitution - in 
a single document. He realised that certain passages in 
each would have to be rewritten to provide the Arab 
revolution with a basis of theoretical unity, with 
nationalism as its distinctive ideology. For example, 
chapter nine of the Egyptian charter would need amendment, 
since at present it described the partial unity of certain 
Arab states as a means to the eventual attainment of the 
complete unity of the Arab world,(8) He also proposed 
another five unities of what he termed "objectives"; 
force, will, instrument, action and priority. Through 
these unities he envisaged the possibility of achieving 
the unification of Arab revolutionaries in one compre­
hensive pan-Arab revolution.(9)
Saadoon Hamadi, the Iraqi Baathist, w^ as an advocate 
of horizontal unification who rejected the idea of a 
single party system on the ground that it had failed in 
the past and caused rivalry between the revolutionary Move­
ments which placed stumbling blocks in the path of unity.(10)
(7) Abdullah al-Remawi, "al-Thawra al-Arabiyyah" (Arab
Revolution) Dar-maktabat al-fikr, 
Tripoli, Libya, 1974, pp.71-73
(8) Abdullah al-Remawi, "al Harakah al-Arabiyyah al-
Wahidah" (One Arab Movement), 
Loc.cit., p.382, 387-390
(9) Abdullah al-Remawi, "al-Thawrah al-Arabiyyah" (Arab
Revolution), Loc.cit., p.233
(10) S. Hamadi, "al-Wahdah wal Masoliyyah al-Tarikhiyyah",
(Unity and Historical Responsibility), 
Dirasat Arabiyyah, Beirut, Vol.8, No,7, 
M â y T n C W J T  pp. 13-14
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Hamadi preferred the formation of a National Front which 
would be a coalition of existing parties, rather than a 
new party to replace them all. He thought such a front 
could lead to the attainment of unity for several reasons.
The failure of the UAR experiment had shown that unity 
under the aegis of a single revolutionary movement such 
as the Arab National Union of 1958-1961 could work only 
in exactly the right circumstances and that it could not 
succeed when the right conditions did not exist. If 
the attempt to achieve organic unity were made in the 
wrong conditions, the forces of unity would soon split 
among themselves and bring the downfall of the union. 
Furthermore the UAR experience had shov/n that an artif­
icial entity could not produce the positive effect of 
persuading other Arab states, who regarded themselves as 
beneficiaries of the status quo, to Join the union, but 
rather had the effect of inducing them, and giving them 
opportunities, to attack the union through its internal 
weakness.(11) Formal unity of state and party under­
mined by ideological discordance could only lead to 
disintegration and disunity. A link that was looser 
and accepted as weaker, together with a clear understand­
ing of ideological differences, might have proved more 
durable especially if genuine power-sharing had ensured 
that no party to the arrangement felt resentment of 
another.(12)
(11) David Hirst, Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle
East, Faber & Faber, London 1966, 
pp.26-32
(12) ibid., p.16
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We will now look in more detail at the two major 
socialist revolutionary movements in the Arab world in 
the 1950*s and 1960*s: the Baath, with its main strength
in Syria and Iraq, and the Nasserite movement, based in 
Egypt but with enthusiastic adherents throughout the Arab
world.
I
I
B M m i M
The Baath Party was organised by Michel Aflaq, Salah 
al-Bitar and Said Jalal in Syria in 1940. It moved 
into the open when Syria gained formal independence in 
1943, began publishing the Journal, al-Baath, in 1946, 
and held its first congress in 1947,(13)
The Baath Party started its activities from a 
position of opposition, and so could not be identified 
immediately with the ambition of any one established 
government. Beginning as an ideology in search of 
power, the Baath believed that its Arab nationalism would 
create conditions in which the Arabs could establish both 
socialism and unity. These tv/o were seen as inextric­
ably linked: ’’there is no socialism without unity and
no unity without socialism**, (14) The two went together 
because, as Aflaq thought, only in this way could the 
Arab workers be brought to accept unity and nationalism 
as meaningful and desirable.
In accordance with its ideology, which held Arab 
states to be "regions’* (aggtar) of a single nation, the
(13) K.H, Karpat, op.cit., p.185
(14) S. Hamadi, "al-Wahdah wal-Masoliyyah al-Tarikhiyyah"
(Unity and Historical Responsibility), 
Loc.cit., p.13
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party set out to organise branches throughout the Arab 
world which it regarded in its entirety as the arena 
where it had to struggle for power. To date, however, 
the limit to its success has been to gain power in Syria 
and Iraq and to establish branches in Lebanon and Jordan: 
in the latter, Baathists have also succeeded in playing 
a role in the government of King Husein.
Aflaq built the ideological framework of the Baath 
party on three principles. The first was that a true 
nationalist movement should spring from the "masses".
These are defined in the Baath constitution as "the 
inhabitants of the entire area between the Taurus and the 
Sahara and the Atlantic and the Persian Gulf",(15) The 
Baath added a class dimension by further defining the 
masses as the workers and peasants. The Baath has had 
some success in recruitment; indeed, there is testimony 
to their effectiveness in the fact that the party is 
banned in most Arab countries, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia,
Morocco and others. But to say that the revolution 
should "spring from the masses" is to raise questions 
about the role of the masses, Nasser questioned Aflaq 
about this in 1963 and told him that he was mistaken if 
he thought that government by the people was merely having 
elections and then having a few people sitting in a room 
and deciding affairs, for, despite the elections, the 
Party would have isolated itself from the whole people
(15) K.S.A. Jaber, "Constitution of The Arab Baath
Socialist Party", Article No.7, 
op.cit,, p.169
74
and would rule as a tiny minority.(16) The same criticism, 
of course, would have applied just as much to Nasser's 
regime.) The Baath strategy for popular revolution has 
in fact been the usual one of a revolutionary elite, that 
is, setting out to infiltrate the masses and arouse them, 
not to seize power for themselves, but to support the 
Baath leadership in an attempt to seize power which it 
promises to use, w^hen gained, on behalf of the masses.
The second of the Baath principles is that the Arab 
nationalism of the inhabitants of the entire Arab world 
is one and indivisible. In developing this principle, 
the Baath could start with the feeling of cultural unity 
which is known as Arabism and proceed from it to an 
assumption about the possibility of the emergence of a 
sense of political unity - Arab nationalism.(17) To 
make this assumption, however, was to stretch the argument 
a long way. At one end, Aflaq was on firm ground since 
there was ample evidence in history and culture for the 
existence of Arabism; but at the other end, he came up 
against the realities of the political diversities of 
the Arab world and so had to resort to the pretence that 
the existing Arab states, despite their manifest emerging 
consciousness of themselves as, say, Egyptian or Tunisian, 
were somehow "artificial". This was not a satisfactory
(16) K.H* Karpat, "Ideological Problems in the Arab World
as Seen by its Leaders", op cit., p.278 
See also a complete text In Walid Khalidi 
& Yusuf Ibsh (eds), Arab Political 
Documents, 1963, Slim Press, Beirut, 1964, 
pp.120-146.
(17) Jaan Pennar, The USSR and the Arabs: the ideological
Dimension, C. Hurst & Co., London, 1973,
p.102.
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position, as is shown by Aflaq*s assertions about the 
inevitability of popular revolution as the only means 
of achieving socialism and unity. On the one hand, 
the Baath proclaimed the fragility of existing frontiers, 
that "the Arab world seems divided because every ’region* 
attew^^ to,solve its regional problems independently"(18); 
while at the same time they were forced to recognise 
that these divisions were not so artificial that it would 
not take twenty separate revolutions to overcome them, 
since they were far too deep to be resolved by compromise.
The third principle concerned the inevitability of 
popular revolution and is important to all of the three 
Baathist objectives: unity, socialism and freedom.
As an objective, unity means the political oneness of 
the Arab people irrespective of their differences in 
citizenship; the objective would be achieved when there 
was a situation in which the loyalty of every Arab people 
to the Arab nation would supersede allegiance to indiv­
idual Arab states, so that the Arabs would live virtually 
in one state.
The meaning of the second objective, socialism, is 
as problematic as that of "masses". At a general national 
level it calls for the establishment of "the ideal social 
order which will allow the Arab people to realise its 
possibilities and to enable its genius to flourish which 
will ensure for the nation constant progress in its 
material and moral output, it makes possible a trustful
(18) K.S.A. Jaber, op.cit., p.168
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brotherhood among its members".(19) This definition 
raises questions about economic, moral and political 
aspects of the Baathist programme.
One interpretation of the Baath economic programme 
is that it aims at "the dictatorship of the lower middle 
class and the levelling down of all those who stand 
above them in the social and economic scale".(20)
Given Syria’s limited economic resources, one might say 
perhaps that this amounts to seeking equality of poverty. 
Provided that it was not possible for individuals to 
escape the common predicament, leaving their fellows 
behind, equality of poverty might be regarded as an 
effective instrument to secure maximum productivity, 
since each individual would know that his own betterment 
could be achieved only as part of general economic 
growth. This policy would not, however, get far unless 
there were adequate economic resources, although the 
Baathists can argue that a positive moral effect of this 
kind of socialism is that it leads to the disappearance 
of class hatred among its members and creates trustful 
brotherhood, because the system "unites and produces 
co-operation in all fields of life".(21)
The Baathist objective of "creating a fair economic 
system in the Arab world"(22) has national and inter­
national (in the Western sense of these words) implications.
(19) K.S.A, Jaber, ibid., p.169, quoting Article 4 of the
Baath Constitution as translated by 
Sylvia Haim
(20) L. Binder, Ideological Revolution in the Middle East,
London & New York, 1964, p.184
(21) ibid., p.184
(22) K.H. "Karpat, op.cit., p.192
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Within individual states, Baathist socialist doctrine 
demands the end of the capitalist system and the establish­
ment of a socialist one, with public ownership of natural 
resources, big companies and foreign concessions, and 
workers' participation in the management of their fac­
tories with fixed wages and a fixed rate of profit 
guaranteed by the state.(23) The vast majority of the 
I Arab people was in a state of poverty with a handful of 
rich landowners and sheikhs standing out conspituously.
The party hoped to win the impoverished masses' support 
in its national struggle by means of its socialist pro­
gramme. But the masses were not merely impoverished; 
they were also armed with faith and a belief in destiny 
which made them unconcerned with their economic situation.
To be satisfied with one’s lot was accounted the mark of 
a virtuous man. So Aflaq saw that the socialist revol­
ution would have to be preceded by a revolutionary 
awakening of consciousness by which the masses would 
become aware of their true situation.
In the Arab world as a whole a fair economic system 
requires the redistribution of the wealth of the father­
land between Arab states. This idea of course arouses 
fierce opposition from the richer of them, leading to 
inter-Arab conflicts which demonstrate the reality, rather 
than the artificiality, of the disunity of the Arab world.
The conservatives’ understanding of the real meaning to 
them of socialism as an essential ingredient of Arab 
nationalism, brings multiple problems to the politics of
(23) K.S.A. Jaber, Articles No.29, 30 and 31, op.cit.,
p. 171
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Arab unity and serves to identify the limits of the 
Baathist fatherland. To say that the unity of the 
Arab world requires the redistribution of wealth between 
twenty states is to say virtually that there can be no 
unity between the conservative and socialist states, 
since the implementation of the doctrine leads to the 
elimination of those states whose strength consists of 
natural resources rather than people, i.e. Saudi Arabia 
and the Emirates of the Gulf, the "gross national products 
without nations". This explains why the conservatives 
oppose socialism itself as well as the governments of the 
socialist regimes; one, indeed, Saudi Arabia, counter­
attacks socialism at the ideological level by placing it 
in opposition to Islam. Although Baathist doctrine 
maintains that there is no unity without socialism and no 
socialism without unity, the establishment of this 
organic link would be at the expense of the rich oil 
states and the eager pursuit of it is accordingly an 
obstacle to Arab unity. In practice the Baath Party 
has to content itself with implementing its socialist 
programme on the "regional" level in Syria and Iraq - 
and these two states are governed by the Baath as separate 
entities which are often embroiled in bitter quarrels 
with each other. A further point about Baathist social­
ism is that it arouses strong feelings of rivalry in 
other socialist regimes and movements such as Nasserism 
and Islamic socialism in Algeria and Libya,
The third objective of the Baath is "freedom" which 
is vital to the advance of the party. When the Party 
was founded, it had to join in the struggle for freedom
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from French rule in Syria and Lebanon. It also had a 
direct interest in freedom from internal feudalism(24) and 
in securing the right to freedom of speech and assembly 
in every Arab state, for without this it would be unable 
to engage in the open struggle for power which it saw 
as its mission. But though the Baath sought freedom 
as a condition for winning power, they were more cautious 
when it came to their own government. The Baath con­
stitution provides that freedom must be kept "within the 
limits of the higher Arab national interests"(25) and 
in Syria and Iraq freedom is restricted to that of a 
guided democracy, with the Baath repressing rival revol­
utionaries as firmly as they themselves are repressed 
elsewhere. This mutual intolerance of competing soc­
ialist movements is as much a factor of disunity in the 
Arab world as is the hostility between socialists and 
conservatives.
The Baath aimed at awakening the Arab masses from 
their lack of concern with their economic condition by 
means of what Aflaq termed "inqilab". In Baathist 
terminology "inqilab" means primarily a process of 
struggle in which moral and spiritual qualities, such 
as courage and enthusiasm, are very important. The 
Baath activists were to win over the masses to acceptance 
of the need for a certain amount of reform in the trad­
itional Islamic way of living, so as to enable a new 
spirit to emerge and thereby a new nation. wAflaq.
(24) L, Binder, op.cit., p.189
(25) A.B. Jaber, op.cit., p.168
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although a Christian, argued that "the Prophet and his 
associates were the embodiment of the true and noble 
Arab spirit".(26) He called for a resurrection (baath) 
of this spirit and, furthermore, for recognition of the 
truth that Islam was a "revolution that can only be 
understood by revolutionaries".(27) The revolutionary 
consciousness of the Arab people was not to be created 
by the Baath; it was to be revived, so that the trad­
itional social and political virtues of Islam could be 
reborn through the Baath.
The Baath was thus to be an instrument of moral and 
spiritual enlightenment; and setting it up as an effec­
tive political organisation was thought of as a pre­
condition of Arab progress towards unity in a reborn 
Arab nation. The first step in the Baath struggle was 
for the believers in Baathism to organise themselves on 
a pan-Arab nationalist basis to refute the division of 
the Arab homeland.(28) To do this they were to form 
branches of the Party in every Arab state where this was 
possible. Each branch would be built up by recruiting 
followers through a cell system. The cell would be the 
smallest unit of the Baath structure, with cells composing 
companies and divisions. Branches would be grouped in 
regions, corresponding to the existing Arab states and a 
national command would direct activities throughout the
(26) L. Binder, op.cit., p.129
(27) Michel Aflaq, "The Socialist Ideology of the Baath",
in K.H. Karpat, Loc.cit., p.193
(28) Michel Aflaq, Fi Sabil al Baath"~TOn the Road to
Baath), Dar al-Taliah li al-Tibaah 
wal-Nashr, Beirut, 1959, pp.126-129
Arab world. By the cell system, the Baath was able to 
infiltrate the masses and found a grass-roots organisation 
in each state. It has experienced most success in 
controlling political power in Iraq and Syria where the
majority of its active members are array officers rather
than workers and peasants.
The second step was to be for the Baath - who claimed 
the title of the party of inqilab - to launch and lead the 
popular struggle (al-inqilab al-shaabi) to raise the 
people's consciousness to a revolutionary level. The 
objective in this struggle was not to be as much the 
overthrow of the ruling class by a coup, as the trans­
formation of the masses themselves. There is in the term 
"inqilab" a certain ambiguity. In the Quran it means
simply "turning around" and thus may be used, as by al-
Kindi, to signify a cyclical turn of power - "inqilab 
al-dawla",(29) In the Baath constitution itself there 
is a certain recognition that the Party's aims require 
the overthrow of the present faulty structure in all its 
manifestations, political, economic, social and intellec­
tual.(80) It so happened that it was possible for the 
Baath to achieve this objective, at least in Syria and 
Iraq, without waiting for the transformation of the 
people. The overthrowing side of the Party's character 
thus received emphasis from the way in which at an early 
stage Aflaq and his colleagues sought and gained an 
orthodox political role through a series of coups d'etat.
(29) Bernard Lewis, op.cit., p.39
(30) Article No.6 of the Baath Constitution
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Outside the Baathist movement, the word inqilab is indeed 
most commonly understood to signify a simple coup (which 
gives a quite different connotation to the Baathist claim 
to be the party of inqilab) while the wider meaning of 
revolution is reserved to "thawra".
The Baathist leaders have shown themselves to attach 
more importance to winning and holding onto immediate 
political power than to bringing about the structural 
change of society which their doctrine propounds; and 
this has undermined the theoretical basis of the movement 
and driven it to adopt opportunist policies. In Syria 
for example, the Baath Party collaborated with the 
Communists to gain power. The Communists then under­
mined the Baath's position in Syria and so, unable to 
manage on their own, the Baathists turned to Nasser and 
agreed to the formation of the UAR. Nasser suppressed 
the Communists, but also seemed likely to eclipse the 
Baath itself - and so the Party gave its support to an 
army coup to break up the UAR.
The Baath's commitment to Pan-Arabism is qualified 
to the extent that when the Party leaders have had to 
choose between supporting a policy which would promote 
Arab unity at the expense of their own power, and a policy 
which would preserve their power at the expense of Arab 
unity, they have always chosen the latter. The Party has 
attempted to reconcile its two objectives, power for 
itself and unity in the Arab world, by advocating a new 
policy called "al-qiyyadah al-jamaiyyah" (a collective 
leadership), During the unity talks held in Cairo in 
March 1963, between Egypt, Syria and Iraq, the two Baath
delegations advanced this idea of collective leadership 
and it was agreed upon by the participants and incorpor­
ated into the Tripartite Agreement which was supposed to 
make a certain degree of reconciliation between Baathism 
and Nasserism. But due to his previous experience with 
the Baathists, and because of personal egotism, President 
Nasser was reluctant to implement this agreement and
/delayed the formation of the federal union. Eventually
!
' he accused the Syrian Baath of breaking the agreement 
when the Nasserite elements in Syria, whom the Baath 
suspected of preparing a coup against them, were 
suppressed. The Baath was no more able to establish a 
"collective leadership" for Syria and Iraq, although in 
these countries they claimed to be two branches of the 
same party. Many rapprochements were made for military 
and economic unity in preparation for complete unity.
The Baath National Command (al-qiyadah al-qawmiyyah) 
agreed in October 1963 that President A. Salam Aref of 
Iraq was to be the first President of the union and 
Mr Salah al-Bitar its first Prime Minister, and yet the 
limited collective leadership of the Baathist group 
failed in bringing about the proposed union.(31)
NASSERISM
The doctrine of Arab socialism known as Nasserism - 
a label which Nasser himself always tried to reject - was 
created by Nasser after the 1952 revolution. At the time
(31) Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq, Oxford University
Press, London, 1969, pp.204-207
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of Farouk's overthrow, although a few of the Free Officers 
leaned towards Marxism or the Islamic reformism of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the majority, like Nasser himself, 
had no coherent political ideology beyond "reform".(32)
This can be seen in the Free Officers' manifesto, the 
Six Principles of the Revolution, from which Nasser 
eventually developed his own political ideas and practices;
1. the elimination of imperialism and its 
traitorous Egyptian agents;
2. the eradication of feudalism;
3. the destruction of monopoly and of the 
domination of capital over the govern­
ment ;
4. the establishment of social justice;
5. the establishment of a strong national 
Army ; and
6. the establishment of a sound democracy.(33) 
Within two years Nasser had placed his personal stamp
on this body of doctrine in his book. The Philosophy of 
Revolution, which he put forward as not merely a policy 
or set of policies, but as a pragmatic theory, developed 
during the national struggle. The two other principal 
documents of Nasserism are the Egyptian constitution of 
1956, which gave particular emphasis to the socialist 
features of the Six Principles, and the National Charter 
of 1962.
Nasserism operates on two levels, the Egyptian and the
(32) P. Mansfield, op.cit., p.114
(33) G.A, Nasser, "The Principles that Guide Egypt's
Political Life", in K.H. Karpat, 
op.cit., pp.200-204
Pan-Arab. Nasser's first attempt at constructing a 
political philosophy was not much more than a rational­
isation of his policy for Egypt. During the period 1952 
to 195ÿ, Nasser concentrated within Egypt on bringing the 
people to an acceptance of socialism, which he called "the 
stage of conversion", while externally he restricted his 
Pan-Arabist activities to agitation and propaganda, which 
he called "the stage of upsurge". His internal strategy 
' was to convert Egyptian society from within by implement­
ing the Six Principles of the Egyptian Revolution as far 
as he could. The elimination of imperialism was achieved 
by the negotiated evacuation of the 80,000 British troops 
from the banks of the Suez Canal. The eradication of 
feudalism, the abolition of monopoly and of the domin­
ation of capital over the government, were pursued by 
means of a whole range of socialist laws, including 
agrarian reform, the redistribution of the fertile land 
to the farmers, the extension of the public sector to 
take in banks and insurance companies, and government 
supervision over foreign trade. (As part of this modern­
isation programme, Nasser revived the long-standing 
project of an Aswan High Dam). Nasser described the 
aims of his Arab socialism as a "society of sufficiency 
and justice". His policy was both to increase production 
and to bring about a redistribution of wealth, believing 
that increased production without justice in redistrib­
ution would mean a further monopolisation of wealth, and 
that redistribution of wealth without increasing national 
income would end only in the redistribution of poverty and
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m is e r y . ( 3 4 )
Nasser's internal political strategy was to bring 
what he called the five groups of the working classes - 
workers, peasants, intelligentsia, armed forces and 
"national capitalists" (mainly small business owners) - 
together in a single political organisation. This has 
had various names at various times: the National Liber-
/ ation Rally (1953-56), the National Union (1956-1962),
/ and (from 1962) the Arab Socialist Union. This polit­
ical organisation has been the only "political party" 
permitted in Egypt. Nasser described it as the ex­
pression of the political will of the active popular 
forces, allied within the framework of a political 
organisation which was different from a political party 
in the Western sense of the term.
Nasser established these successive political organ­
isations as a framework for his national activities and 
as a means of providing popular backing for his policies 
whether in Egypt or in inter-Arab politics. His idea 
was that this framework would permit political partic­
ipation by those he supposed to be naturally sympathetic 
to socialism, while excluding other groups. Socialism 
was initially defined in terms of the Six Principles but 
the socialist programme had later to be revised in the 
light of experience. During the first period when the 
tasks of the Liberation Rally were to implement the Six 
Principles, Nasser did not engage in the politics of
(34) G.A. Nasser, "The Principles That Guide Egypt's
Political Life", Loc.cit., 
pp.200-204
üPan-Arabism very actively. For example, on returning 
from the Bandong Conference, Nasser told the Egyptian 
people: "I declared in the name of the Egyptian people...
that your internal policy was to establish social justice 
and get rid of feudalism and imperialism and its supporters, 
and that your foreign policy was a fully independent /i.e. 
Egyptian/ policy.(35)
It was events, in Egypt and elsewhere, rather than a 
grand plan conceived in advance, which intensified 
Nasser's involvement in the politics of Pan-Arabism as 
well as his endeavours to bring in socialism. The 
Czech arms deal and the failure of negotiations with the 
West on the Aswan^High Dam seems to have made Nasser more 
enthusiastic about socialism. On 1 June 1936, just 
before the final departure of the British troops from 
the Canal Zone, Nasser promised the Egyptian people to 
end the military rule of the Revolutionary Command Council 
in Egypt and to turn the country into a "co-operative 
society". He announced that the RCC would be disolved 
on 23 June when Egypt's new constitution was voted on.
The new constitution was to mark three developments.
First, the Six Principles were reaffirmed in its preamble. 
Second, the socialist features of the regime were 
emphasised by the manner in which the Liberation Rally 
was developed into the National Union (al-ittihad al- 
qav/rai). The last of the 192 articles of the Constitution 
provided that the people of Egypt should form a National
(35) See "Chronology", The Middle East Journal,
Washington B.C., Vol.6, 
June-July, 1955, p.221
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Union. This body would provide a comprehensive frame­
work for all the political aspects of the transition to 
socialism, including debate on how this should be brought 
about. As part of its function, it was to make socialist 
nominations for membership of the National Assembly.
(To underline his commitment to socialism, Nasser and three 
of his ministers accepted 1,318 of the National Union's 
/nominations and rejected 1,210 as "politically undesir- 
I able".) The third development was that the idea of
I
Pan-Arabism became one of the formal objectives of 
Nasserism. Paragraph 6 of the Constitution preamble 
begins as follows: "We, the Egyptian people, realising
that we form an organic part of the greater Arab entity, 
and aware of our responsibilities and obligations toward 
the common Arab struggle for the glory and honour of the 
Arab nation ...".(36) This affirmation came just in 
time for the Suez Canal Crisis, which broke on 26 July, 
1956, in which Nasser's call for Arab unity became much 
more vigorous, as part of his struggle for survival.
Thus two parallel struggles were institutionalised: 
socialism and Pan-Arabism. Nasser intended that the two 
should reinforce each other in the second stage of his 
Revolution: but in fact they were to be stumbling blocks
to each other.
The National Union lasted through the experiment of 
union with Syria. After the downfall of the UAR in 1961,
(36) Curtist F. Jones, "The New Egyptian Constitution",
The Middle East Journal, 
Washington D.C., Vol.10, No.5, 
1956, pp.300, 304
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Nasser decided to give a new precise form to socialism 
through a National Charter. This document set out three 
objectives and one may notice that the importance of Pan- 
Arabism had been reduced. The three objectives were 
freedom, socialism and unity. Freedom meant both 
independence for the country and freedom for the citizen 
in the sense of being able to participate in, or be rep­
resented by, the only political organisation of the 
country, the Arab Socialist Union. Socialism meant the 
just redistribution of wealth to every citizen. Unity, 
as an objective, was not elaborated upon in the National 
Charter beyond stating that unity was the natural order 
of a nation: the whole context of the Charter, which
was concerned exclusively with Egyptian affairs, makes 
it evident that this referred to the unity of the Egyptian 
people. As far as Pan-Arab unity was concerned, the 
Charter, to salvage what it could from the wreck of 
the UAR, included a recognition that partial unity of 
any two or more Arab states could, perhaps, lead to 
total unity as long as these partial unities were com­
plementary to one another (rather than contradictory as 
had been the case in 1958 when the UAR confronted the 
Hashemite Federation of Iraq and Jordan).
In its first two years, the Egyptian Revolution had 
been preoccupied with the problems of the Nile Valley and 
had not greatly concerned itself with wider Arab affairs. 
Nasser's early ideas about Egypt's role in the world, which 
he saw in terms of Arab, African and Islamic circles, were 
set out in The Philosophy of Revolution which was later 
described by Professor Walid Khalidi as "vague and dreamy
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reminiscences rather than a statement of political 
philosophy",(37) The generality of Nasser's idea of 
inter-Arab co-operation is suggested by his statement 
in January, 1955 that "our comprehension of unity is that 
if anything happens in Damascus there is an echo in 
Cairo".(38) He was so far from being a fully-fledged 
Nasserist that he was prepared to assert the primacy of 
that very conservative body, the Arab League, in Arab 
affairs (although it was in fact other Arab states which 
had to take the initiative in diplomatic co-operation with 
Egypt through League channels). He wrote in 1955: "the
League can be made the instrument through which a greater 
unity can be achieved among the Arab nations^ in every 
field of activity".(39)
Even though Nasser was slow to become a Nasserist, 
the roots of Nasserist Pan-Arabism are to be found in 
the Six Principles, despite the fact that they contain no 
direct reference to the cause of Arab unity. It was, 
however, implicit in the first of them, that pledging the 
leaders of the Revolution to fight against imperialism.
This linked Egypt to the wider Arab cause of independence, 
since a large part of the Arab world was still under 
colonial rule, and the Egyptian struggle in the Canal Zone 
was both an encouragement to other Arab countries to strive 
for their independence and, at the same time, a part of
(37) Walid Khalidi, "Nasserism and the Arabia World",
Middle East Forum, Beirut, 1959, 
Vol.XXIV, No.4, pp.30-37
(38) Al-Ahram, September, 1973, p.5 (Obituary)
(39) Nasser, Gamal Abdul, "The Egyptian Revolution",
Foreign Affairs, XXXIII, January 1955,
p.210
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their struggle.
Thus the implicit connotation of the first of the Six 
Principles of Revolution was the initial take-off point 
of Nasser's Pan-Arab policy, but it was followed by 
vigorous attempts to exercise as much leadership as 
possible, starting with the Canal Zone and the Algerian 
revolt in November, 1954. The vigorousness of Nasser's 
involvement was stimulated by successive events in the 
Middle East, starting v/ith the signing of the Baghad Pact 
in February, 1955 and the open conflict with Israel which 
started again in the same month with the Gaza raid, and 
by the Bandong Conference in April, 1955 where Nasser for 
the first time met the Third World leaders and got an 
opportunity, with the help of China, to initiate an 
arms deal with Russia. This arms deal was followed by 
the withdrawal of American economic aid for the Aswan 
High Dam and so led to the Suez Crisis in 1956.(40)
When Nasser brought the idea of the Arabism of Egypt 
into the 1956 constitution, his cry for Arab nationalism 
became louder. He said when announcing the nationalis­
ation of the Suez Company that "the people will stand 
united as one man to resist the imperialists' act of 
treachery. We shall do whatever we like ... v/e have 
taken this decision to restore part of the glories of 
the past and safeguard our national dignity and pride".(41)
(40) P.J. Vatikiotis, "Egypt and the Arab World", in
Foreign Policy in World Politics, 
ed. by Roy C. Macridis, Prantice-Hall 
International, Englewood Cliffs,
1962, p.342
(41) G.E.K, "Arab Nationalism and Nasserism", The World
Today, Vol.14, No.12, December 1958, p.540
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The response of the Arab masses to Nasser's call 
for Arab nationalism was immediate and enthusiastic and 
showed the measure of success that had been achieved in 
his "stage of upsurge". His own explanation of the 
nationalisation of the Canal, only twelve years before 
the concession was due to expire anyway, was that he 
and Egypt had been "slapped in the face" by the Americans 
and that he had needed some dramatic way to electrify the 
Arab masses into protest. The immediate nationalisation 
of the Canal was the means he chose and its major objec­
tive was to "arouse Arab nationalism".(42) He explained 
his strategy thus: "a people cannot be inspired to
mobilise their strength and to be made aware of their 
strength just by shouting. They must be aroused by 
dramatic action, by deeds, by action that proves one's 
strength, and by deeds carried out with all the effective 
means at one's command".(43) Each success would give 
the Arab spirit a new horizon which might eventually raise 
the self-confidence of the people and banish the sense of 
inferiority that had so long affected them.
After the crisis, Nasser made more and more play of 
the idea of Arab unity because he wished to exploit the 
new-found popular support which had proved itself to be 
so vital to his survival as a leader. The transition 
to the next phase of his Pan-Arab policy, to what he called 
"the stage of constitutional unity" again came about 
opportunistically. When conflict in Syria^ldd the Baath
(42) Willard Range, "An Interpretation of Nasserism",
West.Political Quarterly, Utah, Vol.12, 
No.4, 1959, p.iOlT“
(43) ibid., 1011
Party to appeal for help against the Communists by offer­
ing Nasser a union between the two countries, Nasser 
seized with delight this opportunity to extend his in­
fluence. His rationalisation of his response, which had 
not been foreshadowed in earlier theoretical statements, 
was that to gain the strength needed to acquire self- 
respect and the respect of others, the Arab people must
/unite constitutionally in a single state.
' Nasser now used the king of language which suggested
that the UAR was part of a grand Nasserite design (rather 
than the outcome of a Baathist tactical move to keep power 
in Syria) and held that a United Arabia was the only kind 
of political arrangement for the Arab world that could 
produce political stability among Arabs, prevent ex­
ploitation by foreign "devils"(44) and give the Arab 
people a sense of self-reliance. All parts of the Arab 
world were inter-dependent; no part could be defended 
without defence of the whole and a single defensive 
system was as necessary for the Arab region as for the 
Pan-American region.(45) The reference to the OAS seemed 
to cast Egypt in the same relation to the Arab world as 
the US occupied in the Americas, and served to bolster the 
identification of Nasserism with Arab nationalism.
Although Nasserism had had a profound effect on the 
Arab world, it did not have universal appeal. Its 
importance was recognised by such external commentators 
as Richard H. Nolte and William R. Polk, who argued that
(44) ibid., n.lOll
(45) ibid., p.1013
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Arab nationalism was a considerable force, and that "if 
the United States is to pursue its objectives successfully 
in the Middle East it must understand that the decisive
social and political force at work is Arab nationalism,
and must come to terms with it ...",(46) To Nasser's 
supporters, Nasserism meant the way to comprehensive Arab
unity including all the lands where the Arabic language
/
and culture were predominant; but his rivals saw it as 
a force which could undermine their interests or even 
bring their very existence to an end. To most Egyptians 
Nasserism had come to mean the extension of Egypt's dom­
ination over the Arab world, a bid for leadership in Black 
Africa and victory for the Arab cause;(47) but even within
Egypt Nasserism was a devisive force. It had brought to
the Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwan al-Muslimin), on the 
extreme right, the destruction of their party and the 
death of their leaders and this in turn brought some 
discredit on Nasser in the wider Arab world where the 
hanging of the Muslim Brotherhood's leaders was seen as 
an attack on Islam. On the left, Nasserism meant to the 
Communist Party in Syria a suppressive force which denied 
its right to exist in its homeland. These rivals on 
right and left accordingly worked to slow down the 
Nasserite drive to unity.
All other governments in the Middle East were in 
varying degree suspicious of Nasser, To Nuri al-Said of 
Iraq, Nasserism was the force which had isolated Iraq and
(46) The World Today, "Arab Nationalism and Nasserism",
Vol.14, No.12, December 1958, p.532
(47) P.J. Vatikiotis, op.cit., p.335
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taken control over the Arab League (not least because 
Egypt in the early years of the League paid 42% of the 
League Budget; this proportion declined as other Arab 
states took a fairer share, and since 1973 has stood at 
14%, the same as that paid by Kuwait). Eventually 
Nasserism, after the formation of the UAR, was the force
I
which brought Nuri's regime to an end.(48) To Lebanon,
/Nasserism was the force behind her civil war of 1958.
I
To Israel, Nasserism was a dangerous force (49), (and to 
the Soviet Union, by the same token, a useful ally in the 
Middle East). Thus, because of the hostility as well 
as the adulation which Nasser inspired, Nasserism was a 
centrifugal rather than a centripetal force and as such 
contributed to what v/as called "the Arab Cold War". (50)
Eventually, Nasserism encountered a great deal of 
opposition from within and without the UAR. The most 
fatal centrifugal force was the "constitutional unity" 
itself, which the Syrians regarded as no more than 
Nasserite domination in Syria. Whereas the Baath Party 
rejected the idea that the UAR meant that the character­
istics of Egyptianism and Syrianism should cease to 
exist, the Egyptians worked to proceed at once to complete 
unification with a common citizenship.
From 1962 there were signs of change in Nasser's 
approach to unity. He produced the National Charter for
(48) P.J. Vatikiotis, op.cit., p.343
(49) Uri Avenry, Israel Without Zionists A Plea for Peace
in the Middle East, Macmillan, London, 
1968, p. 102, 103
(50) M. Kerr, The Arab Cold War, Oxford University Press,
London, 197l ”
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the Egyptian people in which he accepted the idea of 
peaceful partial unification. On the need for peaceful 
methods, the Charter stated that "unity cannot be, nor 
should be, imposed. The national objectives should be 
equally honourable in their means as in their ends, there­
fore coercion of any kind is detrimental to unity".(51)
With respect to partial unification, Nasser accepted the 
possibility of forming two or more unities on the path 
to total unity when he said "any political unification 
within the Arab world by two or more of the Arab states 
is a step forward and draws nearer the day of total 
unity".(52)
At the same time, however, as Nasser's ideological 
principles were taking a new shape he was, in practice, 
living amid the storm of the inter-Arab Cold War. His 
disputes with Saudi Arabia, which had started before the 
formation of the UAR with a Saudi conspiracy to have 
Nasser assassinated,(53) were brought to a new level of 
intensity by the Yemeni coup in September, 1962 and the 
start of the republican-royalist civil war. Furthermore, 
Nasser's socialist transition as formulated in the Charter 
exacerbated his relations not only with the states of the 
conservative bloc but also with other feudalist elements 
in the Arab world. Finally, Nasser's conflicts with 
Qasim of Iraq and the secessionist regime of Syria were 
continuous until the former was overthrown by a Eaathist-led
(51) Abdul Moghni Said, "The National Charter", in Arab
Socialism, Blandford Press, 
London, 1972, p.129
(52) ibid,, p.129 See also Al-Ahram, Cairo, September,
1973, p.5 (Obituary)
(53) David Hirst, op.cit., pp.26,27
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coalition in February, 1963 and the Baathists returned 
to power in Syria in March.
While the Yemeni coup (led by the Iraqi trained 
officer Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal) and the subsequent 
civil war, on the one hand, perpetuated the Egyptian- 
Saudi war of propaganda and, on the other, brought Saudi- 
Jordanian relations closer, the coming of the new Baathist 
regimes in Iraq and Syria brought the three socialist 
regimes of Egypt, Iraq and Syria into a new era of under­
standing. Amid these developments Nasser's policy of 
Pan-Arabism manifested a new approach: unity of "goal,
thought, outlook and unity of political action" of the 
socialist states. The policy came to public notice when 
the Baathist regimes of Iraq and Syria proposed new 
unity talks with Egypt which were held in Cairo in 
April, 1963. One may notice that the reconvening of 
the unity talks at that particular time was initiated 
by the Baathist regimes; this had at least three im­
plications. The first was that the Baathists were 
trying to mal^e amends for their own contribution to the 
downfall of the UAR. The second was that they were 
attempting to strengthen their positions in both countries 
and to gain popular support by offering to their own 
people the ultimate goal of Arab unity. The third was 
that if there was to be any unity with Egypt it should not 
be on the old Nasserite terms. The three governments 
agreed on two things. The first was the idea of 
"collective leadership". Nasser at first accepted this 
as a policy of gradual approach to unity. He thus in­
directly recognised the Baathists' demand for power-sharing
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and a limit to Egyptian domination of the proposed union.
The second was that to implement their agreement, the 
three governments agreed on what they called a "Charter 
for National Action".(54) This had been suggested by 
Abdullah Remawi, as an instrument which would define the 
principles, aims and social philosophy of the progressive 
forces which it was supposed to bring together, and which 
would become the basis of their interaction. One of its 
principles was to be freedom to form popular organisations; 
the Arab Socialist Union would be free to operate in 
Syria and Iraq and the Baath would be permitted in Egypt.
The idea was to enable the "free popular will to find an 
organised means of self-expression and the united political 
leadership to guarantee the co-ordination of all popular 
organisations on the road of unification".(55)
Behind the agreement, however, each party had hidden 
objectives. Nasser's was to enable the Nasserite elements 
in Syria and Iraq to grow rapidly and seize control of 
power there. The Baathists, in accordance with their 
strategy of favouring the multi-party system in other 
countries, had it in mind to suppress the Nasserite 
elements at home while starting a grassroots Baathist 
movement in Egypt. It was not surprising that when the
ruling Baath party in Syria took the first step down this 
road and suppressed the Nasserites in Syria, the agree­
ment fell apart. Nasser's reaction to yet another failure
(54) For further details see M. Kerr, "The Cairo
' Negotiations, March-April 1963", op.cit., p.44-73
(55) Walid Khalidi, "Minutes of the Tripartite Talks" in
Arab Political Documents, Slim Press, 
Beirut, ~ 1 M 3 , pp. 75-217 '
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was to abandon ideas of collective leadership and to 
seek a general co-ordination of policy with Arab govern­
ments, without looking for any special relationship with 
the Baath.
The negotiations on setting up a second UAR had not 
interrupted the continuous stream of Kasserist propaganda 
from Cairo directed at the Arab masses, urging them by 
radio to defeat capitalism and imperialism and to demolish 
exploitation. This Cold War continued, with Egypt 
facing Saudi Arabia in the Yemen civil war, attacking 
the South Arabian Federation which had been set up in 
January 1964, as well as, at the other political extreme, 
the ruling Baath party in Iraq. Nasserite propaganda, 
perhaps, had some share in the ousting of the Baathists 
from the Iraq government in November 1963 and contributed 
much to the eventual downfall of the South Arabian 
Federation in November 1967 (when the Peoples Republic 
of South Yemen was declared), But the Yemen civil war 
was so difficult and costly and such a drain on the 
Egyptian economy, that Nasser attempted to bring it to 
an end through a series of agreements within the general 
context of his new strategy of co-ordination of policy.
An opportunity arose in 1964 with respect to the 
proposed scheme for the diversion of the River Jordan,
Nasser suggested that this should be the subject of an 
Arab Summit Conference which might serve to evoke Arab 
enthusiasm for unified Arab action. If the conference 
were attended by Saudi Arabia, Nasser could make it an 
occasion for reconciliation with Faisal and CTCfillg 
the war in the Yemen. This would have the advantage of
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easing the severe strain of the war on the Egyptian 
economy and Egypt’s internal stability, Nasser could be 
confident that the conference would be well-attended, 
because he had chosen a subject that bore directly on 
the Arabs’ fight against Israel, This made it much 
more difficult for any Arab state to stay away than if 
he had chosen the subject of Arab co-operation in some 
field where he could not point directly to an external 
; enemy. But although Faisal came to both sessions of 
the Summit (January and September 1964) and acted as its 
Chairman, Nasser failed to get a Yemen settlement, for 
to Faisal the solution of the Yemen civil war was not a 
matter for a mere political agreement; he would not be 
satisfied with anything less than the total withdrawal 
of the Egyptian array from his neighbour. It was not 
until after the Six Day War that Nasser agreed to do this 
and the conflict was eventually solved in May 1970 by 
compromise.
Despite his failure to attain his direct aim through 
the Summit Conference, Nasser succeeded in perpetuating 
the idea of the Summit itself as a new approach to Pan- 
Arab co-operation. Five Summit Conferences were held 
during the period of 1964-1970 (Nasser died immediately 
after attending the fifth Conference held in Cairo to 
discuss the Jordanian civil war against the Palestinians) 
and the continuing practice of calling such Summits may 
be regarded as Nasser’s legacy to the cause of Pan- 
Arabism. The value of the Summit mechanism raises 
questions beyond the scope of this review of revolutionary 
movements and is discussed in the next chapter.
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Although his schemes of formal unity collapsed,
Nasserism did not entirely fail as a Pan-Arab movement.
It succeeded in the outward struggle against imperialism 
more than in the inward transition to socialism. But 
the increasing number of independent Arab states freed 
from their imperial masters had not brought the aspiration 
of Arab unity any nearer to realisation. Their achieve­
ment of independence had in fact institutionalised a 
proliferation of Arab states each of which valued its 
sovereignty and for itself if not for others, the tol­
eration of a variety of political forms in the Arab 
world.
The "third circle" of Nasser’s Philosophy of Revol­
ution, the Islamic world, also took institutional shape 
when the first Islamic Conference was held in 1968 in 
Morocco and the Islamic Secretariat was founded in Jeddah, 
but the idea was under the leadership of his rival, King 
Faisal, who in theory differed from Nasser by putting 
the idea of Pan-Islamism before Pan-Arabism. (One could, 
however, argue that Saudi practice places a higher value 
on Saudi Arabianism than on either Pan-Arabism or Pan- 
Islamism. Saudi immigration policy, for example, treats 
Arabs and non-Arab Muslims on an equal footing with non- 
Muslims) .
One may attribute some achievements, as well as 
failures, to Nasser’s strategy of mass conversion by 
propaganda or subversion. On the one hand, Nasserism 
succeeded in recruiting followers in some Arab countries.
The Young Officers who led the military coup in Libya in 
September 1969 represented an extension of Nasserism in
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a new form, as a combination of Pan-Arabism and Islamism 
worked out into what is known as Qaddafiyism. The 
Libyian revolutionaries actually tried, with some 
encouragement from Nasser, to go back to the Nasserite 
policy of unity through "constitutional unity" with the 
abortive scheme for a union of Egypt, Libya and the 
Sudan. But when that failed, the Libyans engaged in a 
campaign of propaganda and various alleged subversions 
which gave rise to a minor cold war with President Sadat 
of Egypt and President Numeiri of Sudan.
One may conclude that Nasserism had grown by oppor­
tunism and developed its operational approaches by 
reaction rather than design. The most blatant manifes­
tation of this was that Nasser’s propaganda was origin­
ally a response to various radio stations which operated 
against Egypt;(56) Nasser ordered his aides to stop the 
operation of subversion after the disaster of the Six 
Day War(57) which provides a fair example of his "trial 
and error" policy in Pan-Arab affairs.
BAATHISM AND NASSERISM: A COMPARISON
Baathism and Nasserism were markedly different in
origin. Baathism was the ideology of a political party 
which had been founded by civilians (who had received a 
Western education in France) as an opposition party to 
compete with other political parties for power in Syria,
(56) For further details see M. Abdul-Xader Hatem,
- "Beginnings of an Information Response", in
Information and The Arab Cause, Longman Group Ltd, 
London, 1974, pp.143-165
(57) Heikal, op.cit., pp,124-30
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Its founders, Michel Aflaq, Salah al-Bitar and Jalal Said, 
were of different religions, Christian and Islam. It 
was established with a complete party structure and 
constitution which had been worked out in advance by a 
group of the intelligentsia who wanted to take an active 
part in politics. Nasserism was the rationalisation and 
adaptation to circumstances of the rather vague ideas 
about the modernisation of Egypt held by the group of 
Free Officers who overthrew King Farouq in 1952. Its 
early motivation was resentment against the Palace, the 
political parties and the British presence in Egypt and 
it was an ideology developed opportunistically from the 
Six Principles of Revolution. Far from having a party 
structure worked out in advance, it had to improvise 
three "political organisations" in eight years (1954-1962).
The difference in origin of the two movements led to 
differences in their approaches to Pan-Arabism, The 
Baathist approach was theoretically divided into two 
stages. In the first, the Baath aimed at the conversion 
of the Arab masses into a nation of revolution. In the 
second, the Baath was to lead the core of the Baath 
followers (i.e. those who accepted Baathism as a mission) 
into a revolution aiming at political power. Nasser 
also envisaged two stages of "political" and "social" 
revolution; but as Nasserism started with political 
power, it had no need of a revolution to gain it. So 
for Nasser, the beginning of the two revolutions were 
various changes in the political system introduced after 
the coup d'etat to transform the regime from a monarch­
ical system to a republican one, and from a multi-party
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system to a system based on a type of political organis­
ation which, under various names, was supposed to rep­
resent a framework for Nasser's political democracy.
The social revolution consisted essentially of an economic 
revolution which was to take the form of a socialist 
transformation of Egyptian society. In other words, 
while the Baath had to seek radical change from below 
(by "inqilab" of the masses) as a preparation for polit­
ical revolution, Nasser, having already seized political 
power, had to advocate change from above and impose it 
by decrees and constitutions as well as by means of his 
"guided democracy". A consequence of this difference 
was that the Baath had to work for political power within 
the limit of the capacity of a political party, resorting 
to the establishment of branches in various parts of the 
Arab world on the "cell system" and recruiting new 
party members by persuasion and a political education 
which aimed at "the creation of a new Arab generation 
which believes in the unity of the Arab nation and in 
the eternity of its mission". Nasser, on the other hand, 
could utilise the whole power of the Egyptian state to 
educate and mobilise the Egyptian people and the Arab 
masses to accept his political and social revolutions 
(he did not in any case believe in multi-party systems),
In the Arab world at large he accordingly made particular 
use of radio broadcasts, rather than a party cell organ­
isation, while within Egypt he introduced in schools and 
universities what was called "al-raaddah al-qawmiyyah"
(the National subject), i.e., indoctrination in the 
principles of the Egyptian Revolution, of Arab Socialism
105
and military training.
At the same time, however, as the Baath w^ as trying 
to establish its branches in Arab countries, looking for 
political power through election, it was also recruiting 
military officers who soon became the most active members 
of the Party, with the result that in those countries where 
the Baath achieved power, they did so by means of military 
coups, and not by elections at all. This can be seen as 
a compromise of Baathist principles which brought the 
Baath close to Nasserist practice, Nasserism in Egypt 
went through something like the reverse of this process.
Nasser did not believe in the multi-party system or free 
competition for power; but having seized power he had to 
resort to bringing about a compromise between the various 
groups of Egyptian society within the framework of his 
political organisation where each group elected its 
representatives to Parliament. The competition and 
debates between the various groups, (workers, peasants, 
intelligentsia, small business men and armed forces) within 
this political organisation helped the transition to 
socialism to take place with considerable internal stab­
ility.
In Pan-Arab politics, Nasser exerted his influence to 
persuade other Arab socialist regimes to follow his 
pattern of political organisation. He succeeded in con­
vincing President Abdul Salam Aref of Iraq, President 
Numeiri of the Sudan and Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, to form 
organisations in their own countries similar to the Arab 
Socialist Union, Nasser, perhaps, believed that assim­
ilation in political organisation might ease the way to
lUb
unity, although in practice it had no such effect. To 
the Baath, assimilation in this respect was also desirable 
for the same purpose of unity, but in their case the 
stumbling block arose from the military element in the 
Party, Baathist military involvement in political 
struggle was not always favourable to the Baath Party. 
Military officers could also be recruited as committed 
/members of other political parties, so that a Baath coup 
could be overturned by a Nasserite or some other Arab 
nationalist coup, a process which inevitably led to a 
great deal of political instability in the countries 
concerned, Syria and Iraq,
Nasserism had an advantage over Baathism with regard 
to propaganda. Through mass persuasion Nasser had 
succeeded in spreading his influence in the Arab world 
and recruiting what may be called "hidden subordinates". 
Organising political opposition in their own countries or 
leading military coups in the name of Nasserism, they 
considered themselves part of the Nasserite movement 
although they often acted without the foreknowledge of 
Nasser himself, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Sudan and 
Libya all provide examples of these hidden subordinates. 
Not only were some of them well-hidden but they also 
tended, in his later years, to be more Nasserist than 
Nasser himself. In the Libyan case, for example, Nasser 
sought to discover the orientation of the coup, whether or 
not it was Baathist, only to be informed by its leaders 
that they were Nasserists who wanted to place Libya at
his disposal.(58) Qaddafi even claimed that this had 
been his main motive in organising the Libyan coup, saying, 
"tell President Nasser that we do not want to rule Libya. 
All we have done is our duty as Arab nationalists. Now 
it is for President Nasser to take over himself and guide 
Libya from the reactionary camp, where it has been, to 
the progressive camp, where it would be".(59)
In their propaganda directed at the Arab masses, both 
Baathism and Nasserism sought to strengthen their appeal by 
presenting their doctrines as being at least consistent 
with the teaching of Islam (although the Iraqi Baathists 
have, since their coalition with the Conamunists in 1972, 
adopted an aggressively atheist line).(60) Aflaq viewed 
Islam as a religion which in its spirit and doctrine as 
well as in its lack of formal structure, was capable of 
being turned to revolutionary purpose. He saw it as a 
vital movement which provided the internal strength of 
the Arab nation and contributed to the revival of Arab­
ism. This religion, he said, had provided the basis for 
Arab evolution to unity, strength and progress.(61) Nasser 
made a similar claim, that his Arab nationalism derived 
generally from Islamic teaching and, unlike the Baath, 
he acknowledged no debt to Marxism. His main use of 
Islam, however, was in inter-Arab affairs. His early 
view that the Islamic world offered a third circle for
(58) M. Heikal, op.cit., p.68
(59) ibid., p.184
(60) M. Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Baath (On the Road to Baath)
Loc.cit., p.loO
(61) "Chronology" in The Middle East Journal, Vol.24,
1972, p.”297
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Egyptian foreign policy, and he also tried to make it a 
basis for keeping his relations with the conservative 
regime of Saudi Arabia as close as possible. îîe co­
operated with King Saud to form, in 1954, the Islamic 
Congress (al Mu'utamar al-Islami)(62) with Annwar Sadat 
as its first Secretary-General. When the Arab cold war 
started with Saudi Arabia, the Congress was brought to 
an end, but Nasser formed in 1962 another semi-government 
organisation in Cairo, known as the Highest Council of 
Islamic Affairs (al Majlis al-Aala Lil Shuoun al-Islamiyyah) 
which Saudi Arabia countered with another, formed in 
Mecca, known as The Islamic World League (Rabitah al- 
’Alara al-Islami) in the same year.
The faith of Islam was institutionalised in the 
National Charter of Egypt which proclaimed "unshakable 
faith in God, the Prophet and the sacred messages which 
He passed on to humanity in all places and at all times, 
as a guide to justice and righteousness". In practice, 
however, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic political 
party which had branches all over the Islamic world as 
well as in Egypt, had been banned in 1954 and was not 
accepted as a component of his new political organisation, 
the Arab Socialist Union. The abolition of the multi­
party system in Egypt accordingly led to severe disputes 
with the Brotherhood which, although it had been formally 
banned, was as active as before through its "usrah" (cell)
(62) Ahmad Zaki, "Al-Jamiah al-Arabiyyah wal-Islamiyyah,
hal Tataaradzan?" (the Arab and Islamic 
Leagues, Are they Competitive?) Al-Hilal, 
Vol.62, No.11, 1954, pp.13-16
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system against Nasser,(63) The hanging of their leaders 
in 1954 and 1966 aroused widespread opposition to Nasser's 
regime which was cast in the role of a foe of Islam. 
Furthermore, Nasser's political organisation had made 
other socialist regimes unwilling to join the Nasserite 
path to unity. Thus Nasser's political organisation 
constituted a centrifugal force both within and outside 
/ Egypt.
The Baathist and Nasserite movements proclaimed the 
' same objectives, but with their order reversed. While 
the Baath fought for unity, socialism and freedom,
Nasserists struggled for freedom, socialism and unity.
(Thus the first inkling that Nasser had that Qaddafi was 
one of his followers came from the order in which the 
three objectives of the Libyan Revolution were pro­
claimed) . (64) Both aimed at the Arab masses. A 
notable difference between the two was that the Baathists 
saw an organic relation between socialism and unity, 
whereas Nasser saw freedom (i.e. national independence) 
and socialism as the essential elements of his revolution.
When the two movements came together in 1958, they formed 
the first experiment of Arab union which revealed the 
centrifugal and centripetal forces at work in the Arab 
world.
Arab writers have criticised the Baathist-Nasserist 
union for several reasons. One argument has been that
(63) Peter Mansfield, op.cit., p. 116
(64) Heikal, op.cit., p.68 See also Document "The
Libyan "Revolution in the Words of its 
Leaders", The Middle East Journal, Vol.24 
1971, p.215
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the failure under Nasser’s leadership of this experiment 
in Arab unity did great damage?:to the notion of Arab 
unity itself. This view was expressed in the unific­
ation talks held in Cairo in 1963, where the Baath set 
up "collective leadership" as an alternative to Nasserism, 
as well as in the later policy of the new Baathist regime 
in Iraq under President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr.(65)
Jamil A. Ghafar, a Syrian critical of both Baathist 
and Nasserist conduct in the UAR, attributed the failure 
of the experiment to the immediate adoption of "constit­
utional unity" as a means by which both movements hoped 
to retain power. In his view this should not come at 
the end of a process which should have begun with a 
steady programme of functional unification, so that 
"constitutional unity" would have been the eventual 
expression of an organic relationship between twin 
struggles for national and socialist objectives. This 
organic bringing together of nationalist and socialist 
movements would have intensified the centrapetal forces 
of unity in the feelings of the Arab masses, and those 
feelings of Arab unity would in turn have become the 
basis of Arab daily life.(66) Ghafar suggested further 
that progress towards Arab nationalism had to be based 
on a predesigned programme for socialism. In other 
words, he criticised the way in which the UAR had been 
founded as a merely improvised policy related only to the 
power struggle between the Baath Party and the Communists
(65) M. Kadduri, Republican Iraq, Loc.cit., p.284
(66) Jamil A. Ghafar, op,cit., p.7,8
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in Syria, and had therefore lacked the necessary bases for 
lasting Arab unity. The nature of Nasserite improvisation 
had inevitably led only to a temporary co-existence between 
two incompatible doctrines about the organisation of 
political activity, despite the amalgamation of the Baath 
into the National Union. Thus the failure of the UAR 
was related by Ghafar mainly to the lack of an ideological 
commitment in social, political and economic affairs which 
expressed adequately the interests of the Arab masses.
One may add that this lack of ideological commitment was 
more than a mistake which Nasser might in time have learnt 
to rectify; it was an inescapable feature of the oppor­
tunist approach to Arab unity which was Nasserism.
At another level of argument, Ghafar accused Nasser 
of being too soft in his dealings with private sectors 
of the economy and ideologically uncommjtted members of 
the National Union, and too lenient with petty bourgeois 
elements who had penetrated the Nasserite movement. Nasser 
had practised a policy of accommodation with these 
elements in Egypt, and after 1958 he extended it to the 
whole UAR. He thereby granted his unwitting protection 
to those who in 1960 would act against the socialist 
transformation of Syria and favour its secession from the 
UAR.(67)
0. Farsakh also attributed the failure of the UAR 
to the pragmatic nature of Nasserism which was looking 
for an ideology rather than implementing a well defined 
one. The softness of Nasserism was due to Nasser's
(6 7 ) i b i d . , p . 8
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rejection of the notion of class struggle; but such a 
struggle was required in Syria to implement the socialist 
transformation there. Nasser believed in peaceful con­
version of the Arab masses, but this belief enabled the 
reactionary elements and the petty bourgeoisie to defeat 
Nasser's programme from within.(68)
' Farsakh argued that Nasserism ceased to be a rev- 
/olutionary movement after the formation of the UAR because,
■ although the realisation of "constitutional unity" was a 
revolution in itself (here he differed from Ghafar), it 
was not followed by unification of the governmental 
features of a united state, i.e., political organisation, 
armed forces, currency, administration, laws and political 
ideology. The absence of determination to achieve 
these unities had created the impression that Nasser 
lacked revolutionary enthusiasm. This led at first to 
the emergence of internal opposition among the revol­
utionaries themselves, and then generated bitter conflicts 
which led finally to the secession of Syria.(69)
Regarding the Baathist contribution to the rise and 
fall of the UAR, Ghafar saw the formation of the United 
Arab Republic as no more than a tactical move against 
local Communists. The Baath itself encompassed rightist 
elements who had been able to reach top positions in the 
Party; from there they could spread doubt about the 
correctness of its socialist programme, thereby inclining 
the Party to adopt an opportunistic reformist policy.(70)
(68) For further details see 0.Farsakh, "Wahdah Sanali 1958"
(Unity of 1958), Dirasat Arabiyyah, Beirut, 
Vol.9, No.4, 1973, pp.31-35
(69) ibid., p.35
(70) J.A. ‘Ghafar, op. cit. , pp. 13-14
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Furthermore, the Party was divided into two incompatible 
wings in Damascus and Baghdad. This illustrates the most 
significant of the centrifugal forces exerted in the Arab 
world and the UAR by both Baathism and Nasserism. Each 
practised a kind of ideological fanaticism, not only 
with regard to the other, but also among themselves.
This brought internal rivalries, which cancelled out one 
/another's achievements and finally degraded the notion 
I of unity itself. Ghafar attributed the conflicts 
between the Baathist regimes in Iraq and Syria to the 
spirit of "ideological regimentation" which not only had 
perpetuated the conflicts between them but had also 
exacerbated them to the extent that it was difficult to 
reach mutual understanding even at times when they both 
faced a grievous challenge.(71) On the same point,
Eamadi attributed these conflicts to a "psychological 
separatism" which demonstrated itself in power disputes 
between the two regional Commands of the Party, He 
meant by "psychological separatism", the tendency of the 
leader in each capital to see himself as sole rightful 
leader of the Party as a whole, a tendency which nec­
essarily exerted a negative effect on the Party objective 
of Arab unity as well as on the unity of the Party itself. 
With regard to their relations with other states, both 
movements did great damage. Although Baathist socialist 
doctrine was the more divisive as an ideological factor 
in inter-Arab relations, the combination of^Nasserism with 
the political, economic and cultural standing of Egypt was
(7 1 ) i b i d . , p . 18
a cause of deeper division in the Arab world than the 
Baath. Nasserist Egypt was at the centre of the Arab cold 
war, facing opposition from many quarters, including the 
Baath Party itself. Despite the divisive effects in 
the Arab world of its socialist character, the Baath 
Party rarely involved itself in disputes with conserv­
ative regimes. Thus Nasserism was more divisive in the 
diplomatic realm of inter-Arab relations than Baathism, 
it was also a divisive factor in its dealing with other 
socialist regimes because of Nasser's monopolistic manner 
of political struggle for power. The socialist aspect 
of both Baathism and Nasserism undermined any basis there 
might otherwise have been in Arabism or Islam for drawing 
the conservative Arab oil states into a process of peace­
ful unification, for these two states rejected the path 
of Arab economic unity for fear of a nationalisation 
policy which would deprive them of the special advantages 
which, as independent states, they drew from their oil.
The oil rich countries were also reluctant to invest their 
capital in Egypt, Iraq and Syria, whose socialist policies 
aroused a feeling of resentment in the majority of conserv­
ative Muslims in Arab and non-Arab countries.
Comparing the durability of the progz’ammes, the 
Baath's has proved more successful because the Party has 
an ideology and structure which enables its members to 
work to implement its programme to a certain extent 
independently of the formal leadership. In other words, 
the Baathist programme was a programme of ideas, whereas 
the Nasserite one was an improvised policy linked very 
closely with the changing will of the leader.
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The force of Nasser's propaganda in the Arab world 
had something of the effect of the Baath cell system.
It found supporters in the Sudan and Libya and in some 
factions in Lebanon. In these places it developed into 
a new version, eventually identified with new person­
alities, such as Qaddafi, who became affiliated to 
Nasserism. But whereas support for Baathism grew 
steadily in the Arab masses of Syria and Iraq, with 
increasing popular commitment to its ideology and its 
struggle for political power, Nasserism grew rapidly in 
the entire Arab world as it searched for a Pan-Arab 
ideology - and then withered with the death of the 
leader. Today it is Baathism which is the most power­
ful of the Pan-Arab movements dedicated to socialism and 
Arab unity, and the most threatening force to the con­
servative regimes in the Arab world.
The two revolutionary movements have caused direct 
damage to the effectiveness of the Arab League as a 
formal framework of inter-Arab relations. In the first 
place, at the same time as they aspired to unite the 
Arab world, they were fundamentally against the status 
quo represented by the League. Secondly, as Pan-Arabist 
movements they caused inter-Arab conflicts which imposed 
on the League a heavy burden which in many cases it 
seemed unable to bear. In some cases, they showed it 
to be ineffective in carrying out tasks of reconciliation 
and maintaining the status quo; in others, they compelled 
the Le3.gue to appear as if it favoured some Arab policies 
against others. This last factor was exacerbated by 
Egypt's ability, because of her position at the centre of
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Arab politics, to employ the League as an instrument of 
her inter-Arab policy. The location of the League's 
offices in Cairo, where its bureaucracy was staffed 
mainly by Egyptians, and the high contribution which for 
so long Egypt made to the League Budget, made it often 
appear an annex of the Egyptian Foreign Office. All 
these factors had enabled Egypt to increase her influ­
ence in the League and reserve the post of Secretary 
General for her own nationals: Abdul Rahman Azzam;
Abdul Khaleq Hassuna and, most recently, Mahmoud Riyad.
Although the Syrian and Iraqi governments could not 
turn their backs entirely on the League, the Baath Party 
has attacked its very existence. Aflaq considered it 
"an admission and legalisation of the present disunity 
in the Arab world .... It is not only a short step toward 
unity but also the wrong step".(72) This attitude 
was shared by other Arab revolutionary writers. The 
Arab leaders who compromised on Arab unity and founded 
the League were branded by Fayez Sayegh, a Palestinian, 
as a "bunch of selfish politicians bent upon the assump­
tion of power ?vt any cost. They were a group of oppor­
tunists and compromisers interested in trivialities 
rather than in the general good and the national cause".(73) 
Munif Razzaz, one of the Baath leaders, went further by 
stating that "the coming together of corrupt Arab govern­
ments only resulted in the accumulation of corruption".(74)
(72) K.S.A. Jaber, op,cit., p.25
(73) Walid Khazziha, Revolutionary Transformation in the
Arab World, Charles Knight & Co., 
London^ 1975, p.7
(74) ibid., p.lO
i.J.7
The League was an accumulated corruption because "it 
favoured the perpetuation of regionalism as opposed to 
Pan-Arabism, and it was entirely controlled by an old 
generation of Arab politicians".(75)
There is in fact some basis for the revolutionaries' 
reproaches. The League's Charter did indeed permit 
schemes of union between Arab states and Article 9 could
I be said even to encourage the aspiration of closer relations
/ between two or more Arab states. It provided that "The
I
' states of the Arab League that are desirous of establish­
ing among themselves closer collaboration and stronger 
bonds than those provided for in the present Pact, may 
conclude among themselves whatever agreements they wish 
for this purpose". The older generation of Arab 
politicians such as Abdul Hamid Badawi Pasha (later a
. Judge of the International Court of Justice) who died on 
5 August 1965, could thus claim that closer ties between 
two or more member states should 3by no means be con­
sidered contrary to the charter; and Abdul Rahman Azzam, 
the first Secretary General of the League, said "I do 
not consider this article to be framed in a negative 
sense. I believe it v/as put in in order to emphasise 
the rights of member states to conclude whatever agree­
ments they like that are broader in scope than this 
Charter".(76) But the positive initiative for unity 
or closer co-operation had to come from the member states 
themselves, not from the League, It was the fact that
(75) ibid., p.10
(76) K.H. Karpat, op.cit., p.249
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initiative for unity was left to sovereign states which 
led critics of the League to say that it would not serve 
as an instrument of Arab unity. M.A, Mahgoub, the 
foi'mer Prime Minister of the Sudan, said, "the termin­
ology of the Charter makes this unity impossible, from 
the very origin of the League. As its membership has 
grown, disputes between the member states inside and 
outside the conference room have served to keep the Arab 
states apart rather than unite them".(77) But it was 
not just that the League was a forum for disputes, and 
frequently a scapegoat, rather than an instrument for 
unity; the League also legitimised the right of Arab 
states to stand apart from schemes of unity. The con­
servative regimes would not have joined it on any other 
basis. Article 8, in particular, states that "every 
member state of the League shall respect the form of 
government obtaining in the other states of the League, 
and shall recognise the form of government obtaining as 
one of the rights of those states, and shall pledge itself 
not to take any action tending to change that form".
Comparing Article 8 and 9, one may conclude that the 
League is an instrument of the status quo rather than 
the promoter of the policies of Arab unity. N.A, Faris 
suggested to the League two alternatives : revolutionary
violence or voluntary federation.(78) Any Arab country 
might be able to play a role similar to the one played by 
Prussia in forging German unity, if international
(77) M.A. Mahgoub, op.cit., p.294
(78) N.A, Faris, "A View of Arab Unity", in K.H, Karpat,
op.cit., pp.259-261
J. ±51
circumstances were favourable. Why no Arab country has 
yet been able to play the role of Prussia is one of the 
questions examined in the following chapter.
1 2 0
c h a p t e r  V
Brothers, Cousins and Enemies
For most of the period since 1945, and particularly 
in the years prior to the Six Days' War, Arab states have 
appeared to be divided into two groups generally antagon­
istic to each other. One was republican and socialist, 
led by Egypt; the other was monarchist and conservative, 
led by Saudi Arabia; but both were essentially author­
itarian and centralist. On the surface it seemed that 
the struggle between the two was acute, with each trying 
to dominate the other in direct confrontation (as in the 
Yemen); but the underlying reality of inter-Arab 
relations was not a simple bipolarity along lines deter­
mined by the political characteristics of each group.
The relations between Arab states seem to depend as much 
upon the external threat which they face as upon their 
own policy preferences, and as these external threats 
have changed rapidly over the last thirty years so have 
the patterns of conflict and co-operation in the Arab 
world. This view of inter-Arab relations was encapsul­
ated by King Faisal when he was asked in June 1967 how 
he would behave towards Egypt, his opponent in the Yemen, 
now that she had been attacked by Israel. He replied 
with an Arab proverb: I stand with my brother against my
cousin and with my cousin against my enemy".(1) The 
wider significance of this remark for the understanding 
of Arab politics can be shown with respect to the notion
(1) Keesing Contemporary Archive, June 3-10, 1987, Vol.16,
1966-1967, p.22066
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of "circles" which is found in Nasser's writings and else­
where .
Nasser used the idea of "circles" in his Philosophy 
of Revolution to paint a static picture of international 
politics with Egypt at the centre surrounded by the three 
circles of the Arab world, the African world and Islam. 
There are three difficulties about this view as an approach 
to inter-Arab politics. One is that it involves an 
arbitrary assertion about Egypt's position at the centre 
of Arab affairs. The second is that it does not say 
anything about relations within the Arab world itself, and 
the third is that it does not take sufficient account of 
the continually changing nature of Arab politics. The 
circles in Arab politics do not centre on Egypt alone 
but rather on each of the Arab states and they vary in 
extent as the feelings of Arab states towards each other 
change. If we are to use broad categories to describe 
the relationships between Arab states it may be more 
useful to borrow the terras employed by King Faisal rather 
than Nasser's "circles", and to analyse inter-Arab 
relations in terms of "brotherhood", "cousinhood" and 
"enmity".
The first circle or category of inter-Arab relations 
may be regarded as the relation of brotherhood. This 
may imply an actual relation of kinship as in the case of 
brothers or cousins ruling in neighbouring states (e.g. 
the Rasheraites in Iraq and Transjordan); and by extension, 
the term may also apply between leaders with similar 
political systems in their own countries. In other words,
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those who rule through monarchical systems may regard each 
other as brothers, and so may republicans. On another 
dimension, those with similar ideologies may recognise a 
degree of political brotherhood between each other; 
traditionalists and conservatives are brothers in their 
own group and socialists are brothers in their own cluster. 
The second category is that of "cousinhood". This term 
refers to the relationship between Arab groups with 
differing political systems and ideologies. Relations 
between Arab royalists and republicans are of this kind 
of cousinhood, as are relations between Arab socialists 
and conservatives.
Brotherhood and cousinhood are both based first of 
all on the political sentiment of Arabism, that is, the 
feeling of belonging to one nation (qawm) bound by a 
common religion, language, historical memories and common 
culture. This feeling transcends the division of the 
Arab world into many different states(shuoub). Despite 
this division, the Arab masses may be regarded as brothers 
with respect to their Arabness; and by the same token, 
the Arab states may be regarded as being in a relation of 
kinship to each other, of either brotherhood or cousin­
hood. When the relation of Arabness is reinforced by 
a marked similarity of political system or ideology, the 
feeling of kinship between two states may be close enough 
to merit the term "brotherhood"; but when the Arab bonds 
between two states are cut across and weakened by 
differences of political systems and ideologies this 
more distant relationship may be called "cousinhood".
One may accordingly define political brotherhood as
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the relationship of two states who are bound together by 
Arabism and shared political and ideological attitudes, 
and who feel a strong obligation to help one another when 
threatened by an outsider. Cousinhood is a looser 
relationship based on Arabism, but weakened by differing 
political and ideological attitudes. Cousins, however, 
are prepared to help one another at a time of crisis with 
I outsiders, though at other times they may oppose each 
other in support of brother states.
The level of relationship between states who might 
foe expected to regard each other as brothers (e.g. because 
both are monarchies) may be retarded at, or degraded to, 
that of cousinhood either because of recent historical 
enmity or because of political or doctrinal conflicts.
Such have been the relations between the House of 
Ibn Saud and the Hashemites whom he drove out of the 
Arabian Peninsular, and, on the republican side, the 
rivalries between Nasser and Qasim, and Nasser and 
Bourquaba. The relations of ideological brotherhood 
also degrade into cousinhood when members of an ideol­
ogical cluster come into direct or indirect confrontation 
with one another in the struggle for political power, as 
was the case with Nasser's relations with the Baathist 
regimes in Syria and Iraq. A rather similar case of 
deterioration in a relationship for doctrinal reasons can 
be seen in the quarrel between Saudi Arabia and the former 
Kingdom of Yemen over matters of Islamic doctrine.
Relations of brotherhood tend to hold firm when 
challenged by cousins, and relations of cousinhood tend 
to upgrade to brotherhood when cousin states are faced by
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common enemies. The former proposition can be seen in 
Jordanian-Iraqi relations during the first half of 1958, 
and the latter is demonstrated by the Syrio-Egyptian 
relations prior to the Six Day War.
The relations of enmity which most concern us here 
are also to be understood in the context of Arabism.
When relations between Arab states deteriorate to the level 
of enmity it is because the actions of one of them are 
perceived as threats to the fundamental values of Arabism 
as encapsulated in the compromise which permitted the 
formation of the Arab League. These values are: first,
resistance to interference by non-Arabs in Arab affairs; 
second, respect for the independence of each Arab state; 
and third, a rather vague obligation to co-operate with 
other Arab states, an obligation to be strictly adhered 
to whenever Arab states are threatened by outsiders.
These values may be regarded as the framework of inter- 
Arab relations and actions intended to change this frame­
work are likely to be considered as an act of antagonism 
which degrades the actor's relations with other inember- 
states of the League into the third circle of "enmity".
Hostile acts may take many forms but in any part­
icular case as essential ingredient will be a threat to 
one or more of the values mentioned above. In some 
cases, the hostile acts have been of such a nature as would 
disrupt friendly relations in any group of nations, for 
example, the employment of military means to annex the 
territory of another Arab state or to consolidate polit­
ical power over another Arab country obtained by a coup.
Where such actions have been taken, by Qasim of Iraq against
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Kuwait, or by Egypt in Yemen, or in the Algerian-Morocean 
border disputes, the result has always been^ not surpris­
ingly, a sharp decline from relations of cousinhood to 
outright enmity. But in the particular circumstances of 
Arab politics, we also find very sharp reactions to 
policies which have a particular significance in relation 
to Arabism. Thus Arab Nationalists, particularly 
Baathists and Nasserists, tend to treat as an act of 
enmity any infringment of the basic tenets of Arabism,
Offence has been given by Arab states welcoming foreign 
military bases or allying with foreign countries in 
defensive treaties, e.g. King Idris of Libya and Nuri al- 
Said of Iraq, even though the British and American bases 
in Libya and the Baghdad Pact were not directed against 
Arab interests. Arab nationalists have similarly treated 
as hostile any moves by Arab states to co-operate with 
communist elements against their own brand of Pan-Arabism, 
e.g. Iraq under the Qasim regime, or to propagate peaceful 
coexistence with those whom the nationalists regard as 
enemies, e.g. Bourquaba who proposed, in 1963, peaceful 
coexistence with Israel. Arab traditionalists on the 
other hand, react with hostility to a different set of 
stimuli, which reflects their own interpretation of 
Arabism. They treat as enemies Arab states who help and 
encourage change in the political system or ideology of 
other Arab states, whether by military intervention or by 
propaganda, such as Egypt during the period of Arab cold 
war until 1967 and during her intervention in Yemen. The 
primacy for all Arab states of the values of respect for 
the sovereignty of individual Arab states is shown by the
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fact that attempts to achieve territorial unification by 
force have always provoked dissension in the Arab world and 
constituted notable set backs to the Arab cause. This 
has occurred regardless of whether the "offender" has 
been progressive (e.g. Iraq's campaign against Kuwait) or 
conservative (e.g. Morocco's campaign for Mauritania and 
Spanish Sahara).
The shifts in inter-Arab relations between brother- 
/ hood and enmity are also very much affected by the actions 
of outside powers. Attempts by outsiders to form close 
relationships with particular Arab states, whether or 
not the outsider intended to influence its Arab partner's 
relations with other Arab states, have frequently resulted 
in tensions within the Arab world. This can be seen in 
the case of the relations of the United Kingdom with Iraq 
and Jordan, similarly those of the United States with 
Saudi Arabia, and again the Soviet Union with Egypt. The 
close relations between the British and the Hashemites 
contributed much to the downfall of the Iraqi monarchy, 
by spotlighting it as a target for Arab nationalists.
In the other three cases, the Arab state in question has 
been pushed from time to time to quarrel with its non-Arab 
friends in order to repair its standing with other Arab 
states. Thus, King Husein has, from time to time, turned 
against Britain and America in order to improve his 
relations with Egypt and Syria, Saudi Arabia has moved 
away from the US to emphasise her role as a leading 
contender for Arab leadership, and Egypt has reduced her 
dependence on the Soviet Union, partly to win the favour 
of the United States, but also to reassert her leadership
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of the Arab world (as in 1972-73). Conversely, when an 
Arab state is compelled to have recourse to foreign 
assistance it knows that one inevitable result will be 
accusations of betrayal voiced by its Arab neighbours, as 
experienced by the Lebanon and Jordan in 1958.
Direct attacks on Arab states by outsiders always 
have an immediate unifying effect on the Arab world, of 
a kind described in the remark by King Faisal quoted 
earlier. Arab enemies rediscover their sense of cousin­
hood and cousins become brothers. The most regular 
sponger of Arab unity is accordingly Israel. The problem 
of Israel touches all three of the fundamental values of 
Arabism. It is considered to be a foreign intrusion in 
the Arab world, a foreign intervention in a particular 
Arab country (Palestine) and an enemy to Arab Co-operation. 
But although Israel acts as a catalyst of Arab unity, it 
also provides occasions for Arab discord. The urge to 
resolve the problem of Israel is a standing temptation 
to Arab states and movements to interfere in each other's 
affairs in order to bring about the desired coalition of 
forces against Israel,
One way in which inter-Arab enmity can be suspended 
and perhaps eventually brought to an end is where there 
is any direct external threat against the Arab world. This 
transition from enmity to cousinhood or brotherhood can be 
attributed to the feeling of Arabism which makes all the 
member-states of the Arab League feel obliged to help one 
another as required by the League's Charter. The degree 
of reconciliation is affected by the acuteness of hostil­
ity between cousins and enemies, as well as by factors of
time and space.
As a broad generalisation, it can be argued that the 
strength or weakness of inter-Arab relations depends 
largely on one internal and one external factor. The 
internal factor is that the more Arab states observe their 
commitment to the League Charter to uphold the status quo,
i.e., to respect each other's independence, the more harm­
onious will be their relations. This is why the Pan- 
Arabist movement tends in the long run to be a disruptive 
force in the Arab world. Any attempt, on the part of 
one nation, to move more quickly towards the formation of 
a single Arab state is bound to create considerable enmity 
within the Arab world. Indeed, such action is such a 
direct attack on a fundamental principle of Arabism, as 
expressed in the League, that it may even lead cousins to 
ally with external powers for their own security and to 
defend the Arab League status quo. The external factor 
is that, subject to the above qualification, the stronger 
the enmity directed externally against the Arab world, 
the closer the relations of brotherhood and cousinhood will 
be. But while political support to brothers or cousins 
is usually given at once where military help is concerned, 
the co-operation among brothers and counsins in time of 
crisis depends on factors of time and space. The location 
of the fighting, the cost of helping, the likelihood of 
immediate or delayed reward or retribution, and the degree 
of immediate peril faced by those engaged in the actual 
fighting, all influence the extend and intensity of Arab 
collaboration. One may notice that space, in particular, 
has different effects on military and political support:
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the nearer the states are to the enemy the more military 
support is given; the further they are away, the more 
they are inclined to give their support politically. By 
the same token, the nearer the states are to the scene of 
possible fighting, the more they are prepared to support 
a political solution; the further they are away, the more 
they cry for military action.
We must now examine in more detail some of the key 
elements in the general interpretation of inter-Arab 
politics set out at the beginning of this chapter. The 
first step is to look at the "bloc model" of Arab politics 
to see how it has been imposed on Arab politics and why 
it is less able than the "brotherhood/cousinhood model" 
to explain the shifting pattern of relations between Arab 
states.
The emergence of revolutionary Pan-Arabist movements 
in the Arab world suggested the possibility of dividing 
Arab states into blocs of "progressive socialists" and 
"conservatives". It was tempting to identify the dis­
puting groups in the Arab world as blocs corresponding 
to the rigid Eastern and Western groupings in the Cold 
War, especially when it looked as though one group was 
headed by socialist, "progressive", Pan-Arabist Egypt 
while the other group appeared to follow the lead of 
traditionalist, Islamic and conservative Saudi Arabia.
Such an interpretation was attractive to the Cold 
Warriors in East and West, since it might serve to bind 
to each camp at least some of the Arab states, by deep­
ening inter-Arab rivalries and intensifying their tensions 
to a state of conflict in which each Arab bloc would be
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dependent on a Super Power. The Soviet Union in part­
icular adopted a policy of supporting the unity of social­
ist "progressive" Arab states. In this policy, a major 
Soviet objective has been to oppose the very idea of 
"Arabism"(2) and to prevent its achievement by either 
group, by supporting one Arab group against the other.
The divisive character of Soviet backing for progressive 
movements in the Arab world was shown by a statement in 
Pravda (April 3, 1963): "it all depends who carries the
banner of unity and on what basis it will be realised: 
anti-imperialist, democratic, popular, or pro-imperialist 
and anti-democratic".(3) This showed how progressive 
slogans could be used to turn Arab states against each 
other, by labelling conservative Arab states as lackeys 
of imperialism. The clear Soviet international objec­
tive in the context of the Cold War was to polarise 
friendly Arab states against the Soviet Union's rivals in 
the West as well as against Western supporters in the 
Arab world. When Soviet spokesmen announced that "the 
Soviet people enthusiastically welcomed the strengthening 
of the unity of the Arab peoples on the basis of the 
struggle against Colonialism"(4) it meant that the Soviet 
Union welcomed the strengthening of some Arab peoples' 
struggle against Colonialism at the expense of Arab unity.
(2) Aryed Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror,
Israel University Press, Jerusalem,
1973, p.203
(3) ibid., p.230
(4) ibid., p.202 See also John R. Swanson "The Soviet
Union and the Arab World: Revolutionary 
Progress Through Dependence on Local 
Elites, The Western Political Quarterly" 
University of Utah, Vol.27, No.4, 1974 
pp.637-656
131
The Soviet model of bloc politics could not survive 
for long the frequent shifts in relations between Arab 
states. This was because too many factors were at work 
in Arab politics building bridges across the socialist/ 
conservative divide, and because the two supposed groups 
had too many attitudes in common. Both groups based 
themselves fundamentally on the idea of Arabism. Certainly 
; it was true that the revolutionary socialist group emerged 
I in Arab politics v/ith the objective of promoting the idea 
I of Arabism as it applied to individual citizens and 
individual states, into a political ideology for the 
entire Arab people and all Arab states; but individual 
Arab states had accepted in the institutional framework 
of inter-Arab relations expressed by the Charter of the 
League, a framework which permitted the promotion of the 
Pan-Arabist ideology so long as it was confined within 
the bounds set by the values of that Charter. Conse­
quently when the member-states of the League were divided 
over political systems and ideologies they could, never­
theless, react to one another at least within a relation­
ship of cousinhood. Furthermore, when enmity arose 
because an Arab state had transgressed a fundamental 
principle of the League Charter, such as respect for the 
autonomy of individual states, it could repair the injury 
by reaffirming its support for the principles of the 
Charter, though it might be required further to give proof 
of its sincerity, and could then be taken back into the 
fold of cousinhood. One other factor working against the 
cohesion of "blocs" of Arab states has been the practical 
difficulties encountered, by any state which has contemplated
such a policy. On one hand the principles of the Arab 
League stand in the way of overt interference in the 
affairs of Arab states, such as is necessary from time to 
time to ensure bloc conformity; on the other, no Arab 
state has the power to compel compliance. A shifting 
pattern of relationships is almost inevitable in a system 
in which power is widely diffused.
The bloc model of inter-Arab relations does not 
survive an examination of the relationships involving the 
two supposed leaders of the blocs, Egypt and Saudi Arabia; 
such an examination rather shows how relationships move in 
and out of the categories of brotherhood, cousinhood and 
enmity during the course of the twenty one years between 
1952 and 1973.
After the Egyptian Revolution of July 1952, Saudi- 
Egyptian relations were generally in the nature of cousin­
hood. Although Saudi relations with Farouk had not been 
particularly close and Prince Faisal, Saudi Prime Minister 
until he deposed his brother King Saud in 1964,(5) voiced 
no objections to the new Republic, the two countries 
remained distant from each other in consequence of their 
differences in political system and the gradual transition 
of Egypt to socialism. Relations between the two countries 
were at their most harmonious when both were facing poten­
tial enemies. Saudi Arabia had Egypt's sympathy in her 
bitter disputes with Britain over the Buraimi Oasis,(6)
(5) In March 1958, King Saud relinquished powers to 
Prince Faisal and in 1964 Saud was deposed.
(6) G.E. Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics: a Concise
History, Methuen, London, 1961, p.34
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while Egypt could rely on Saudi hostility to the Hash­
emites in the conflicts with Iraq concerning the latter's 
membership of the Baghdad Pact (which Nasser considered 
to be in complete contradiction to the objective of Arab 
nationalism), The Pact was particularly offensive to 
Nasser because it appeared to offer Britain some compen­
sation for what she was being given up through the 
negotiated withdrawal of her troops from the Canal Zone.
Saudi-Egyptian relations were brought closer when Britain 
attempted to induce Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact, a 
development which would have made it even more offensive - 
to Saudi sentiment. Saudi Arabia threatened Jordan with 
military action, and on 8 February 1955, Prince Faisal 
stated that his government was in complete agreement with 
the Egyptian government on all matters of Arab and foreign 
policy.(7) At the same time, Jordanian Arab national­
ists were receiving constant Nasserist support for their 
campaign of opposition to Jordan's joining the Pact.
Thus in 1955 and 1956, the most conservative Arab 
monarchy and the most progressive Arab republic joined 
forces against the Hashemite monarchies, partly in pursuit 
of private quarrels and partly to resist an imperialist 
intrusion in the Arab world. At the same time all Arab 
states, monarchies and republics alike, supported the 
liberation movements in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco in 
their struggle against France. This was very far from 
the politics of two opposing blocs.
(7) "Chronology", The Middle East Journal, Washington D.C.,
Vol.9, No.2, 1955, p.166
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In February 1956, Husein's nerve broke and he dis­
missed Glubb Pahsa.(8) This success for Nasserism further 
inflamed nationalist sentiment within Jordan and increased 
the Internal threat to the monarchy, but the break with 
Britain had positive effects on Jordanian relations with 
other Arab countries. Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia 
together were prepared to replace British assistance to 
Jordan of £E 20 million, and a tripartite military Command 
of Egypt, Jordan and Syria v/as established on 25 October 
1956.(9) The whole process of reconciliation of the 
Arab world was of course immeasurably assisted by the 
Suez War which had, in turn, to some extent been caused 
by the disruptions and anxieties provoked by the Arab 
quarrel over the Baghdad Pact.
The growth of Nasserism after the Suez Crisis marked 
a turning point in Arab politics. There began a series of 
rapid changes in the inter-Arab relations of brotherhood 
and cousinhood, especially with regard to relations between 
Egypt and the monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Egypt 
accelerated her transformation to socialism which now found 
expression in the new constitution, Nasser was thus 
giving added impetus to his move to the left which had 
started with the Czech arms deal and the nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal, This leftwards drift resulted in his 
estrangement from the conservative regimes and the contin­
uation of his fierce attack on the Muslim Brotherhood added
(8) Anthony Nutting, No End of a Ijesson: the Story of Suez,
Constable, London, pp.28-29
(9) Peter Mansfield, The Middle East: a Political and
Economic Survey, 4th Edition^ Oxford 
University Press, 1973, p.143
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to their anxieties about the direction of his policies.
The hanging of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders in 1954 had 
been accepted as a matter of internal affairs, but the 
continuing repression of any moves by the Muslim Brother­
hood to take a part in Egyptian political life had worry­
ing implications for the traditional Islamic rulers in the 
Arab world. At the same time a new external factor, which 
was bound to have divisive effects on inter-Arab politics, 
emerged in the form of the Eisenhower Doctrine.(10) This 
was presented as a means of containing subversion by 
foreign communist influences in the Arab world, but was 
in fact aimed at containing Nasserism and the communist 
movement in Syria as well as at perpetuating the status 
quo and protecting America's friends in the Middle East.
The United States State Department seems also to have 
considered the possibility of buttressing Saud as a rival 
to Nasser's leadership of the Arabs.(11) While Egypt and 
Syria opposed the new threat of American interference in 
Arab affairs, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon were happy to accept 
the Doctrine, both being as opposed to Nasserism as they 
were to Communism, although King Saud and his advisers 
still tried to avoid an open clash with Nasser. Jordan,
(10) President Eisenhower's message to the Congress on
- 5 January 1957, that the United States would use force 
to secure and protect a nation requesting such aid 
against overt aggression from any nation controlled 
by international Communism.
See John Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British 
Imperialism, A Study in Power Politics, The Cresset 
Press, London, 1961, pp.146-147
(11) Anthony Nutting, I Saw for Myself,
Constable, London, 1958, p.61
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however, because of Nasserist ideological influence, main­
tained close relations with Nasser, and her nationalist 
government went as far as opening diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union. Thus Jordan proceeded to 
strengthen her alignment with Egypt. The nationalist 
government denounced the Eisenhower Doctrine (and thereby 
forfeited an American loan) and successfully insisted on 
the withdrawal of the Hashemite Iraqi troops who had 
entered Jordan at the time of Suez,(12) These were 
replaced by Syrian and Saudi troops in accordance with the 
Joint Military Command Agreement of October 1956, but the 
Saudi troops were soon withdrawn, leaving only the Syrians.
It looked as though the emerging pattern of Arab 
politics would place Jordan in alignment with Egypt and 
Syria against Saudi Arabia, with Iraq isolated. Then 
the Jordanian nationalists overreached themselves; an 
attempt at a Nasserist coup against King Husein by the 
army failed (its leader All Abu Nawar fled to Syria),
Saudi troops returned to Jordan to strengthen Husein*s 
position, and the Jordanian-Egyptian brotherhood was 
disrupted.
We have already examined in Chapter IV the particular 
factors in the Baathist and Nasserist movements which con­
tributed to the formation of the UAR. This event also, of 
course, had major significance for inter-Arab relations of 
brotherhood, cousinhood and enmity. The establishment of 
the UAR was in part the result of the interaction of ex­
ternal and internal forces in the Arab world, and it
(12) Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson, Loc.cit., pp.90-99
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produced an important, albeit temporary, realignment of 
Arab relationships. The growth of Nasserism threatened 
Western, particularly British, interests in the Arab world 
and opened the way to Soviet influence in the Middle East.
At the same time as Nasser was turning in the direction 
of the Soviet Union, and relying more on Soviet assistance, 
the Syrian Communist Party was also growing and becoming 
involved in political struggle with the Baath party in 
Syria. It was in response to these developments that 
the Eisenhower Doctrine was propounded, with the objective 
of containing both Nasserism and Communism in the Arab 
world and supporting the conservative Arab states. The 
struggle between the Baath and the Communists culminated 
in a crisis in Syria which involved Turkey, the Lebanon 
and the United States.(13) The crisis brought Syrio- 
Egyptian relations closer and Egypt felt obliged to send 
her troops to Syria in accordance with the Mutual Defence 
Agreement between the two countries. The international 
response to the crisis intensified the power struggle 
between the Baath party and the Communist in Syria.
Finally, when the Baath found itself unable to sugress the 
Communists and feared that they would take power, the Baath 
offered President Nasser union with Egypt.(14)
The conservative regimes had played little, if any, 
part in the struggle between the progressive factions in
(13) W.Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East,
F.A. Praeger, New York, 1959, pp.247-61
(14) Monte Palmer, "The United Arab Republic: An Assess­
ment of Its Failure", The Middle East 
Journal, Washington D.C., Vol.20,
No.l, 1966, pp.52-53
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Syria, They certainly had not combined their strength to 
oppose the communists and had left that task to their main 
nationalist rival. But when the United Arab Republic was 
an accomplished fact, the monarchies reacted against it. 
Nasser claimed in February 1958 that the Saudi reaction­
aries were trying to have him assassinated on the eve of 
the formation of the UAR. The two Hashemite kingdoms of 
I Jordan and Iraq hastily formed the short-lived Arab 
Federation.(15) Thus Syrio-Egyptian relations were 
transformed by the formation of the UAR, while relations 
between the two traditional rivals of the Saudi and 
Hashemite Houses were shifted into the brotherhood of 
the monarchical system. When the Iraqi monarchy was 
overthrown in a coup instigated by Nasser it caused a 
nev/ shifting of inter-Arab relations. The Jordanian 
reaction was to turn to Britain rather than to Saudi 
Arabia (at the same time the Lebanon called on the United 
States to help). This train of events suggests that the 
conservatives did not attach much practical importance to 
the conservative bloc (the Arab Federation was primarily 
Hashemite rather than monarchist) and turned individually 
to the West when their survival was threatened. Similarly, 
the progressive movements were guided by individual con­
siderations rather than group objectives: when the Baath's
ambitions were hampered by Nasser, they broke up the UAR; 
and when Qasim reached out for Kuwait, he met opposition 
not only from Britain and Saudi Arabia but also from Egypt.
(15) Reeva S. Simon, "The Hashemite Conspiracy; Hashemite
Unity Attempt", International Journal, 
the Middle East Study, Great Britain,’ 
Vol.5, 1974, p.321
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The early 1960's provided many examples of the 
rapidly shifting pattern of Arab objectives and relations. 
Regarding the power struggle between the Baath and Nasser; 
the ideological brothers in the days of the UAR's decline, 
the Baath party found itself threatened by Nasser and 
this caused a new shifting in inter-Arab grouping with 
the Baath working together with Jordanian and Saudi 
Arabian interests to bring down the Nasserist regime in 
Syria. The Baath was able to regard the conservatives 
as at least cousins once Western intervention had been 
withdrawn from both Lebanon and Jordan, The conservative 
rulers, although they opposed Communism and radical 
nationalism, were quite happy to work with one radical 
nationalist force, the Syrian Baath, against another,
Nasser, who had suppressed the Syrian Communists and was 
becoming suspicious of Soviet influence throughout the 
Middle East, Furthermore, Nasser, the enemy of Western 
influence in the Arab world, set himself the task of 
indirectly implementing the spirit of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine. The new Baathist, Jordanian, Saudi Arabian 
grouping was able to bring off a military coup in Syria 
which brought Nasser's UAR to an end.
The break up of the UAR was followed by successive 
crises between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and Egypt and 
Syria. The deterioration of relations between Egypt and 
Syria culminated on 28 August when the Egyptian delegation 
walked out of an Arab League meeting in Lebanon that had 
been called to discuss the Syrian complaints of Egyptian 
intervention in her affairs. A few days earlier, Egypt's 
relations with Saudi Arabia had taken a turn for the worse
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when Nasser had offered hospitality to a renegade brother 
of King Saud. On 19 August 1962, Prince Talal Ibn Abdul 
Aziz had fled to Cairo and publicly denounced his brother's 
regime; on 21 August he v/as granted a meeting with 
President Nasser in Alexandria which increased Baud's 
suspicion of their being engaged in some sort of con­
spiracy. The crisis between the two countries culmin­
ated when the Imam of Yemen was overthrown on 27 September 
1962, and Egypt and the USSR recognised the new regime 
two days later. The granting of political asylum to the 
crew of a Saudi Air Force aeroplane that had been sent to 
Yemen with arms for the royalists, but had turned up in 
Egypt, gave Cairo an opportunity to JOaunt the new enmity 
between the two countries. Egypt was involved in the 
actual fighting side by side with the republicans, while 
the Saudis backed the royalist forces with financial 
support and arms. Egyptian involvement in Yemen gathered 
the remaining monarchies into one circle of brotherhood 
composed of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco.(16) Faisal 
did not, however, justify his Yemeni policy as a defence 
of monarchy, but as resistance to the breaking of a 
treaty by a fellow Arab state: "Saudi Arabia was bound
by a tripartite defence pact between her, Yemen and Egypt. 
When this unfortunate aggression was launched by a party to 
this pact, the Saudi Government felt itself obliged to 
defend a country to which it had bound itself". (17) He
(16) H. Kerr, "Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen" in
The Arab Cold War, Oxford University Press, 
1971, pp.107-114
(17) Walid Khalidi, Arab Political Documents, Loc.cit.,
pp.372-373
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also pointed to the right of any Arab state to defend 
its sovereignty; he fought, he said, "to defend ourselves 
and our very sovereignty. The leaders of Egypt declared 
that they had moved to the Yemen and were fighting there 
to destroy this country as well. We were forced, there­
fore, to protect ourselves, and self-defence is the right 
of every state and nation".(18)
The Arab "Cold War" of 1962-1967 is the best, if 
not the only example of bloc politics in the Arab world.
It is, indeed, hard to see how the term can be justified.
The period of acute hostility did not last long and it was 
Nasser who took the initiative in trying to bring the 
Egyptian-Saudi Arabian confronation to an end. Nasser 
attempted to reconcile himself with Saudi Arabia by 
bilateral approaches as well as by means of a Summit 
Conference within the framework of the Arab League.(19)
Nasser succeeded in attaining Saudi de facto recognition 
of the Republic of Yemen when Abdullah al-Sallal and 
King Faisal sat together in the second Arab Summit 
Conference in September 1964. The Conference was 
followed by a reduction in tension in Egypt's relations 
with Saudi Arabia and also with Jordan and Syria, and 
Faisal made a conciliatory gesture when he pardoned his 
brother, Prince Talal. Further progress was recorded 
in the Joint Communique of 3 March 1964, at the end of 
his visit to Cairo, when Saudi Arabia and Egypt declared 
that they had no ambitions in Yemen, and gave their
(18) ibid., pp.373-375
(19) Walid Khalidi, Arab Political Documents, Slim Press,
Beirut, 1964, p/69“
unqualified support to its independence.(20) This marked 
the return of Saudi Arabia to cousinhood with Egypt which 
Faisal explained by saying that "we did not begin a new 
era with our friends in the UAR (Egypt), we merely 
restored relations that were always there and always 
strong". It was then Husein's turn to pardon a Nasserist 
as a gesture of reconciliation with Egypt and he allowed 
Ali Abu Nawar to return home. The lack of cordiality, 
however, in the restored relations of cousinhood between 
Riyyad and Cairo was shown by the continuing anxiety of 
Saudi Arabia about the security of her borders with Yemen.
Throughout the Yemen War, Nasser had continued to 
have difficulty in his relations with his "progressive" 
brothers; indeed the relationship was akin to cousin­
hood. Egypt's quarrels with Syria and Iraq were resolved 
by the overthrow of the regimes in these tv/o countries,
Qasim was overthrown on 8 February 1963 by Abdul Salam 
Aref, his collaborator in the Revolution, mainly because 
Qasim's violence had become a personal threat to his 
colleagues. In March 1963 the tension between Syria 
and Nasser was brought to an end by a bloodless coup in 
Damascus which had the effect of purging the non-Baathist 
elements in the coalition government. The new regime in 
Iraq and Syria were both of generally Baathist character 
and they joined forces in demanding a new Arab union with 
Egypt. Three sets of talks were held in Cairo between 
14 March and 14 April 1963 which resulted in the proclamation
(2 0 ) i b i d . , p p . 39 7 -3 98
of a new Federation of Arab Republics.(21) The declar­
ation never came into force, however, for reasons discussed 
in chapter IV, it is necessary here only to recall that 
declared ideological solidarity could not overcome differ­
ences of policy and the desire of each regime to maintain 
its Independence unimpaired. The relations of ideological 
brotherhood improved between Syria, Iraq and Egypt after 
I a new Baath government took power in Syria, In February 
I 1966, agreement was reached on the basis of full
sovereignty and equality for all parties, and, in November 
1966, a comprehensive defence agreement was signed for 
a unified military command between Egypt and Syria.
This train of events shows the extent to which the mood 
of inter-Arab relations depends on the most variable 
ideological mood of individual regimes.
While Saudi-Egyptian relations remained in an 
uncertain condition, Saudi Arabia initiated a wider policy 
of co-operation among the forty states of the Islamic 
world (of which the members of the Arab League accounted 
for only half). The Saudi initiative was aimed at 
seeking an alternative, wider framework for their inter­
national policy where Saudi Arabia could use her position 
in the Islamic world to play a leading role in competition 
with Egypt, the leader of the Arab League. It was also 
a part of the Saudi counter-attack on the socialist 
transformation in Egypt which had been given fresh impetus 
by the Egyptian National Charter. The first step in the
(21) W. Khalidi, Arab Political Document, Loc.cit.,
1963, pp.175-213
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new policy was taken in partnership with the Shah of 
Iran. A joint Saudi-Iranian communique, published on 
13 December 1965, stated that "the two sovereigns agreed 
to support the call for an Islamic Conference to provide 
the opportunity for discussion of matters of importance 
to the Islamic states, and to be a starting point towards 
Islamic unity and the protection of Islamic interests".(22) 
Faisal chose to act in conjunction with the Shah in the 
hope that this would help the two countries to reach agree­
ment on the future of the Gulf, since he had little confid­
ence in the capacity of the Arab Joint Defence Agreement 
to contain Iranian ambitions. It was not, however, a 
partnership that was at all welcome to Nasser and the 
newly restored relationship of cousinhood deteriorated 
to the extent that President Nasser postponed the Summit 
Conference planned for the Summer of 1966 on the ground 
that Arab reactionaries were exploiting it for their own 
ends. Eventually the Unified Arab Military Command 
ceased to exist.(23)
It is hard to see this pattern of relationships 
moving to any logical conclusion and impossible to view 
it as any sort of progression towards Arab unity. The 
internal logic was one of continually shifting relation­
ships, moving according to changing interests and ideol­
ogical moods. This internal logic was, however, to be
(22) W, Khalidi, Arab Political Document, 1965, Loc.cit.,
p.449, See also T. Bulloch "Revolution in 
the Gulf", in The Making of a War, The 
Middle East 1S67 to 1973, W & J Mackay, 
Chatham, 1974, p74'49
(23) P.Y. Hammond, "Inter-Arab Division", op.cit., pp.60-63
disrupted by the Six Day War, when a sharp external threat 
drove the Arabs into co-operation with each other. To 
some extent the war can be seen as in part the product 
of inter-Arab relations. The establishment of harmonious 
relationships among the.socialist regimes had been followed 
by an intensification of their sponsorship of Palestinian 
guerilla activities against Israel. Israel responded
/with military reprisals and threats of heavier action
I
I which were, however, "no more than routine warnings of 
reprisals in what had become a standardised pattern".(24)
But when the Russians warned the Egyptians that there was 
an Israeli plan for an imminent major attack against 
Syria,(25) Nasser found himself under intense pressure 
to respond to this warning. Although the United States 
and the Soviet Union appealed to Nasser to show self- 
restraint, (26) he was bound to accept the "projected" 
challenge and comply with the Egyptian-Syrian Military 
Agreement. He was also under "Psychological" pressure, (27) 
not only because his friends looked to him for leadership, 
but also because his rivals, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, would 
take advantage of any failure to act and were loudly taunt­
ing him with accusations of cowardice. So he expelled 
UNEF, engaged in a military demonstration in Sinai, and 
closed the Gulf of Aqaba to shipping bound for Eilat (he 
had never in fact told the Egyptian people of his tacit 
acceptance of the Israeli right of passage). To the
(24) W.Z. Laqueur, The Israel-Arab Reader. A Documentary
History of the Middle East Conflict, 
Loc.cit., p.344
(25) ibid., p.189
(26) ibid., p.190
(27) Ibid., p.180
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Israelis, the blockade of the Gulf was "an act of war".(28) 
The Kings were now caught in the crisis which their rivalry 
with Nasser had helped to provoke. Three days before the 
war broke out King Husein of Jordan flew to Cairo to effect 
a reconciliation with the PLO as well as to conclude a 
military co-operation agreement with Egypt, His reward 
for adjusting his policy and closing ranks with his Arab 
cousins was the loss of half of his kingdom. Faisal had 
to make the same adjustment as soon as the war broke out, 
explaining his move with the proverb quoted at the begin­
ning of this chapter.
Throughout the period from 1956 to 1967, Arab politics 
had been marked by sharp distinctions between relations 
of brotherhood, cousinhood and enmity. These years had 
been characterised by the vehemence of inter-Arab prop­
aganda and by frequent trials of strength and nerve 
between the Arab states. In all this, Nasser had been 
in the forefront, as the most vigorous exponent, followed 
by the Baathists, of the cause of Arab unity. In the 
aftermath of the defeat of June 1967, the humiliated Arab 
leaders were inclined to see Nasser as the symbol of their 
failure. Some Arab writers even attributed the defeat 
to the Nasserist propaganda and its misconceptions,
A. Hatem said, "Arab counter-propaganda seemed to be in 
complete disarray, not only did it give way to wild 
emotional threat, but it contradicted itself, it even lost 
sight of the basic truth of 5 June 1967..,"(29) The Arab
(28) ibid., p.219
(29) M.A, Hatem, op.cit., p.230
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states were now looking for a more sober and rational 
basis for their relationships than Pan-Arabist propaganda.
Nasser himself, perhaps, realised that although the 
propaganda approach of the Pan-Arab movements had had some 
positive results, in instigating Arab revolts for indepen­
dence and in overthrowing some monarchies, it had finally 
damaged the Arab struggle against Israel. In any case, 
after 9 June 1967 the intensity of Nasserist propaganda 
was lessened and Egypt joined in the work of promoting 
reconciliation between brothers and cousins. Hatem 
reflects the Arab expectation that a new start would be 
possible after the Six Day War, in his optimistic inter­
pretation of the Khartoum Summit Conference which was 
the first step towards recovery, "The Arab Governments 
had demonstrated to their own people and to the world 
that they too had the will to preserve their unity and 
their sense of shared destiny in spite of all that the 
Zionists could do".(30) But although their "crushing 
defeat" in the war awakened the Arabs to manifest their 
will and demonstrate their feelings of brotherhood and 
cousinhood, the goal they sought in the Conference was 
unified Arab action in pursuit of shared objectives, not 
pan-Arabist unity, or even the partial unity of the early 
I960's. Three of the Arab monarchies, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait and Libya, accepted their Arab responsibilities in 
a practical manner by offering subsidies to Egypt and 
Jordan,(31) and republics such as Algeria and the Sudan
(30) M.A, Hatem, ibid., p.234
(31) The Syrian Government did not attend the Conference.
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sent their troops to help Egypt after the war, (but the 
Algerians were soon withdrawn from the Canal Zone).
Practical co-operation of this type implied respect for 
each others' sovereignty and an acceptance that there 
could be no forced unification.
After 1967 there have been some old-fashion calls for 
unification but they have come from new regimes without 
direct experience of the old traumas. In 1969 there were 
military coups in the Sudan led by Colonel J. Numeiri, and 
in Libya led by Colonel M. Qaddafi. Both considered them­
selves as Nasserist and the Libyan demanded Pan-Arab unity 
of the kind that Nasser had achieved in 1958-61. Before 
Nasser's death, and on Qaddafi's initiative, constitut­
ional unity - the Federation of Arab Republics - was 
declared in 1971 between Libya, Egypt and Syria;(32) and 
in 1972 a plan was actually agreed for the merger of Libya 
and Egypt in the context of the new Federation, again on 
Qaddafi's initiative. The ideological gulf between 
Qaddafi and Sadat, the new Egyptian President, was, however, 
so great that nothing practical was achieved, and the 
struggle for leadership between the two men was more 
apparent than any moves to implement the achievement of 
unification. President Sadat was mainly interested in 
bringing about closer relations with Saudi Arabia, which 
had far more political weight and influence in the Arab
(32) Tabitha Petran, "Federation of Arab Republics",
op.cit., pp.254-257. The third member 
was to have been the Sudan; but she 
withdrew because of difficulties 
connected with the South Sudan problem 
and was replaced by Syria.
and Islamic worlds than the young and untested Libyan 
leader and was more powerful economically. The immediate 
and urgent requirement of Egypt was to rebuild the 
Egyptian economy, strengthen her armed forces and undo 
the damage that Egypt had suffered under Nasser, To go 
along with Qaddafi's projected unification meant an 
additional drain on the wearied Egyptian economy and a 
possible renewal of the unrewarding inter-Arab cold war, 
Sadat accordingly confined the existence of the Federation 
to Libyan territory.
The ideal of Arab unity was treated after Nasser's 
death in the same remote and formal way as it had been 
before the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. Nothing immed­
iate was to be done, though there could be a minimal, 
notional, constitutional foundation for the future develop­
ment of Pan-Arabism. Thus Article 9 of the Federation 
Constitution characterised its member-states as "Arab 
republics that believe in Arab unity, work for the 
realising of a unified socialist Arab society”.(33) But 
this commitment to socialist Pan-Arabism, however formal, 
carries some risk of reviving and perpetuating the division 
of the Arab world into two circles, progressive and 
reactionary, A return to the struggle for socialist 
transformation would probably lead back to the Nasserist 
path of inter-Arab struggle.
President Sadat faced considerable difficulties in
(33) See Document; "The Constitution of the Federation of
Arab Republics", The Middle East Journal, 
Washington D.C., Vol.25, No.4, 1971, 
pp.523-529
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establishing his grip on Egyptian political power. He 
was "riding the storm"(34) internally, surrounded by 
Nasser's men who were still inclined towards the Soviet 
Union, and had given a pledge to the Egyptian people that 
the year 1971 was to be a decisive year with Israel, 
although at the same time he was at odds with the Soviet 
Union over the supply of weapons and the Soviet loan for 
the Aswan High Dam. In this awkward situation, at odds 
with the Power on which he relied for supplies of weapons, 
closer relations with Saudi Arabia and Syria were highly 
desirable. The former had the oil which could be used 
if necessary as a political weapon. King Faisal had 
emerged as a major leader of the Arabs after the death 
of Nasser and had a long-standing relationship of mutual 
respect with Sadat. Faisal also looked to Syria for the 
future security of his oil pipelines (Tapline) across 
Syria from Saudi Arabia to Sidon, Faisal's most immediate 
objective in 1971 was to get fifty per cent participation 
in the oil companies by 1980 and preference for Arab oil 
entering the United States. A limited war with Israel 
might be utilised as a pretext for using oil as a polit­
ical weapon in case the American authorities continued 
to reject this programme.
The dramatic success of OPEC's oil diplomacy is not 
really relevant to an account of Arab unity, for what was 
involved was Arab co-operation, not unification. The 
same may be said of the Arab moves leading up to the attack 
on Israel in October 1973. The three leading Arab states
(34) M. Heikal, op.cit., p.263
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were able to collaborate effectively because their interests 
coincided and none perceived a threat to its Independence 
emanating from the others. Pan-Arabist propaganda 
directed by one against another would have been the death 
of either enterprise. This tripartite collaboration, on 
a basis which excluded Pan-Arabist politics, meant that 
for the first time the Arabs were able to conclude a pre­
designed unified Arab action involving military and 
economic might.
It was suggested at the beginning of this chapter that 
one of the fundamental values of Arabism is rejection of 
outside interference in Arab affairs. This can be seen, 
throughout the period since 1945, in the acute disturb­
ances which have inevitably followed such attempts at 
intervention. Let us now look at the cohesive and 
divisive effects of external interventions in Arab affairs 
on relations between Arab states. These can take the 
form of threats to individual Arab states or to the Arab 
world as a whole; or they can take the form of attempts 
to build special relationships with particular Arab 
states. In either case, intervention has marked effects 
on the pattern of relationships in the Arab world.
The cohesive effects of external intervention are 
seen most clearly in the Arab response to Israel and the 
Suez invasion. Israel is seen a.s an intrusion as well 
as an enemy and this added to the agony of the victory of 
Israel in the 1948 war. It motivated the Arabs to promote 
and improve military and economic co-operation within the 
framework of the Arab League and by bilateral and tri­
lateral agreements. Some Arab leaders even suggested a
radical change in the constitutional status of the League 
itself as a means of bringing about Arab unity; in 1950, 
member-states of the League agreed on the Treaty of 
Military and Economic Co-operation which became an 
integral part of the League Charter, and in the same year 
Nazim al-Qudsi proposed a scheme of Arab unity through 
developing the League into a "supranation government",
A.M. Mustafa made a similar suggestion in 1957 in the 
aftermath of Suez.(35) Outside the League, successive 
bilateral and trilateral military agreements were con­
cluded mainly by Israel's Arab neighbour states, which 
indicates the extent to which Israel acted as a cohesive 
factor in inter-Arab relations. This proposition is 
emphasised further when we look at the various attempts 
at unification in the Arab Middle East, e.g. Egyptian- 
Syrian, Syrian-Iraqi, Jordanian-Iraqi and finally 
î^gypfian-Libyan, and note the absence of similar schemes 
in North Africa. If they were merely a matter of unif­
ication between two or more Arab states, the unification 
of Egypt and the Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,and 
Algeria and Tunisia would have been more rational and 
acceptable. The frequency of these attempts at unif­
ication signifies the nature of an integrated Arab 
response to the threats which had also motivated some Arab 
leaders to call openly for Arab unity, believing that in 
unity alone is strength which may undo the effects of these 
threats.
One may ask why, up till now, no Arab unity has been
(35) See Chapter III pp.55-57
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attainable, and why such as there has been, has not 
endured. To some extent at least the answer is that the 
threat itself is not overwhelming* enough to affeçt the 
whole Arab world as a single target. This flows partly 
from deliberate Israeli policy which recognises the fact 
that the wider the threatened area is, the less security 
the Israelis can maintain, and reciprocally, that the
/further Arab states are away from the Israeli threat, theI
less they feel its cohesive effects. But it also has to
f
be recognised that the shifting nature of inter-Arab 
groupings, which is related to the politics of brotherhood 
and cousinhood, and the rivalries between brothers and 
cousins for political power, has minimised or even 
cancelled the cohesive effects of the threats themselves.
The desire for unified Arab action in one way 
emphasises the feeling of a shared responsibility among 
the Arabs, but its effectiveness is less than might be 
expected because it gives rise only to a policy of reaction 
to threat, rather than to a predesigned and thoroughly 
considered policy to prevent any foreseeable threat. One 
might suggest that the greater the frequency of threat, 
the more its cohesive effects would be experienced and 
manifested in improved inter-Arab relations. But con­
sidering the actual nature of inter-Arab relations, this 
proposition would only be tenable if it could be shown that 
the main Arab states would always see their ultimate 
interests lying in united Arab action. This can be seen 
in Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian collaboration prior to the 
October War 1973, but it has not always been the case.
The Suez Crisis rallied the Arab world and gave extra drive
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to the rise of Nasserism in the Arab world, a movement which
among other things rejected military alliance with an out­
sider. Although most of the Arab world could unite on 
this issue, it intensified the struggle between Nasser and 
Nuri al-Said concerning the Baghdad Pact, The Suez Crisis 
also had a share in bringing about the formation of the 
UAR, but this too turned out to be a divisive factor in 
Arab politics.
We now turn to the effects on Arab unity and disunity 
of "special relationships" between Arab states and out­
siders. There are many examples; Britain and Iraq 
until 1958, Britain and Jordan; the United States and
Saudi Arabia; the United States and Lebanon; perhaps
none had created so many problems for the Arab world as 
the special relationship of the Soviet Union with Egypt.
Despite the close alliance between the Soviet Union 
and President Nasser, Nasserism posed serious problems 
for Soviet ideology. From the point of view of world 
politics, fervent Pan-Arabism was unwelcome to the Soviet 
Union for three reasons. First, Nasserism contradicts 
the communist doctrine of the unity of the working class 
of the world; secondly, nationalism raises potentially 
embarrassing questions about the nature of Soviet influ­
ence in Eastern Europe; thirdly, the achievement of Pan- 
Arabist objectives, however unlikely this may be, would 
pose at least a potential threat to Russia from the South­
west, particularly if it led to a revival of the ideal of 
an Ummah which would embrace some forty million Soviet 
citizens. Such considerations, combined with more immed­
iate Soviet state interests, have led the Soviet Union
15!
into being highly selective in her support for Pan- 
Arabism,
In general, the Soviet Union inclined to support 
pro-socialist forces and to oppose reaction. But in 
the Middle East the Soviet Union has aspired to control 
the Arab world through Arab communist parties, whose 
main local rivals are local socialist nationalists.
The Soviet Union has accordingly, from time to time, 
been driven to support democratic institutions to en­
able the communist parties to survive and flourish in 
competition with nationalists. The purpose of the 
Soviet-proposed democracy is limited to permitting 
communist participation in policy-making and political 
power in the country concerned. This can be seen in 
the cases of Syria and Iraq;(36) the continuous supply 
of arms and economic aid to Syria and the close relations 
with the Baathist regime in Iraq were directed to these 
ends. But the nature of Soviet objectives in the Arab 
world, and of the complexities to which they have given 
rise, can be seen best in the case of Egypt.
During the time of Nasser, the close Soviet-Egyptian 
friendship had a divisive effect on inter-Arab relations.
It started with Egypt's need for arms supplies, economic 
aid to build the Aswan High Dam, and Eastern European 
markets in which to sell Egyptian cotton. Soviet- 
Egyptian relations alarmed conservative Arab states and 
the divisive effects of what was to Egypt an essential
(36) See Chapter IV and also Harry N. Howard "The Soviet 
• Union in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan", in The Soviet 
Union in the Middle East, edited by J. Lederer 
Hoover Institution Press, California, 1974, pp.134-157
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relationship were intensified by Egypt's transition to
a socialism which was in the sight of the conservative
regimes akin to communism. King Husein's reaction to
his own nationalist government’s proposal to set up
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was an example
of this alarm. Husein's distrust of the Soviet Union
in turn affected Nasser’s Pan-Arab movement. Soviet-
Egyptian friendship was thus a factor in the severing
of the Egyptian-Jordanian relationship of cousinhood.
The Soviet objectives in Egypt were similar to those 
in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. Nasser differentiated 
between the Soviet Union as a state, and Communism; his 
dealings with the former did not entail acceptance of 
the latter.(37) The Soviet friendship with Egypt had 
the support of home-bred communists but Nasser's policy 
towards them was to exclude them from any share in 
political power. Bearing in mind the effects of massive 
Soviet aid to Egypt, he refrained from hanging them, the 
fate he had inflicted on the Muslim Brotherhood leaders.
Other Arabs were suspicious of Soviet motives in her 
relationship with Egypt. They saw the Soviet Union as 
hostile to Pan-Arabism with an interest in weakening Nasser, 
the leader of the movement. With the communists inside 
Bgypt rendered ineffective politically by Nasser, Soviet
(37) Paradoxically, the main route for the infiltration of 
■ Communism into the Arab world was through the Western 
educational institutes in Beirut and Cairo. As King 
Faisal said, the American University of Beirut 7/as a 
principal breeding place of Arab communists in the 
Middle East; its most celebrated student was George 
Habash, the leader of the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine, See M. Heikal, op.cit. p.76, 
and W. Kazziha, op.cit., pp.17-30
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aid to Egypt could be seen as a manoeuvre to gain influence 
and control the country by alternative means. After 1967 
it looked like being a most successful strategy, as Egypt's 
situation obliged her to accept a bigger and bigger Soviet 
military presence; but this presence had the same sort 
of divisive effect in the Arab world as had the Western 
Special relationships which had aroused Nasser's anger
/
and in the end Sadat had to expel his Soviet advisers,
‘ Soviet-Egyptian friendship can thus be compared with the 
 ^ efforts of the West to win particular friendships in the 
Middle East. Originally seen as a lifeline by the Arab 
state, it was ultimately recognised as a very mixed 
blessing. The Soviet-Egyptian alliance divided the 
Arab world in the same way as the Baghdad Pact had done, 
having been considered by Nasser as interference in Arab 
affairs and contradictory to the Arab League Charter, 
Similarly, the Eisenhower Doctrine was seen as an offer 
of friendly relations made to some Arab states as a 
protection against the growth of Nasserism and Communism 
in Egypt and Syria respectively. When President Chamoun 
of Lebanon anticipated that the growth of Nasserism would 
lead to a threat to Lebanon's independence, he accepted 
the offer of American help which eventually sparked the 
Lebanese civil war in 1958 and led to the landing of 
American troops to save and perpetuate the Lebanese con­
ventional system. Thus external interventions, whether 
in the form of threat or friendship, had some cohesive 
and some divisive effects in inter-Arab relations, bring­
ing to bear on the movement of Arab unity the pressures 
exerted by the ambitions of world communism and the struggle
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between East and West in the context of the Cold War,
The external threats were not enough to bring about Arab 
unity; while the special relationships of friendship 
acted both to divide the Arab world and to maintain the 
status quo of disunity.
We have already mentioned the impact of Israel on 
inter-Arab politics and must now look at the role of the 
Palestinian movement. The internal politics of the 
Palestinians are the most volatile of Arab politics and 
the relations of the Palestinians with the Arab states 
fluctuate continuously between brotherhood, cousinhood 
and enmity. It is accordingly not surprising that the 
Palestinians have constituted a divisive force in inter- 
Arab politics, although occasionally they have been the 
focus of cohesion.
The formal policy of the majority of Arab states 
is that the Palestinians should preserve their Palestin- 
ianness as a separate identity in the family of the Arab 
nation, with the same status as the Jordanians, Egyptians, 
etc. According to this view none of the Arab states is 
entitled individually to take action aimed at solving 
the problem without the consent of the Palestinians them­
selves as well as that of the member-states of the Arab 
League, In fact, however, the seriousness of the 
Palestinian problem varies for each Arab state according 
to its geographical location, and the front-line states 
are frequently compelled to act alone. This contradic­
tion between the formal doctrine and the realities of the 
situation is a fertile source of inter-Arab quarrels.
Jordan's policy of using the Palestinian issue to
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extend and strengthen Hashemite dominions was clear from 
the beginning. Under the slogan of Arab unity Amir 
Abdullah (the grandfather of King Husein) attempted in 
1948 to absorb the Palestinians into his Kingdom of 
Transjordan by annexing the Jordan West Bank and calling 
his country the Kingdom of Jordan. He and his successor 
failed, however, to Jordanise the Palestinians for various 
reasons. The most fundamental was that the successive 
hostilities on the Jordanian-Israeli borders strengthened 
the inhabitants’ feeling of Palestinian nationalism rather 
than of Jordanian citizenship. Palestinian indifference 
or lack of loyalty to the Hashemite dynasty was exploited 
by Nasser, who set out to frustrate Husein’s objective of 
totally Jordanising the West Bank. For this purpose 
Nasser attempted to form the Palestinian organisations 
into one supposedly representative body, the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation. He succeeded, during the 
second Summit Conference held on 5 September 1964, in 
gaining the conference’s approval for the formation of 
the PIX).
The implication of this policy was first of all to 
deny Husein's claim of sovereignty on the West Bank, for 
now the PLO was considered the representative of the 
Palestinians in this area and in the Gaza Strip. Secondly, 
Nasser himself had to refute the accusation of wishing to 
annex the Strip to Egyptian territory. He v/as willing 
to do this because by recognising the identity of the 
Palestinian as different from that of the Egyptians he 
could secure agreement that the Palestinian problem should 
be solved by the Palestinians themselves, dealing directly
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with Israel: in this way the responsibility of the
guerillas' activities would fall on the PLO and not on 
Egypt as a state. The price Nasser had to pay was to 
submit to accusations that his main purpose v/as to get 
rid of his responsibility for sponsoring the Palestinians' 
cause by shifting the entire burden to the Palestinian 
people.
The formation of the PLO brought a new problem to 
the small Arab states neighbouring Israel. It constit­
uted a set-back to Hashemite ambitions of territorial 
agrandisement which had been partially realised in the 
1948 war and also brought about a direct confrontation 
between Jordan and Israel. Nov/ that the West Bank was 
in the eyes of the Palestinians recognised as part of 
their homeland, they thought they had a right to use it 
as a base from which to launch activities against Israel.
As far as King Husein was concerned, however, the PLO 
still had to comply with the rules laid down by Jordanian 
sovereignty and he thus actively rejected the notion of 
the dual identity of his Kingdom. This was the crucial 
problem between the PLO and King Husein, which became 
particularly acute after the Arab defeat in 1967. Israeli 
policy was to fix responsibility for guerilla attacks on 
the state from whose territory they had been launched.
This put Jordan in a quandary. Husein could either go 
along with the Palestinians, which might lead to Israeli 
reprisals which could cost him the remaining half of his 
Kingdom; or he could contain the guerillas' activities 
with his own security forces at the risk of civil war.
His adoption of the second policy resulted in his driving
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the PLO out of his territory in the Jordanian civil war 
in 1970 and so to very damaging rifts in the system of 
Arab co-operation which had been established at Khartoum.
Looking at the attitudes of other Arab states towards 
the Palestinian problem one may see the following categ­
ories. Egypt, Syria and Iraq had sponsored the formation 
of the PLO, but limited its activities because Syria and 
JEgypt attached the main priority to recovering the 
/territory they had lost in the Six Day War. The oil
rich conservative Arab states provided financial support 
and arms supplies to the PLO, without taking much account 
of the security problems which this posed for the small 
Arab states, particularly T^ebanon; the main motive of 
the oil shiekhs was to appease their Palestinian residents. 
All Arab leaders, especially those who had newly seized 
power by coups, claimed themselves to be devoted to the 
Palestinian cause, as a means of identifying themselves 
as revolutionary nationalists, so as to consolidate their 
own grasp on political power in their own countries. No 
Arab state wanted to absorb large numbers of Palestinians, 
but neither was any Arab state genuinely devoted to the 
Palestinians' struggle for their own state in their own 
homeland.
The Palestinian problem has become an ingredient of 
inter-Arab relations and of the inter-Arab political game. 
The call for Arab unity for the sake of the Palestinians 
has been a mere slogan; in fact the Palestinian problem 
has exacerbated inter-Arab divisions. The exacerbation 
became acute when the PLO itself was incapable of control­
ling its extremist members who were trying to establish a
new Hanoi in the Middle East, seeking an Arab capital 
that could accommodate their activities on a full scale. 
None of the Arab states was willing to provide such 
accommodation because of their fear of Israeli vengeance 
falling on any Arab Hanoi. It was accordingly not 
surprising that Lebanon, the country that had least power 
to drive out the PLO or to contain its movements, should 
become the site of the Arab Hanoi and the latest victim 
of this problem, violently demonstrated in the civil war 
of 1975-76. As matters stand at the end of 1976, the 
most recent lesson of the Palestinian problem for the 
Arabs has been the demonstration of how much can be 
achieved by the ruthless co-operation of the three major 
Arab states. Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, acting under 
the banner of the Arab League, but making sure its 
machinery serves their purposes.
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CHAPTER VI 
Conclusion
In this thesis we have examined the fundamental 
obstacles that have defeated the cause of Pan-Arabism, 
leaving the Arab states to work for a less elevated goal, 
that of co-operation. It remains to consider why no 
/single Arab state has been able to find a way round these 
obstacles and lead the Arab peoples towards union, i.e., 
to play the role of Prussia in the creation of Germany.
The roots of the struggle between the centrifugal 
and centripetal forces in Arab politics lie in the differ­
ent interpretations of the origin of Arab nationalism.
Some Arab writers placed it in remote pre-Islamic history 
and others preferred to find the origin in the emergence 
of Islam itself. Some Arab writers saw Islam as the 
product of Arabism, while others preferred to say that 
Arab nationalism could not have existed without Islam,
The writers who have been markedly influenced by western 
culture have attributed the emergence of Arab nationalism 
to the forces introduced into the Arab world when Bonaparte 
landed in Egypt in 1798. Whatever the historical origins 
of Arab nationalism all have agreed that in the modern 
era, nationalism is a matter of feeling of belonging to 
one nation, with the Arabic language, historical memories, 
a common culture and way of life as the main ingredients 
of this feeling. Despite this agreement, different inter­
pretations of nationalism have resulted in different pref­
erences, either to Pan-Arabism or Pan-Islamism. This 
diversity of doctrines and interpretations is the first
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centrifugal force in Arab politics,
A further manifestation of this force is the variety 
of proposals that have been put forward by Arab writers 
for the bringing about of Arab unity by peaceful means.
These proposals may be gathered in two main groups. The 
first was the Islamic revivalism expressed by the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Mahdi 
movement in the Sudan. The second group was more var­
iegated, It included suggestions for Arab, rather than 
Islamic, cultural revivalism which might intensify the 
self-awareness of the Arab nation, and also suggestions 
on hov/ Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism might be reconciled 
in a democratic system characterised by variety and 
tolerance. But unity of culture, language and common 
historical memories cannot by themselves bring about Arab 
unity; what is required to translate all these unities 
into a political unity is the political will of the Arab 
leaders. This in turn raises the question of how the 
unifying political power is to be achieved, whether by 
force, as Saudi Arabia might desire, or by free compe­
tition, as advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
Islamic political parties. The former can intensify 
cultural, linguistic and even ideological unity by the 
exercise of political power, while the latter approach 
sees political power as the result of cultural unity.
Bearing in mind this tension between Islamic revivalism 
and Pan-Arabism, the political will of Arabs as a whole 
must be seen as the subject of struggle between mainly 
traditionalist conservatives and the progressives. Lack 
of compatibility between the two is another centrifugal
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force of Arab unity.
This incompatibility gives rise to a variety of 
ideologies, which means in the Arab context a matter of 
serious dispute. Not only are these disputes between 
conservatives and progressives: the conservatives and
traditionalists are rivals among themselves, with the 
Hashemites against Saudi Arabia and the latter against 
the Hamiduddin House. These quarrels have overshadowed 
all talk of Arab unity and eventually reduced the aspir­
ations of Pan-Arabism to mere co-operation among states, 
as in the Arab League.
The democratic solution which might have reconciled 
Arab rivalries and created the conditions of co-existence 
has failed to rally the Arab leaders. The solution 
itself had different connotations for different political 
systems. An economic democracy which would favour the 
working classes was unacceptable to the oil-rich Arab 
countries because it would work at the expense of the rich 
states. The propagation of this solution by the Baath 
and Nasser, as a socialist path for Arab national move­
ments, had the immediate result of deepening disputes 
among the Arabs themselves. Thus unified political will 
was not attainable by means of economic democracy. 
Furthermore, those who believed in a similar socialist 
path could not themselves unify their movements into one 
organised party to cover the whole Arab world. They are 
divided between Baathism, Nasserism, Algerian socialism, 
Yemeni socialism, and Libyan socialism. Proposals have 
been put forward to unify them into one movement but the 
socialists themselves have failed to unify their political
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will to come together. These movements are rivals to 
one another; none of them is allowed to survive in the 
region of others, especially as each state believes in a 
single political party and denies the principle of free 
competition between various political parties. As far 
as the conservative regimes are concerned, the idea of 
political party does not exist at all. Thus the possib- 
/ility of achieving political will of the Arab masses 
i through political organisation has no place in Arab 
politics.
The different times and circumstances in which the 
various Arab states have achieved their independence have 
also had divisive effects. Arab nationalism has found 
expression in the various stages of pre-independence, 
independence and post-independence. In all three stages, 
the Arabs have failed to unify their movements so as to 
further the cause of Pan-Arab unity. The cases of 
Lebanon and Syria in 1942-46 offer an example of the 
limits of the capacities of Arab nationalism in the pre­
independence period. As we have discussed in Chapter III, 
inter-Arab rivalries were a centrifugal force working 
against the unification of either the Fertile Crescent 
or Greater Syria, or even Minor Syria, not to mention the 
hindrances which they created for Arab co-operative efforts 
to help those countries to attain their independence. In 
the end it was British troops which forced French colonial 
power to recognise Syrian independence. As another ex­
ample we can see how, after the formation of the Arab 
League, Arab states showed little enthusiasm for partic­
ipation in actual fighting side by side with, say, the
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Algerian rebels. Their participation was expressed in 
the form of diplomatic efforts in the United Nations and 
moves to win over world wide public opinion, in arras 
supplies and financial backing; the burden of fighting 
was shouldered by the Algerians themselves. Lack of 
actual military involvement must be attributed mainly 
to the weakness of Arab states vis-a-vis French military 
and economic strength, but the geographical factor - the 
remoteness of Algeria from the Arab Middle East - was 
also a factor, Arab unity against the colonialists was 
also undermined by the fact that Egypt, the strongest of 
the Arab states, was distracted by bitter quarrels with 
other Arab states and successive conflicts with Britain 
and her allies in the Arab world. It was not surprising 
that the Algerians considered themselves as Algerians 
first, Muslims second and Arabs third.
If actual involvement in brothers’ armed struggles 
for their independence was impossible, forced integration 
by military intervention in other Arab states also ended 
in failure, e.g., the Egyptian intervention in Yemen.
The withdrawal of the Egyptian troops was a precondition 
of her peaceful relations with Saudi Arabia, and the with­
drawal signified at least that the Egyptians were not strong 
enough to play the role of Prussia in the creation of Arab 
unity. Inter-Arab regrouping had a share in weakening 
the Egyptian efforts in this respect, and the Egyptian 
withdrawal from Yemen also signified that the value which 
the Arab League Charter had placed on the sovereign 
independence of all existing Arab states had at last 
prevailed in inter-Arab relations.
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The second stage of Arab nationalism is as an ex­
pression of independence. The Arabs had not collectively 
launched their struggle for independence to cover the 
whole area whose people had a feeling of belonging to 
one nation, because they came under different colonial 
powers at different times. The achievement of indepen­
dence by separate states gave these states a feeling of 
local nationalism, e.g., Sgyptianism was different from 
Tunisian political sentiment in 1954 when Tunisia was 
still under French rule. After independence it was easy 
for pre-independence enthusiasm for Arab unity to wither 
and eventually become formalised in the already instit­
utionalised form provided by the Arab League, which the 
newly independent states could now join.
In the third stage, when all the Arabs were ruled 
by separate sovereign states, the task of unification 
became even more difficult. The rich oil countries were 
conservative traditionalist, and had rarely joined in 
even the calls for Pan-Arabisra, preferring in the case of 
Saudi Arabia, the doctrine of Pan-Islamisra. The poor 
Arab states called for Pan-Arabisra and adopted socialism 
as the means of solving their economic problems. These 
contradictions could result only in negative inter-Arab 
relations. Furthermore, different political ideologies 
led to different political, economic and security prefer­
ences, leading to divisive friendships with the Western 
and Eastern worlds. Stable inter-Arab relations might 
have been helped by stable international relations in the 
world as a whole, but as things happened Arab ideological 
differences were exacerbated by the East-West Cold War.
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Leaving aside the external factors, the nature of inter- 
Arab groupings and regroupings with all their volatility 
had had corrosive effects on Arab alignments and had made 
them too unstable to sustain long term unification,
A, Paris, a political scientist, had looked for a 
single Arab state which could play the role of Prussia 
in forging Arab unity.(1) This state would have to be 
capable of tipping the balance in the struggle between 
the centrifugal and centripetal forces of Arab unity 
which had resulted in the perpetuation of the status quo.
He did not explain why he saw a "Prussian role" waiting 
to be filled, but there is an obvious parallel between 
Germany before 1870 and the existence of numerous Arab 
states which had been fragmented during the course of 
centuries into separate dynastic and regional states and 
were striving for unity following their achievement of 
independence - especially as their struggle had resulted 
so far only in the formation of the Arab League which 
reinforced their separateness. The role of Prussia may 
be desirable as an alternative means to the end of Pan- 
Arabism, if only because collective efforts, compromises 
and collective bargaining among different Arab political 
systems and ideologies had failed to attain this Objec­
tive, But even the strongest member-states of the Arab 
League lack the strength to bring about this unity in the 
way the Prussians had created German unity. Only Egypt 
has anything approaching the necessary capabilities and 
her power has never been equal to the task.
(1) N.A, Faris, op.cit., p.261. See also p. 118
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Egypt's national power is to some extent an attribute 
of her geographical location. Nasser had acknowledged 
his awareness of the importance of this element in his 
book, The Philosophy of Revolution, whore he described 
Egypt as occupying the central position in three circles, 
those of the Arab, African and Islamic worlds, as well as 
being a meeting place, crossroads and military corridor 
of world importance. The second geographical factor of 
some Importance is the Nile River, which provides Egypt 
with permanent irrigation and relatively favourable 
conditions for the agricultural production of export 
commodities (e.g. cotton) and wheat, rice and sugar for 
local consumption. The building of the Aswan High Dam 
has enabled Egypt to increase the area of arable land and 
her capacity for hydroelectric power, as well as creating 
a fishing industry on the artificial Lake of Nasser,
The Egyptian industry is considerably more advanced 
than that of other Arab states, both in traditional 
manufactures (cotton spinning and weaving, sugar and 
cement) and the new industries (fertilizers, rubber tyres, 
pulp and paper, iron and steel, and automobiles).(2) In 
addition, although Egypt has a tiny amount of oil compared 
with Saudi Arabia, it is enough to meet the demands of 
local consumption.
The Egyptian population is the largest among the Arab 
peoples, and concentrated within the Nile Valley. It is
(2) Bent Hansen, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic
Development : Egypt. Colombia University
Press, New York, London, 1975, 
pp.137-139, 203-298
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big enough to give the Egyptian government man-power to 
be recruited into the military services, and cheap labour 
to work in industries. Qualitatively, the Egyptians are 
simple in their way of life, emotional and forgiving at 
the same time (except in blood feuds) liberal, if compared 
with Saudi Arabians, not sufficiently educated in religious 
affairs but more advanced in mundane subjects and so able 
to provide teachers, doctors and engineers to many Arab 
countries as well as a civil service which is capable of 
taking control of the Arab League. The Egyptian morale 
is highly integrated and strongly supports government 
programmes as well as strengthening the administrative 
machinery. This has been tested three times, in the 
defeats of 1956 and 1967 and after the death of Nasser in 
1970, when the Egyptian people have shown a steady deter­
mination to support their government’s inter-Arab policies.
Egyptian military might is the strongest among the 
Arab armed forces in terms of the number of men, quantity 
of weapons, training, leadership and morale. Egypt had 
been tested militarily several times both by Israel and 
in the conflict in Yemen: admittedly she has usually lost,
but never so badly that she did not retain her military 
leadership. Perhaps Egypt's strongest asset has been her 
ability to produce national leaders not only for the 
Egyptian people but also for the Arab world. President 
Nasser was one of the outstanding leaders in recent history 
but it is probably unfair to attribute Egypt’s national 
power to merely one national leader in isolation from other 
elements. One may ask, in order to illustrate the effects 
of these elements, what could Nasser have done if he had
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been born in Yemen? The natural elements of national 
power which are permanent, have more weight than any single 
person. Egypt had played the role of Arab leader before 
Nasser, when Nahas Pasha took over the initiative of the 
movement of Arab unity in 1943.(3) Any new regime would 
probably have been welcomed as an improvement on Farouk’s 
and Nasserism, as a creed, was rather shallow; neverthe- 
/less, the secret of Nasser's charisma was probably that he 
was able to express the aspirations of the Egyptian people 
and was capable of making them enthusiastic about his 
programme of Pan-Arab unity.
With these advantages, what had Egypt to fear from 
other Arab countries, particularly Iraq and Saudi Arabia?
As we have seen in Chapter III, the first advocate of the 
movement of Arab unity was Nuri al-Said of Iraq in the 
early 1940's; but his proposal came to a standstill and 
was taken over by Nahas Pasha who succeeded in achieving 
the formation of the Arab League. This implies that 
Iraq was not in a position to claim Arab leadership because 
of her location at the far end of the Arab world, her 
limited economic resources, her national morale as well 
as her internal instability (the Iraqi population is 
divided between Sunni and Shi'i doctrines and between Arab, 
Turkoman and Kurdish peoples). The same is true with 
regard to Saudi Arabia, Although she possesses the largest 
resources of oil (which Nasser described as a nerve of 
civilisation) oil was and is her only commodity and prob­
ably the only nerve on which her national power depends.
(3) See Chapter III, pp.41-42
Further indication of Saudi Arabia's lack of the quality 
of leadership is that although she was among the biggest 
oil producers, the initiative was taken by the Iraqi 
Government to establish OPEC, and the first unilateral 
decision to increase oil prices was taken by Libya. The 
recent use of oil as a political weapon was made possible 
by collective efforts. These two countries, Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia, are not capable of replacing Egypt's Lead­
ership of the Arab world; but they can stop Egypt from 
exercising it effectively and this vulnerability to 
blocking tactics is what has kept Egypt from playing 
the role of Prussia.
Egypt's geographical location has brought disad­
vantages as well as advantages for Egyptian national 
power, especially during the Cold War. Both the Eastern 
and Western blocs were trying to exert their influence 
on this corridor to Africa and Asia; if they could do 
this in cooperation with Egypt, so much the better, if 
not, they would make the attempt regardless. The 
example of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal illus­
trated each bloc's attitude towards Egypt, The Eastern 
bloc seized on Egypt's disputes with the West to demonstrate 
its friendly intentions with arms supplies and later with 
a military presence. This friendship was coupled with 
qualified declarations of support for Nasser's Pan-Arab 
movement. Western treatment of Egypt has been much 
more forceful at times. These external actions have 
focused attention on Egypt's position of leadership, but 
they have weakened her to some extent and helped force 
her into an unwanted degree of dependence on the Soviet
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Union,
Many of Egypt's failures and misfortunes can be 
explained as mistakes. Looking at Nasser's policy of 
Pan-Arab unity, it was often provocative to the West, 
especially to the US with its acceptance of Eastern 
arms and the Soviet loan for the Aswan High Dam, to the 
British Government, with the nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal, and to France, with Nasser's help to the Algerian 
guerillas, as well as being provocative to Israel in the 
form of fedaiyeen raids. Not all these actions were 
strictly necessary. In inter-Arab relations, Nasser 
allowed himself to be provoked by the Baghdad Pact into 
an Egyptian-Iraqi war of propaganda which was the starting 
point of the Arab cold war. In other words, from 1954 
to 1958, Nasser antagonised four strong states and one 
of his own cousin states, and caused three of them to 
join forces in an attempt to bring him down. This 
hardly compared with Bismarck's policy.(4) Later, in 
inter-Arab relations, Nasser at the peak of his power in 
1958-1931, involved himself in bitter disputes with almost 
all the Arab states in the Middle East, in the Lebanese 
civil war, the attempted coup in Jordan, with Saudi Arabia 
and Iraq (both with Nuri al-Said and Qasim) with the Sudan 
and also with the Soviet Union concerning the Iraqi Commun­
ists. Again, only a supremely powerful state could have 
afforded to take this dangerous road to unity.
The quality of Nasser's diplomacy was low because of
(4) Helmut Bohme, The Foundation of the German Empire,
Select Doçiimentsÿ translated'by G. ”Ramm, 
Oxford Ü.P., New York, London, 1971, 
p. 138
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his excessive use of propaganda rather than alliance with 
his fellow Arab leaders. His approach to Arab unity was 
to antagonise in order to polarise, instead of consolid­
ating his brotherly relations with Arab states to achieve 
the eventual objective of Arab unity. As a matter of 
fact, Nasser followed two parallel lines in his inter­
national and inter-Arab relations. In the former his 
diplomacy was to challenge the external powers in order 
to attain the independence of various parts of the Arab 
world and indeed he succeeded in this respect. In the 
latter, as the policy of challenge to expel the external 
powers succeeded, it began to have effects in inter-Arab 
relations, the very reverse of what Nasser intended.
Nasser eventually realised that for Egypt, Pan-Arab unity 
was unrewarding and costly, and he started to return to 
his original policy of "Egypt for the Egyptians", keeping 
his inter-Arab relations within the formal framework of 
the Arab League's charter. This policy has been con­
tinued and strengthened by President Sadat. Thus Egypt's 
national power was unable to overcome the contradictions 
between the centrifugal and centripetal forces in Arab 
politics; it rather intensified the acuteness of the 
ëfruggle, deepened inter-Arab rivalries and speeded up 
and destabilised the shifting nature of Arab relations 
of brotherhood, cousinhood and enmity.
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